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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes practices of science and technology in the early United
States as windows onto the American Enlightenment. Although scholars have emphasized
the important impact of Enlightenment thought on the American founding, the
historiography tends to argue for the decreasing influence of the Enlightenment on
American culture as the nineteenth century progressed. In addition, scholars tend to see a
decline in American science after Benjamin Franklin as nineteenth-century Americans
began to focus primarily on the practical problems of everyday life. I question these
interpretations by connecting scientific practice in the Early Republic with transatlantic
Enlightenment thought and analyzing American conversations about knowledge creation
in practical pursuits such as agriculture. I place American science in the context of
Enlightenment debates about how human beings could create knowledge, or
epistemology. This part of the dissertation involves a review of American exposure to
such Enlightenment thinkers as John Locke, David Hume, and Thomas Reid. Then, I
conduct several case studies of different kinds of science in America, including
agriculture and natural history, and I analyze how Enlightenment epistemology informed
the practice of these sciences. Finally, I consider how Enlightenment epistemology and
American scientific practice shaped American discourse about political economy and
political philosophy. In books and pamphlets that discussed political topics, American
writers attempted to support their arguments by applying what they saw as proper
epistemological methods. Through discussion of these aspects of science, I show that the
v

Enlightenment continued to make its mark on American culture throughout the early
nineteenth century.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the historical imagination of western civilization, few developments loom
larger than the Enlightenment of the long eighteenth century. Few concepts, however,
have inspired such diverse interpretations. For some scholars, the Enlightenment
constituted a definitive break from the mysticism and religiosity of previous ages and led
to the rise of religious toleration and objective science. For others, the Enlightenment
enshrined a narrow rationalism that culminated in the development of racist and
genocidal ideologies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Still others have defined
the Enlightenment as an explosion of print culture and commerce that created
transnational networks of people through the exchange of goods and the written word.
The diffusion of the Enlightenment presents another contentious issue. To what extent did
the style, attitudes, and ideas of the Enlightenment extend beyond savants in the salons
and learned societies of London and Paris? Did the common people experience the same
Enlightenment as the philosophes, or any Enlightenment at all?
Historian Robert Darnton reflected on these differing interpretations by
characterizing two approaches for studying the Enlightenment. The first, epitomized by
the synthetic work of intellectual historian Peter Gay, took the philosophical writings of
major thinkers as the main source for investigating the Enlightenment. In Gay’s
Enlightenment, Darnton argued, the disciples of reason ushered in modernity by
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questioning the foundations of religious belief. The second approach, led by French
historians of the Annales school, “[located] the Enlightenment by not looking for it,” as
Darnton put it.1 These historians went to more mundane sources; they reviewed cheap
pamphlets and almanacs rather than philosophical treatises. Considering the ideas
contained in these less prominent sources, Darnton explained, resulted in a more
complicated portrait of the eighteenth century that questioned its status as the “Age of
Reason.” Darnton thus called for a reconsideration of the Enlightenment that produced a
new social history of ideas; no longer could historians understand the Enlightenment only
by analyzing the great books of the long eighteenth century.
Around the same time as Darnton’s challenge to produce this social history of
ideas, historians of early America were writing new interpretations of the American
Enlightenment. Henry F. May and Donald H. Meyer both produced monographs
published in 1976 that attempted to define and describe the American Enlightenment.
Reflecting Darnton’s call for a more nuanced interpretation of the Enlightenment, both
authors eschewed defining the Enlightenment as a unitary phenomenon. Both, however,
made the tension between religion and Enlightenment a key element of their analysis.
May defined Enlightenment thinkers as those who contended that, through the proper use
of the human faculties, mankind could achieve progress in many pursuits. This definition
thus excluded from the enlightened category those persons who turned to “revelation,
tradition, or illumination” as the primary sources of truth. Very few people outside of the
colonial and early national elite, May stated, could be considered enlightened under this
definition because of the primacy of Protestantism in American culture.2 May went on to
1. Robert Darnton, “In Search of the Enlightenment: Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of
Ideas,” The Journal of Modern History 43, no. 1 (March 1, 1971): 124.
2. Henry F. May, The Enlightenment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), xiv–xv.
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develop a four-period chronology of the Enlightenment in America. Around the
beginning of the nineteenth century, what May called the “Didactic Enlightenment,” led
by Scottish philosophers of the Common Sense school, succeeded in ensconcing itself in
American culture. Institutionalized in American colleges, the Common Sense school
reacted against the skepticism and radicalism of thinkers like David Hume and JeanJacques Rousseau by defending “the intelligible universe, clear and certain moral
judgments, and progress.”3 Meyer argued that Americans produced a particular variant of
the Enlightenment through their interaction with European ideas. In brief, the particular
conditions of early America gave rise to an American Enlightenment that emphasized the
practical applications of ideas over speculative theorizing. Like May, Meyer saw the
American Enlightenment turning in a conservative direction around the start of the
nineteenth century in response to the radicalism of the French Revolution.4
May and Meyer considered a variety of topics within their analysis of the
American Enlightenment, including religion, morality, and politics. The two said very
little, however, about science in early America, especially after 1800. For May and
Meyer, the achievements of natural philosophers like Newton may have inspired
Americans to adopt an experimental method in religious, political, and social inquiries,
but with the exception of Benjamin Franklin’s electrical experiments, Americans did not
produce much scientific work. May, for example, saw the early nineteenth century as a
period of decline in American science as the state and federal governments provided
almost no support for scientific studies. The rise of egalitarian democracy in this period,
May argued, made it difficult to justify government support for elite men of science.5
3. Ibid., xvi.
4. Donald H. Meyer, The Democratic Enlightenment (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1976).
5. May, The Enlightenment in America, 1976, 308–9.
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Historians of the European Enlightenment also took up the call for a
reconsideration of the long eighteenth century. Summarizing the results of this research,
Dorinda Outram wrote that scholars could no longer define the Enlightenment as a
coherent intellectual movement with clear goals. Instead, scholars should see the
Enlightenment as “a series of problems or debates, of ‘flash-points,’ characteristic of the
eighteenth century.”6 This framework conceptualized the Enlightenment as a process of
working out various problems in society rather than a fixed ideology. Armed with this
reworked concept of Enlightenment, historians pursued Darnton’s agenda of interrogating
the movement and exchange of ideas in arenas far from the philosopher’s closet, such as
coffeehouses, salons, the popular press, fraternal organizations, and the state. As part of
this endeavor, historians looked to the practice of science in Europe. In an analysis of
science in the Enlightenment, Thomas L. Hankins argued that “the Enlightenment was
not a fixed set of beliefs but a way of thinking, a critical approach that was supposed to
open the way for constructive thought and action.” Hankins identified a key
epistemological shift in theology in the late seventeenth century. Whereas in the Middle
Ages theologians had relied on pure reason to deduce truths about God, the seventeenth
century saw a turn to the study of external nature as a revelation of God. As a result, in
the Enlightenment, “reason changed from the methods of formal logic to those of the
natural sciences, and the laws of reason became identical with the laws of nature.”
Hankins, drawing from his earlier study of the French mathematician and natural
philosopher Jean d’Alembert, argued that mathematical methods provided the essential
structure of this new science of nature.7 Outram agreed with Hankins that the natural
6. Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3.
7. Thomas L. Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
3, 16; Thomas L. Hankins, Jean d’Alembert: Science and the Enlightenment (New York: Gordon and
Breach, 1970).
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sciences constituted one of the important flash-points within the Enlightenment. She
observed that because natural science lacked the high status that it would come to enjoy
in the twentieth century, men and women of science in the eighteenth century had to face
many thorny questions about how to pursue knowledge.8 In introducing a volume of
essays on European science during the long eighteenth century, William Clark, Jan
Golinski, and Simon Schaffer commented that previous studies of European science
during the Enlightenment had focused on highly localized subjects or on the development
of specific scientific disciplines. These frameworks failed to connect the particular topics
with the broader Enlightenment context. Still, the authors of these studies assumed that a
future synthesis would reveal a singular Enlightenment “mind” that drove the various
practices of science in this period. Revising this method, Clark, Golinski, and Schaffer
argued that the Enlightenment was “now seen not as some mind or spirit, but rather as
something projected, circulated, and negotiated day by day by agencies such as the
‘Republic of Letters.’” The three thus advocated for case studies of science that revealed
particular kinds of Enlightenment in different times and places. For example, a series of
essays in the volume discussed the rise of quantitative measurement techniques to impose
discipline on practices of science during the Enlightenment.9
From the beginning of the twenty-first century to the present, scholars of science
in the European Enlightenment continued to give their subject more and more diverse
shades of color and, for the most part, abandoned the attempt to discern a singular mind
or ideology of Enlightenment. For example, Jessica Riskin revised the account of the rise
of empirical science during the Enlightenment in her study of French “sentimental
8. Outram, The Enlightenment, 48.
9. William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer, “Introduction,” in The Sciences in Enlightened
Europe, ed. William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1999), 16, 21, 26.
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empiricists.” In discourses about knowledge during the eighteenth century, many
philosophers rejected the existence of innate ideas and instead grounded all knowledge on
sensory experience. But contrary to interpretations of this empiricism that saw it as an
emotionless consideration of facts, Riskin argued that French empiricists recognized that
experience involved both sense impressions and the feelings engendered by those
impressions. As Riskin concluded, “knowledge grew not from sensory experience alone,
but from a combination of sensation and sentiment.”10 In a similar manner, Adelheid
Voskuhl analyzed the construction of anthropomorphic automata in the late eighteenth
century and interpreted these machines as representative not of a cold mechanistic
philosophy but of a culture of sentimentality that placed great importance on feelings as
well as sensory perception.11
The last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first
saw another reexamination of the American Enlightenment. Much of the work during this
period continued to maintain a focus on the tensions between religion and the
Enlightenment in early America, but some scholars questioned this framework that set up
religion and Enlightenment as rival camps. Robert A. Ferguson, for example, analyzed
the rhetoric of the American Revolution and found that the success of the uprising
required both religious and enlightened discourses working together to achieve a
consensus.12 John Fea’s study of Philip Vickers Fithian, a College of New Jersey (later
Princeton) graduate who tutored children of Virginia planters in the middle of the
eighteenth century, drew out the tensions between Fithian’s traditionalism and his desire
10. Jessica Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility: The Sentimental Empiricists of the French
Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 4.
11. Adelheid Voskuhl, Androids in the Enlightenment: Mechanics, Artisans, and Cultures of the Self
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
12. Robert A. Ferguson, The American Enlightenment, 1750-1820 (London: Harvard University Press,
1997).
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to become enlightened.13 In a similar manner, J. Rixey Ruffin considered the case of
William Bentley, a Massachusetts minister in the Early Republic who constructed a
uniquely enlightened brand of Christianity that put him in conflict with evangelical
sects.14 Finally, Nina Reid-Maroney directly challenged the traditional interpretation of
the Enlightenment’s opposition to or tension with religion in her study of enlightened
Philadelphians in the colonial and early national periods. She argued that, for Benjamin
Rush and his fellows, Calvinist doctrines and Scottish Enlightenment epistemology
reinforced one another in their doubts about the ability of finite human minds to know
perfectly the truth about God or the natural world. In this case, then, Christianity and
Enlightenment worked hand-in-hand; enlightened Philadelphians did not see the need to
reconcile the two. Unlike other scholars who had given short shrift to science in America,
Reid-Maroney made Philadelphia’s interaction with natural philosophy and medicine a
key aspect of the city’s Enlightenment.15
Other historians unpacked American interaction with various strands of the
Enlightenment and the influence of these ideas on multiple arenas beyond the tension
between religion and reason. Sari Altschuler, reflecting the turn to the study of
sentimentality with the Enlightenment, analyzed how Benjamin Rush conceptualized the
Early Republic as a living, breathing body rather than a sterile machine. Altschuler
argued that Rush understood that this body politic needed to be regulated by the action of
sympathy, an important concept that grew out of the Scottish Enlightenment.16 Eran
13. John Fea, The Way of Improvement Leads Home: Philip Vickers Fithian and the Rural Enlightenment
in Early America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
14. J. Rixey Ruffin, A Paradise of Reason: William Bentley and Enlightenment Christianity in the Early
Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
15. Nina Reid-Maroney, Philadelphia’s Enlightenment, 1740-1800: Kingdom of Christ, Empire of Reason
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2001).
16. Sari Altschuler, “From Blood Vessels to Global Networks of Exchange: The Physiology of Benjamin
Rush’s Early Republic,” Journal of the Early Republic 32, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 207–31.
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Shalev traced the influence of celestial metaphors, and particular the Newtonian model of
the universe, in American political rhetoric up to the Civil War.17 Similarly, Richard
Striner analyzed the various uses of the Newtonian universe in the politics of Europe and
America.18 William Huntting Howell explored the image of Philadelphia astronomer
David Rittenhouse as emblematic of the disinterested man of science and republican
citizen.19 Colleen A. Sheehan revealed the importance of French Enlightenment thought
for James Madison’s analysis of the role of public opinion in a republic.20 Daniel D.
Blinka considered the Scottish Common Sense roots of American lawyer Simon
Greenleaf’s analysis of the credibility of the writers of the Gospels.21 Finally, Gail S.
Murray’s examination of children’s literature in the Early Republic found that many of
these books contained Lockean assumptions about the importance of beneficent
experience in the instruction of children.22 These studies revealed an early America that
engaged deeply with the broader Enlightenment on a variety of fronts.
In addition to scholars that interrogated America’s interaction with the
Enlightenment, several historians demonstrated how America and its people shifted
practices of knowledge creation in the colonial and early national periods. Susan Scott
Parrish’s study of natural history in the British Atlantic world showed how the
empiricism of the Enlightenment provided space for white colonists, African slaves, and
17. Eran Shalev, “‘A Republic Amidst the Stars’: Political Astronomy and the Intellectual Origins of the
Stars and Stripes,” Journal of the Early Republic 31, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 39–73.
18. Richard Striner, “Political Newtonianism: The Cosmic Model of Politics in Europe and America,”
William and Mary Quarterly 52, no. 4 (October 1995): 583–608.
19. William Huntting Howell, “A More Perfect Copy: David Rittenhouse and the Reproduction of
Republican Virtue,” William and Mary Quarterly Third Series 64, no. 4 (October 2007): 757–90.
20. Colleen A. Sheehan, “Madison and the French Enlightenment: The Authority of Public Opinion,”
William and Mary Quarterly 59, no. 4 (October 2002): 925–56.
21. Daniel D. Blinka, “The Roots of the Modern Trial: Greenleaf’s Testimony to the Harmony of
Christianity, Science, and Law in Antebellum America,” Journal of the Early Republic 27, no. 2
(Summer 2007): 293–334.
22. Gail S. Murray, “Rational Thought and Republican Virtues: Children’s Literature, 1789-1820,” Journal
of the Early Republic 8, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 159–77.
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Native Americans to contribute to the pursuit of knowledge about the natural world. In
previous Enlightenment scholarship, these groups were seen as either outside the sphere
of Enlightenment or as mere collectors of facts and specimens that European savants
would analyze to produce scientific knowledge. Parrish inverted this center-periphery
model of knowledge creation and placed people in America at the forefront of the
analysis.23 Kathleen Murphy followed Parrish with an examination of how white
naturalists translated the “vulgar” knowledge of Indians and Africans in the New World
into legitimate matters of fact.24 She also analyzed the slave trade as a source of
specimens and facts for natural history.25 With a similar emphasis on how travel shaped
natural knowledge, Frederik Albritton Jonsson took a look at Swedish naturalist Pehr
Kalm’s voyage to North America and his reliance on the testimony of local residents to
understand the changes in climate that occurred in North America over time.26 Margot
Minardi’s consideration of a smallpox epidemic in Boston in the early eighteenth century
revealed how Cotton Mather relied on the testimony about smallpox inoculation from his
slave Onesimus to argue for the propriety of inoculating Bostonians against the disease.
Minardi’s analysis of the role of African knowledge in this case provided another
example of diffuse scientific authority in America; elite whites did not have sole access to
creditable knowledge in this period.27 Other historians shed light on the impact that
Native American knowledge had on various areas of inquiry. Sarah Rivett contended that
23. Susan Scott Parrish, American Curiosity: Cultures of Natural History in the Colonial British Atlantic
World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 8, 314–15.
24. Kathleen S. Murphy, “Translating the Vernacular: Indigenous and African Knowledge in the
Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic,” Atlantic Studies 8, no. 1 (March 2011): 32.
25. Kathleen S. Murphy, “Collecting Slave Traders: James Petiver, Natural History, and the British Slave
Trade,” William and Mary Quarterly 70, no. 4 (October 2013): 637–70.
26. Frederik Albritton Jonsson, “Climate Change and the Retreat of the Atlantic: The Cameralist Context of
Pehr Kalm’s Voyage to North America, 1748–51,” William and Mary Quarterly 72, no. 1 (January
2015): 99–126.
27. Margot Minardi, “The Boston Inoculation Controversy of 1721-1722: An Incident in the History of
Race,” William and Mary Quarterly Third Series 61, no. 1 (January 2004): 47–76.
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the study of Indian languages in the seventeenth century prompted several European
thinkers to rework the philosophy of language. In European encounters with the strange
tongues of Indians, philosophers came to argue that languages grew out of the social
conventions of particular societies. No longer could words be seen as direct
representations of ideas.28 Amy Morris showed how colonial Americans employed Indian
stories and myths to argue that fossilized bones and teeth found in New York belonged to
an ancient giant.29 Similarly, Cameron B. Strang, in a study of the Florida borderlands in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, argued that Indian storytelling formed
an important part of the construction of natural knowledge in that region.30 Finally,
Christopher Steinke examined a map created by the Indian leader Too Né that provided
an alternative geography of the land that Lewis and Clark explored in their famous
expedition.31 The work of these scholars demonstrates that the Enlightenment cannot be
conceived as only the movement of ideas from Europe to peripheral areas; instead, the
periphery actively participated in the creation of knowledge and even shaped the contours
of that knowledge in significant ways.
James Delbourgo’s study of electricity in early America made the most successful
attempt to date to connect the practice of science in America to the Enlightenment
context. In an analysis of the many ways in which Americans interacted with electricity,
from experiments that passed electricity through human bodies to the construction of
lightning rods to investigations of electric eels, Delbourgo concluded that the American
28. Sarah Rivett, “Learning to Write Algonquian Letters: The Indigenous Place of Language Philosophy in
the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World,” William and Mary Quarterly 71, no. 4 (October 2014): 555.
29. Amy Morris, “Geomythology on the Colonial Frontier: Edward Taylor, Cotton Mather, and the
Claverack Giant,” William and Mary Quarterly 70, no. 4 (October 2013): 701–24.
30. Cameron B. Strang, “Indian Storytelling, Scientific Knowledge, and Power in the Florida
Borderlands,” William and Mary Quarterly 70, no. 4 (October 2013): 671–700.
31. Christopher Steinke, “‘Here Is My Country’: Too Né’s Map of Lewis and Clark in the Great Plains,”
William and Mary Quarterly 71, no. 4 (October 2014): 589–610.
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Enlightenment was “ecstatic and antinomian.”32 Far from seeking the “rational mastery”
of nature, Americans celebrated the wonder and complexity of nature; they accepted that
humans could never achieve a complete understanding of nature.33 Along the same lines,
this attitude toward science reflected an American distaste for the centralization of
knowledge and power.34 In a discussion of Edward Bancroft’s observations of the electric
eel, for example, Bancroft portrayed himself as a more trustworthy authority about the
eel’s electrical properties than European men of science who had never seen the beast.35
Delbourgo thus continued the reassessment of the Enlightenment that had added more
diverse shades to the portrait of the long eighteenth century.
Over the last few decades, then, scholars have fractured the once solid unity of the
Enlightenment. As one result of this movement to reveal the heterogeneity of the
Enlightenment, the practice of science has come to the forefront as one of the key flashpoints of the long eighteenth century. But with the exception of Delbourgo’s work, this
more nuanced conception of the Enlightenment has not informed the study of science in
the Early American Republic. The dismissal of science in the Early Republic stems from
a longstanding interpretation of nineteenth-century Americans that portrayed them as
concerned only with practical matters and distrustful towards the pronouncements of elite
intellectuals.36
This dissertation seeks to add to the effort to expand our understanding of the
Enlightenment in America by considering the interaction between Enlightenment ideas
32. James Delbourgo, A Most Amazing Scene of Wonders: Electricity and Enlightenment in Early America
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 10–11.
33. Ibid., 282–83.
34. Ibid., 280–81.
35. Ibid., 180.
36. Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1965), 271–312; Perry Miller, Nature’s Nation (Cambridge: Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 1967), 4–9.
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and scientific practice. Unlike previous studies of the American Enlightenment, however,
it focuses primarily on the first half of the nineteenth century in order to demonstrate that
the questions raised in the eighteenth century continued to have resonance in this period
and that science in America did not die with Franklin. With the fracturing of the
Enlightenment, John M. Dixon has warned that the concept of the Enlightenment in
America has become so loose and vague so as to “render the Enlightenment incoherent.”
Dixon argues that the refusal to define the Enlightenment as a set of ideas has erroneously
reinforced the notion that Americans cared little for philosophy or ideas in general. Too
much focus on social practices and culture, he explains, has left historians blind to “the
very question of what the Enlightenment is.”37 This dissertation attempts to address these
concerns by grounding the analysis in an examination of the particular Enlightenment
philosophers that Americans interacted with in libraries. Only after laying a foundation
with an investigation of Enlightenment epistemology in America will the dissertation
move on to specific practices of science through case studies of such topics as
agriculture, astronomy, and natural history. I thus attempt to combine both the ideas of
Enlightenment and the practices of Enlightenment. The variety of scientific practices
considered in this dissertation will, I hope, avoid the pitfall that Clark and his co-authors
identified of constructing a narrow topical or disciplinary history that does not address
the wider Enlightenment themes that specific practices reveal.
Before commencing this examination, I must clarify the terms that I will use
throughout the dissertation. As David Cahan has pointed out, the long nineteenth century
saw the transition from a pursuit called “natural philosophy,” which included practices of
37. John M. Dixon, “Henry F. May and the Revival of the American Enlightenment: Problems and
Possibilities for Intellectual and Social History,” William and Mary Quarterly 71, no. 2 (April 2014):
276, 275, 278.

12

natural history, to a variety of activities concerning the study of the natural world that
were all subsumed under the term “science.” In the nineteenth century, various sciences,
such as biology, physics, and geology, began to define themselves as separate disciplines,
and the notion that all of these investigations were conducting something called “natural
philosophy” fell out of favor. Specialization marked the development of science in the
nineteenth century. These natural sciences also grew farther and farther apart from the
concerns of philosophy and theology, and so “science” lost its former association with
knowledge generally and came to refer only to the study of the natural world.38 The
period examined in this dissertation fell right in the middle of these shifts in the
conception of science, and so I will use the term “science” to denote various kinds of
knowledge rather than a specific method of investigating the natural world or a particular
discipline. Indeed, the figures analyzed in this dissertation spoke of such inquiries as the
science of the human mind, the science of morals, and the science of government,
concerns far from the specialized natural sciences of today.
Each chapter of this dissertation addresses an open question in the history of the
American Enlightenment. Chapter Two conducts an analysis of the presence of
Enlightenment philosophers of mind in a selection of American libraries in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Starting with the particular epistemological
treatises found in American library catalogs, the chapter characterizes the kind of
Enlightenment that Americans imbibed. This chapter specifies the particular
Enlightenment philosophers, primarily English and Scottish empiricists, that Americans
read to understand how the mind worked and what human beings could actually know. In
38. David Cahan, “Looking at Nineteenth-Century Science: An Introduction,” in From Natural Philosophy
to the Sciences: Writing the History of Nineteenth-Century Science, ed. David Cahan (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2003).
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this way, the chapter attempts to bring the ideas of the Enlightenment back to center
stage.
Chapter Three explores the issue of empiricism through a discussion of attempts
to found experimental farms in the early nineteenth century. I argue that the promoters of
experimental farms employed a brand of empiricism that questioned the ability of
ordinary farmers to achieve progress in the science of agriculture. The chapter thus
demonstrates how Americans applied the empiricism of Enlightenment philosophers to
the practical problems of agriculture.
Chapter Four uses the American career of mathematician and astronomer George
Blackburn as a window onto the place of the mathematical sciences in the Early
Republic. I argue that Blackburn’s advocacy of mathematical methods in education and in
surveying projects clashed head-on with Americans’ preference for the practical and
useful over the abstract and theoretical.
Chapter Five discusses the uses of empirical evidence in urgent moral and
political questions. In the early nineteenth century, Americans received word of the
discovery of two ant species that enslaved other ant species. The discussion of this
peculiar fact from nature entered the American discourse about the South’s peculiar
institution. In particular, this fact raised the question about whether it was
epistemologically valid to draw an analogy between the slavery of the insects and the
slavery of man.
Chapter Six examines the career of Peter A. Browne, a Philadelphia man of
science in the early nineteenth century, as a practitioner of the inductive method of
science advocated by many of the Enlightenment philosophers of mind. Browne’s
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scientific work reflected the concerns of natural history, such as measurement, collection
of facts, and classification of natural objects.
Chapter Seven argues that the epistemological concerns of the Enlightenment
went beyond the practice of natural science and entered the realm of political philosophy.
Through an analysis of the kinds of reasoning employed in the political treatises of the
Early Republic, this chapter shows that the questions raised during the Enlightenment
continued to have resonance throughout the early nineteenth century and outside of
natural science. The chapter concludes with an analysis of Alexis de Tocqueville’s
observations of the democratic mind of Americans. Far from seeing Americans as
uncritical and unconcerned with ideas, Tocqueville argued that the democratic mind
moved in a dizzying manner from particular ideas to general ideas, with little in between.
Tocqueville thus provides an account of Americans that does not deny their Enlightened
status, but instead reveals the specifically American brand of Enlightenment formed in
the New World.
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CHAPTER 2
REPUBLICS OF KNOWING: THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE
EARLY UNITED STATES
Introduction
With the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, the United States began its life as
a nation in the late Enlightenment. The long eighteenth century had seen a flurry of works
that questioned how human beings could come to know the world around them. How
could one determine the validity of different kinds of evidence? Under what conditions
could the testimony of others be trusted, and why? These questions seemed particularly
pressing because of the rise of new thinking in natural philosophy, especially Newton’s
work on gravitation and motion, and the emergence of deism and religious skepticism in
some quarters. In short, who or what possessed authority in the creation of knowledge,
and why did they have that authority?
To understand the intellectual context for American science in the early republic,
we must explore the particular strands of Enlightenment thought to which Americans
exposed themselves. The Enlightenment contained a great variety of ideologies and
perspectives, so determining the particular kind of Enlightenment that Americans
experienced will help to put American science in context. The catalogs of American
libraries in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century provide one window onto this
interaction between Americans and the Enlightenment. For this analysis, I have reviewed
16

catalogs published in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries from the Library
Company of Philadelphia, the American Philosophical Society library (located in
Philadelphia), the Boston Library, the Boston Athenaeum, and the Charleston Library
Society.39 With the exception of the American Philosophical Society, these libraries
operated on a subscription basis, with members usually paying a yearly fee for access to
the library’s collections. The catalogs for these libraries thus reflect the interests of the
polite reading public in three major cities of the Early Republic. Following a discussion
of the works that appeared in these library catalogs, I analyze American responses to this
literature to demonstrate that Americans did not passively accept the findings of
Enlightenment authors but actively engaged in the discourse on knowledge.
For the most part, Enlightenment epistemology in America argued for an
empirical and inductive method that followed the evidence towards general conclusions.
Much of the literature, especially commentaries on the method of Isaac Newton, warned
against the formation of hypotheses prior to the analysis of facts from nature. The ins and
outs of this empiricism, however, found many Enlightenment authors at odds. In
39. Charleston Library Society, A Catalogue of Books, Belonging to the Incorporated Charlestown Library
Society, with the Dates of the Editions (Charlestown, S. C.: Robert Wells, 1770); Library Company of
Philadelphia, A Catalogue of the Books, Belonging to the Library Company of Philadelphia; to Which
Is Prefixed, a Short Account of the Institution, with the Charter, Laws and Regulations (Philadelphia:
Zachariah Poulson, Junior, 1789); Boston Library, Catalogue of Books in the Boston Library. January
1, 1795 (Boston, 1795); Charleston Library Society, A Catalogue of Books Belonging to the Charleston
Library Society (Charleston: W. P. Young, 1806); Charleston Library Society, A Catalogue of Books
Belonging to the Charleston Library Society (Charleston: W. P. Young, 1811); American Philosophical
Society, Catalogue of the Library of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for
Promoting Useful Knowledge (Philadelphia: Joseph R.A. Skerrett, 1824); Boston Atheneum,
Catalogue of Books in the Boston Atheneum: To Which Are Added the By-Laws of the Institution, and a
List of Its Proprietors and Subscribers (Boston: William L. Lewis, 1827); Boston Library, Catalogue
of Books in the Boston Library, June, 1830: Kept in the Room Over the Arch in Franklin-Place
(Boston: John H. Eastburn, 1830); Library Company of Philadelphia, A Catalogue of the Books
Belonging to the Library Company of Philadelphia; To Which Is Prefixed, a Short Account of the
Institution, with the Charters, Laws, and Regulations, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: C. Sherman & Co.,
1835); Library Company of Philadelphia, A Catalogue of the Books Belonging to the Library Company
of Philadelphia; To Which Is Prefixed, a Short Account of the Institution, with the Charters, Laws, and
Regulations, vol. 2, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: C. Sherman & Co., 1835).
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particular, the clash between David Hume’s skepticism and Thomas Reid’s Common
Sense philosophy featured prominently in American intellectual discussions.
The Philosophy of Mind
The library catalogs contained many books that specifically addressed the natural
sciences, such as Newton’s Principia Mathematica and Buffon’s Histoire naturelle. In
addition to these “scientific” works, the catalogs listed a number of books that considered
how human beings could gain knowledge of nature in the first place. These works on the
philosophy of mind addressed the thorny problems of what constituted good evidence,
the conditions for trusting that evidence, and who had the authority to produce good
evidence.
The works on the philosophy of mind that appeared in early American libraries
can be divided into four general categories. First, British empiricists made up a
significant portion of these libraries’ collections. Inaugurated by John Locke and revised
by David Hume and James Hutton, this empiricist tradition held, broadly, that experience
served as the foundational source for all human knowledge. Besides this general claim,
however, these authors differed greatly on how exactly the mind operated on and used
this experience. Second, George Berkeley developed an epistemology of immaterialism.
Although Berkeley emphasized the importance of experience in securing knowledge of
the world, he broke dramatically with the line of British empiricists by arguing that
sensations did not derive from physical things made up of matter but directly from the
will of God. Third, a number of authors, including Thomas Reid and James Beattie,
constituted the Scottish Common Sense school. In response to the British empiricists,
these philosophers argued that an instinctive faculty present in all human beings of sound
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mind, Common Sense, was the source of human knowledge. Common Sense
philosophers contended that experience, although important, could not provide support
for many propositions that human beings knew were true. Finally, the Marquis de
Condorcet provided an account of knowledge that emphasized the creation of
mathematical theories to explain both natural and human phenomena. Although he
subscribed to the basic outlines of Locke’s empiricism, Condorcet’s epistemology
dispensed with the nagging doubts present in the British empiricists’ writings and boldly
argued for the unlimited progress of human knowledge (see table 2.1).
Previous scholarship on the presence of Enlightenment literature in American
libraries supports the focus on these authors. David Lundberg and Henry F. May have
constructed a statistical database of Enlightenment works in 291 American libraries from
1700 to 1813. These scholars included books that appeared in booksellers’ sale catalogs,
college libraries, circulating libraries, subscription libraries, and private libraries. Locke’s
Essay Concerning Human Understanding appeared in 45 percent of the libraries
surveyed, while Locke’s Works (which included the Essay) appeared in 17 percent.
Hume’s Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (which included the epistemological
treatise An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) appeared in 26 percent.
Berkeley’s Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge appeared in four
percent. Reid’s Enquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense
appeared in 14 percent, while his other epistemological work, Essays on the Intellectual
and Active Powers of Man, appeared in 17 percent. Finally, Condorcet’s Outlines of an
Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind appeared in 11 percent. Thus, many
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of the authors analyzed in this chapter had at least some representation in libraries across
colonial and early national America.40
Before commencing with an analysis of the intricacies of these philosophers’
accounts of epistemology, we should place them in the context of the American
Enlightenment generally. Henry F. May has argued that the Enlightenment came to
America in four waves. In chronological order, May labels these four the “Moderate
Enlightenment,” the “Skeptical Enlightenment,” the “Revolutionary Enlightenment,” and
the “Didactic Enlightenment.” The Moderate Enlightenment of Locke and Newton
stressed “balance, order, and religious compromise.” Hume and Voltaire led the Skeptical
Enlightenment, which questioned the authority of religion and the ability of humans to
achieve certainty in natural and moral science. The Revolutionary Enlightenment of JeanJacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, and William Godwin sought the radical reformation of
society along more rational lines. Finally, the Didactic Enlightenment featured a
primarily Scottish response to the Skeptical and Revolutionary Enlightenments that
attempted to defend “the intelligible universe, clear and certain moral judgments, and
progress.” In May’s reading, the Didactic Enlightenment took much greater precedence
over the other strands of the Enlightenment as America moved into the nineteenth
century.41 In their analysis of Enlightenment works in American libraries, Lundberg and
May find that the 1790s saw radicals like Condorcet and Common Sense writers like
Thomas Reid make large gains in popularity. The Common Sense writers continued their
ascent into the nineteenth century as Scottish Enlightenment thought became the template
for many American college curricula.42 Richard B. Sher expands on May and Lundberg’s
40. David Lundberg and Henry F. May, “The Enlightened Reader in America,” American Quarterly 28, no.
2 (Summer 1976): 262–93.
41. Henry F. May, The Enlightenment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), xvi.
42. Lundberg and May, “The Enlightened Reader in America,” 270–71.
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analysis in a consideration of Scottish authors and their publishers in eighteenth-century
America. While May sees the Scottish Enlightenment beginning to dominate the
American intellectual scene around the end of the eighteenth century, Sher argues for the
Scottish Enlightenment wave reaching American shores around 1770.43 For example, he
finds that American publishers reprinted one in five books produced in the Scottish
Enlightenment during the second half of the eighteenth century.44 Following the end of
the American Revolution, a contingent of Scottish and Irish booksellers and printers
immigrated to Philadelphia seeking business opportunities. One of these bookmen,
William Young, placed advertisements announcing the publication of some of Thomas
Reid’s works. Young and his fellows continued the spread of the Scottish Enlightenment
that had begun around 1770.45 The analysis of Enlightenment epistemology that follows
finds significant representation for the Scottish Enlightenment, but it also considers
spokesmen from the three other waves that May identifies. Locke, Newton, and Berkeley
stand for the Moderate Enlightenment, Hume for the Skeptical, and Condorcet for the
Revolutionary.
The following sections provide an overview of these thinkers’ epistemologies by
analyzing three aspects of their philosophical systems. First, each philosopher defined the
raw materials of human knowledge. In other words, where and how could the mind gain
access to evidence? The nature of these raw materials depended on each thinker’s view of
the existence of an external world outside of the mind. Second, each thinker gave an
account of how the mind reasoned with evidence. How did the mind work with the raw
materials of evidence to discover new truths or improve knowledge? Finally, as a case
43. Richard B. Sher, The Enlightenment & the Book: Scottish Authors & Their Publishers in EighteenthCentury Britain, Ireland, & America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 594.
44. Ibid., 508.
45. Ibid., 541, 563–66.
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study of these philosophers’ varying approaches to knowledge, I consider how they dealt
with a certain variety of evidence: human testimony. Could oral or written testimony
about things beyond one’s direct experience be regarded as creditable? Here, I analyze
how each philosopher judged the authority of human testimony in advancing knowledge.
The Raw Materials of Knowledge
John Locke made his most complete statement on epistemology in An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (1689), which appeared in the library catalogs within
the anthology The Works of John Locke (1727). For Locke, the mind formed ideas and
manipulated these ideas through reason. He stressed that all of these ideas derived from
experience; each human mind came into existence as “White Paper, void of all
Characters, without any Ideas.” Experience provided the mind with ideas in two distinct
ways. First, the five senses gave men ideas of external objects. Second, each man’s
reflection on the operations of his own mind served as another source of ideas.46
Sensations produced in the mind by the external world gave clear assurance of the
existence of things outside the mind, Locke argued. He explained that sensation provided
men with simple ideas. In feeling a piece of ice, for example, a man received the simple
ideas of coldness and hardness. Even though he experienced these two ideas together in
touching the external object, his mind easily separated the two distinct simple ideas from
each other.47 Locke called “the Power to produce any Idea in our Mind” a “quality,” and
he divided these qualities into two categories. Primary qualities consisted of those that
one could not remove from some object by dividing it into smaller and smaller pieces.
Objects outside the mind possessed primary qualities like solidity, extension, motion (or

46. John Locke, The Works of John Locke Esq., vol. 1 (London: Arthur Bettesworth, 1727), 32.
47. Ibid., 1:39.
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lack thereof), and figure. Secondary qualities, in contrast, “are nothing in the Objects
themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their Primary Qualities,
i.e. by the Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of their insensible Parts.” According to
Locke, then, the primary qualities of objects “are really in them.” The secondary qualities
differed from the primary ones because they arose from the particular configuration of the
primary qualities and existed only in the mind. For example, when viewing a fire, its
primary qualities of figure and motion had an actual, real, external existence that the
mind could perceive. In contrast, the fire’s heat, a secondary quality, arose from the
particular configuration of its primary qualities, and humans experienced this particular
configuration as a sensation that he or she called “heat.” The fire’s heat and other
secondary qualities, therefore, were not really in the object; they were only in the mind.48
Despite his argument that secondary qualities existed only in the mind, Locke batted
away any suggestion that his account cast doubt upon the actual existence of external
objects. Surely, Locke offered, actually viewing the sun presented the mind with a
completely different perception of it than when one thought on the image of the sun at
night. “We as plainly find the Difference there is between any Idea reviv’d in our Minds
by our own Memory, and actually coming into our Minds by our Senses,” he stated, “as
we do between any two distinct Ideas.” In the same way, actually being burned by fire
had a completely different effect on the mind than dreaming of being burned by fire.49
Reflection provided the second means of producing simple ideas in the mind.
Through reflection on his own mind, a man received the simple ideas of thinking and
willing. Locke argued that once experience had provided a mind with simple ideas, the

48. Ibid., 1:47–48.
49. Ibid., 1:249.
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mind could combine and rearrange these ideas in infinite ways, but it could not make new
simple ideas out of whole cloth.50 All human knowledge thus derived from experience
and not from innate ideas prior to experience. Once the mind had stored up these simple
ideas, it could create innumerable complex ideas by combining simple ideas together.51
Ideas such as “Beauty,” “Gratitude,” and “a Man” served as examples of complex ideas
made by uniting many simple ideas derived originally from sensation or reflection.52
At least two additional authors in the library catalogs closely followed Locke’s
scheme of empiricism. George Gregory’s The Economy of Nature Explained and
Illustrated on the Principles of Modern Philosophy (1796) reviewed a variety of topics in
the sciences, including matter, electricity, and botany. The final section of this threevolume tome consisted of a discussion of the operations of the human mind. In this
section, Gregory, a preacher, largely followed Locke’s system of simple and complex
ideas.53 Isaac Watts’s The Improvement of the Mind also appeared in the catalogs as a
book of advice that reworked Locke’s epistemology into a practical manual for selfimprovement.54 Unlike the more systematic treatments of epistemology from Locke and
Gregory, Watts’s book offered “hints” for those looking to expand their minds and
improve their judgment.55 We will consider Watts in greater detail later when we discuss
accounts of the reliability of testimony.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Ibid., 1:32, 44.
Ibid., 1:39.
Ibid., 1:62.
G. Gregory, The Economy of Nature Explained and Illustrated on the Principles of Modern Philosophy,
vol. 3 (London: J. Johnson, 1796), 464, 470–73.
54. Isaac Watts, The Improvement of the Mind: Or, a Supplement to the Art of Logic: Containing a Variety
of Remarks and Rules for the Attainment and Communication of Useful Knowledge in Religion, in the
Sciences, and in Common Life (London: J. Buckland and T. Longman, 1787), iv.
55. Ibid., x.
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Like Locke, David Hume promulgated an empiricist account of knowledge, but
he pushed this empiricism in a more radical direction. Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding appeared in the library catalogs within the collection Essays and
Treatises on Several Subjects (1768). In Enquiry, Hume agreed with Locke that all ideas
originated in experience. For Hume, sensations supplied the mind with impressions, and
these impressions gave rise to ideas, which were fainter copies of the original impression.
“If you tell me, that any person is in love,” Hume explained, “I easily understand your
meaning, and form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that
conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion.” In the same way, looking
at an object supplied one with the impression of its appearance, and afterwards he or she
could recall the idea of its appearance. The only difference between the impression and
the idea, Hume asserted, was that the former was much livelier than the latter. Hume
concurred with Locke that although the mind could combine and rearrange its ideas in
any number of ways, it could not create new ideas on its own; it could only operate on
“the materials afforded us by the senses and experience.” Thinking of a “golden
mountain,” for instance, merely required the combination of two ideas already lodged in
most men’s minds: the idea of gold and the idea of a mountain.56 Although Hume’s
system shared elements with Locke’s, Hume made an important distinction between
impressions and ideas that Locke did not. This feature of Hume’s epistemology had
dramatic consequences for his account of inductive reasoning, which will be discussed
below.
Hume also differed with Locke on the question of the actual external existence of
objects. Nearly all of mankind, Hume admitted, assumed that the objects that impressed
56. David Hume, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, vol. 2 (London: A. Millar, 1768), 16–18.

25

themselves on the senses had an actual existence regardless of whether a person currently
perceived them or not. Strict attention to the operation of the mind, however,
demonstrated that this assumption of real existences could not hold, for “the mind has
never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any
experience of their connexion with objects.”57 This view could, Hume acknowledged,
drive thinkers into an abyss of skepticism that doubted the mind’s ability to discover a
real world underneath humans’ perceptions of the world. Hume preferred, however, to
retreat to experience as the sole guide for human knowledge. If men of science only
inferred the existence of something from inquiring into its effects and avoided a priori
theorizing, they could have some confidence in their ability to uncover knowledge about
the world.58 We will discuss Hume’s particular view of cause and effect below.
James Hutton’s An Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge (1794) contained
a critique of Locke and Hume’s theories of knowledge. Hutton, known primarily for his
work on geology, composed this three-volume treatise late in his life as a grand statement
about the “progressive” improvement of knowledge.59 In his discussion of the origin of
ideas, Hutton revised Locke’s account. In explaining his disagreement with Locke,
Hutton turned to the example of a snowball. As Hutton explained, “Mr Locke says, a
snow-ball has the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round; whereas he
should have said, it has the power to produce the knowledge or sensation of white and
cold; and that then the mind has the power to produce the idea of that knowledge.”60
Thus, Hutton used the term “knowledge” to represent the original sensations excited by
57. Ibid., 2:178.
58. Ibid., 2:189–90.
59. James Hutton, An Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge, and of the Progress of Reason, from
Sense to Science and Philosophy, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: A. Strahan, and T. Cadell, 1794), 3.
60. Ibid., 1:320.
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some object. In turn, the mind stored “ideas” that proceeded from the original knowledge
garnered from sensation. In Hutton’s account, an external thing had the power to effect a
“passion” in the mind. “But of this external thing,” he continued, “the mind has no farther
knowledge or understanding, than that it is the cause of that which in sensation is known
to the mind.” Following the production of this primary knowledge (sensation), the mind
took these raw sensations and produced ideas of such things as “extension, direction,
magnitude, [and] figure.” If we take the example of the snowball, Hutton would argue
that the visual sensations excited by it entered our mind. Then, because we have had
experience in exercising our optic faculty, we can know that the snowball takes up some
space (extension) and that it is spherical (figure). Hutton called this act of knowing such
things as extension and figure “perception.” Finally, the mind could take a third step in
the operation of what Hutton called “judgment.” In exercising judgment, the mind used
both the primary knowledge gained by sensation and the secondary knowledge gained
through perception to create new ideas of such qualities as “solidity and compressibility,
hardness and softness in bodies, and motion and rest in space.”61 Hutton thus strongly
disagreed with Locke and Hume’s schemes which saw all ideas as generated almost
directly from experience, with little action on the part of the mind itself. According to
Hutton, ideas of extension, magnitude, and figure were produced within the mind
following the excitement of sensations. As a result, Hutton argued that although external
things did have an actual existence outside the mind, such qualities as the extension,
magnitude, and figure of these things had no real external existence. They were creations
of the mind itself.

61. Ibid., 1:328–30, 340.
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George Berkeley’s 1734 edition of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of
Knowledge appeared in Philadelphia and Boston libraries. His discussion of epistemology
started from similar premises as Locke but took a completely different turn from there as
Berkeley argued for the nonexistence of matter. The “Objects of Human Knowledge,”
Berkeley asserted, consisted of ideas formed by the senses or the operations of the mind
and ideas formed by the memory or the recombination of other ideas. In addition to ideas,
Berkeley asserted that there must exist some entity that received ideas and exercised its
will in thinking on these ideas. Berkeley called this thing “Mind, Spirit, Soul or my
Self.”62 So far, Berkeley’s account of ideas resembled Locke’s. But whereas Locke
insisted on the actual external existence of objects (even though the secondary qualities
of objects only existed in the mind), Berkeley argued that objects did not exist apart from
a mind that perceived them. In other words, objects existed only as ideas. Thus, Berkeley
only allowed for two kinds of entities in the world: ideas and spirits. To those who argued
that ideas were copies or representations of external objects actually existing apart from
the mind, Berkeley answered that “an Idea can be like nothing but an Idea.”63 This
account of ideas, Berkeley argued, dispensed with Locke’s classification of primary and
secondary qualities. If every sensation the mind received was an idea, then Berkeley did
not need to assume that the primary qualities of extension and figure really existed
outside the mind while a secondary quality like color only existed within the mind. For
Berkeley, both extension and color existed only as ideas within the mind.64 At first blush,
Berkeley’s doctrine of immaterialism seemed to deny the very reality of an external
world apart from the individual human mind. Berkeley, however, resisted this
62. George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (London: Jacob Tonson,
1734), 35–37.
63. Ibid., 41.
64. Ibid., 41–42.
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interpretation of his account. “I do not argue against the Existence of any one thing that
we can apprehend, either by Sense or Reflexion,” Berkeley wrote. He merely denied the
existence of some underlying “Matter or corporeal Substance” that philosophers took to
be the root physical cause of human sensations.65 He went on to explain that just because
one human mind did not perceive some object at a particular time did not mean that all
minds did not perceive the object. Thus, Berkeley’s doctrine did not imply the continual
annihilation and creation of objects in the world.66 Furthermore, humans had no control
over the sensations they experienced. Upon opening his eyes, a man could not help but
see particular colors and shapes. A man could not will a desk to appear a different color
or shape. Where, then, did the ideas associated with the desk come from if Berkeley
denied the actual existence of matter? He answered that since ideas could only exist in a
mind or spirit, these ideas of sensation within a man’s mind must be caused by some
other spirit, which was God. The regularity and constancy of nature, Berkeley argued,
pointed to the existence of a powerful and wise God who willed that natural laws should
not change.67
Berkeley had criticized Locke’s epistemology for his insistence on the real
existence of matter. A group of Scottish philosophers, disturbed by the implications of
Hume’s revision of Locke, crafted their own response to Hume’s system. The Scotsman
Thomas Reid took the lead in this response, and this philosophical movement came to be
known as the Common Sense school. Reid and his acolyte, fellow Scotsman James
Beattie, made multiple appearances in the library catalogs. In Inquiry into the Human
Mind (1769), Reid attacked Hume’s theory of ideas as a sure route to skepticism, “which
65. Ibid., 63.
66. Ibid., 75.
67. Ibid., 163–67.
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leaves no ground to believe any one thing rather than its contrary.”68 Through a
discussion of the five senses, Reid argued that Hume’s scheme of impressions that led to
ideas missed a crucial operation that every sound mind undertook. For Hume, sensation
gave the mind impressions, and these impressions gave rise to ideas, which were fainter
copies of the original impressions. For Reid, sensation did not only generate some
passion in the mind. Sensation also led almost instantaneously to the belief that the object
of sensation had a real existence. As Reid argued, when he saw a tree, he could be
assured of the present existence of the tree. If, later, he thought on the image of the tree,
he could be assured of its past existence, but not of its present existence. Thus, Reid
contended that Hume’s scheme which defined ideas as merely less vivid impressions was
highly flawed. The mind operated completely differently when it thought on a memory
(or idea) of a visible tree than when it originally perceived the tree.69 How exactly could a
person know that what he or she perceived actually existed? Reid here appealed to the
notion of Common Sense. Take the example of a person touching a hard pillar, Reid
suggested. A man touching the pillar could feel that it was hard. But, the property of
hardness, or “the firm cohesion of the parts of a body,” was completely unlike the
sensation of hardness that the man felt. Nonetheless, touching the hard pillar immediately
compelled the man to believe that the pillar was actually hard. Reid concluded that “by an
original principle of our constitution, a certain sensation of touch both suggests to the
mind the conception of hardness, and creates the belief of it: or, in other words, that this
sensation is a natural sign of hardness.” He called this original principle man’s Common
Sense.70 A man could not use reason or point to experience to argue for his belief, but he
68. Thomas Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense (London: T. Cadell,
1769), v.
69. Ibid., 290.
70. Ibid., 83–86, 91.
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believed nonetheless. James Beattie gave a more polemical version of Reid’s argument in
An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1773). Beattie asserted that the
foundational pieces of evidence in the various sciences could only stand on man’s
common sense. For example, in mathematics, all proofs stood on self-evident axioms that
the mind immediately assented to without rigorous demonstration. “Who will pretend to
prove a mathematical axiom,” Beattie asked, “That a whole is greater than a part, or, That
things equal to one and same thing are equal to one another?”71 In the same manner, no
one could prove that man’s senses gave him information about real things actually
existing in the world, yet men naturally believed the evidence of their senses.72 Reid and
Beattie thus struck back against what they saw as the overly skeptical epistemologies of
Locke and Hume.
The Marquis de Condorcet provided a Continental flavor to the mostly British
epistemological tradition that appeared in the libraries. Philadelphia and Boston libraries
held copies of Condorcet’s Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human
Mind (1795). Formally, Condorcet’s epistemology differed little from Locke’s, and he
cited the Englishman several times in this treatise. He broke from Locke and other British
thinkers, however, in his supreme confidence that mathematical frameworks could lead to
unlimited progress in the sciences. In the introduction of Outlines, Condorcet gave a
restatement of Locke’s theory of ideas. Humans had the ability to experience sensations,
and they could separate out these sensations into simple ones. These simple ideas could
then be recalled by memory and combined in any number of ways within the mind.
Condorcet made clear that “external objects” gave rise to “certain complex sensations,
71. James Beattie, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and
Scepticism (London: Edward and Charles Dilly, 1773), 59.
72. Ibid., 64–65.
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the constancy of which, whether in their identical whole, or in the laws of their change, is
independent of himself [man].” Thus, like Locke, Condorcet had no doubt of the actual
physical existence of an external world apart from the mind.73 The rest of Outlines
consisted of Condorcet’s history of human progress, which he divided into nine epochs,
from the formation of hunter-gatherer hordes to the founding of the French Republic.
Returning to Locke in the ninth epoch of his narrative, Condorcet declared him “the first
who ventured to prescribe the limits of the human understanding, or rather to determine
the nature of the truths it can ascertain and the objects it can embrace.” Locke’s method,
Condorcet argued, led to improvements in many sciences, including those of politics and
morality.74 Condorcet also signaled his opposition to the Common Sense school. Scottish
philosophers, according to Condorcet, “attributed to the human soul a new faculty,
distinct from those of sensation and reason, though at the same time combining itself with
them; of the existence of which could advance no other proof, than that is was impossible
to form a consistent theory without it.”75 For Condorcet, this a priori assumption of the
existence of the Common Sense faculty within each person did not meet the test of
reason.
Reasoning
Once the mind had gathered raw materials in the form of sensations, impressions,
and ideas, how did the mind work with these materials to improve knowledge? Each
thinker provided his own account of reasoning.
For Locke, humans could gain knowledge only by perceiving “the Connection
and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas.” Locke identified
73. M. de Condorcet, Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind (London: J.
Johnson, 1795), 1–2.
74. Ibid., 242–43.
75. Ibid., 245.
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four kinds of agreement or disagreement. First, the mind naturally perceived that a single
idea agreed with itself and that other ideas were not this idea. Locke provided the
proposition “Blue is not Yellow” as an example of this kind of (dis)agreement. Second,
the mind noted various connections between its many ideas, even if the ideas themselves
were distinct. For example, “Two Triangles upon equal Bases between two Parallels are
equal.” Third, the mind took notice of ideas that co-existed with each other. For example,
the complex idea “gold” arose from the nearly constant conjunction of “Yellowness,
Weight, Fusibility, [and] Malleableness” in the substance that humans called “gold.”
Fourth, the mind could perceive whether or not an idea referred to something that had a
real existence outside of the mind. Locke offered “GOD is” as an example of this kind of
proposition.76
Locke divided this knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of ideas into
three categories. The first and most basic kind of knowledge was called “intuitive.” The
mind grasped this intuitive knowledge immediately, without the assistance of
intermediate ideas. In geometry, the proposition that a triangle is not a circle served as an
example of intuitive knowledge. In contrast, “demonstrative knowledge” required
“reasoning,” or the construction of a chain of intermediate ideas to arrive at this
knowledge. Thus, the proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right
angles needed several intermediate geometrical ideas to prove its truthfulness. Locke
made sure to emphasize, however, that “every step in Reasoning that produces
Knowledge, has intuitive Certainty.” In this way, although the proposition about the
angles of a triangle required several steps of agreement in various ideas to prove it,
humans could have just as much certainty about its truthfulness as the intuitive
76. Locke, Works, 1:243–44.
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proposition that a triangle is not a circle. Third and finally, Locke identified “sensitive
knowledge” as that which gave humans assurance that an external object actually existed.
Because sensitive knowledge could only tell humans that something had a real existence
(the fourth kind of agreement or disagreement of ideas), it reached to a lesser extent than
intuitive or demonstrative knowledge.77
Elaborating on the nature of this sensitive knowledge, Locke raised considerable
doubt about the ability of humans to discover certain knowledge about the physical
world. Although the senses provided humans with knowledge that things existed outside
of the mind, the senses could not form a chain of ideas that led to certainty about the
nature of the physical realm. Take for example the substance humans called “gold.” As
previously stated, humans gave the name “gold” to a substance that excited in observers
several simple ideas together (yellowness, malleableness, fusibility, etc.). Crucially,
however, “No one, I think, by the Colour that is in any Body, can certainly know what
Smell, Taste, Sound, or tangible Qualities it has, nor what Alterations it is capable to
make or receive, on or from other Bodies.”78 Or, in other words, for each simple idea
excited by a substance, there existed “no visible necessary Connection or Inconsistency
with any other simple Ideas, whose Co-existence with them we would inform our selves
about.”79 Unlike the inescapable truth that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two
right angles, ideas about the physical world, such as the laws of motion, had no necessary
connection between each other.80 In fact, humans could imagine any number of consistent
laws that governed the operations of the physical world, but these imaginary laws could
nevertheless have no resemblance to the real world as revealed by sensation. Locke
77.
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therefore argued that “all our complex ideas of them [substances] must be such, and such
only, as are made up of such simple ones, as have been discover’d to co-exist in
Nature.”81 Summing up his doubt about the ability of humans to achieve certain
knowledge of the physical realm, Locke stated that “This way of getting, and improving
our Knowledge in Substances only by Experience and History...makes me suspect, that
natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science. We are able, I imagine, to
reach very little general Knowledge concerning the Species of Bodies, and their several
Properties.”82 For the most part, this method of improving natural philosophy by
experiment and history could lead only to less-than-certain “probability,” not
knowledge.83 In contrast, however, Locke expressed great confidence that moral science
could yield definite truths. If only everyone agreed on what specific complex ideas words
like “justice” and “property” referred to, reasoning could result in unquestionable truths.
“Where there is no Property, there is no Injustice, is a Proposition as certain as any
demonstration in Euclid,” Locke argued.84
Locke thus revealed an important difference in his account of the use of reason in
moral philosophy and natural philosophy. Although Locke did not employ the word
“induction” to refer to the use of reason in natural philosophy, he clearly held that
humans could only achieve an understanding of the physical world through experiments
and observations that took note of things and qualities that appeared together. For Locke,
because no necessary connection existed between the qualities of some substance or the
particular features of the laws of motion, natural philosophers had to make do with an
experimental and historical account of the behavior of physical bodies, which could only
81.
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aspire to probability, not knowledge. In moral philosophy and mathematics, in contrast,
the use of deductive reasoning to chain ideas together could lead to certainty, or
knowledge.
George Gregory largely followed Locke’s account of reasoning. “Reasoning may
be defined as a chain of judgments, following and depending upon one another, by which
some general conclusion is attempted,” he wrote.85 Taking issue with the Common Sense
philosophers, Gregory agreed with Locke that all ideas and knowledge derived ultimately
from experience and not from instinct or Common Sense. The propositions that Common
Sense philosophers argued were based in Common Sense were actually just very closely
related to common experience. “Thus, ‘that things equal to the same thing are equal to
one another;’ ‘that nothing material exists without a cause;’ ‘that, therefore, this world has
a first cause,’ and such like, are propositions immediately connected with experience, and
therefore admitted without hesitation,” Gregory asserted. In contrast, the proposition that
the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles required a chain of reasoning to
prove its truthfulness.86 Gregory warned of the danger in using “analogical reasoning,” in
which humans put forth propositions based on “the resembling parts of complex ideas.”
As an example, Gregory turned to David Hartley’s consideration of the operations of the
stomach in different animals. A claim about the stomach in an animal based on the known
actions of the stomach in some other animal could only be trusted to the extent that the
animals resembled each other. Any sort of difference between the animals diminished the
strength of this analogical reasoning. But, as Hartley argued, “If, on examination, the
stomach, way of feeding, &c. of the second animal should be found, to sense, the same as

85. Gregory, Economy of Nature, 3:532.
86. Ibid., 3:534–35.

36

the first, the analogy might be considered as an induction, properly so called, at least as
approaching to it.”87
In his account of the operation of reason, Hume put forth a great skepticism
regarding the ability of human beings to achieve certainty in any part of knowledge.
Recall that Hume allowed for only two sorts of materials within the mind; sensation
provided the mind with impressions, and ideas were simply less vivid copies of the
original impressions. Similar to Locke, he defined three ways in which humans
associated ideas with other ideas. First, the principle of “resemblance” referred to the
similarity of some idea with another. For example, “a picture naturally leads our thoughts
to the original.” Second, the mind took note of “Contiguity in time or place.” Recalling a
single apartment in some building, for example, led the mind to think on the other
apartments in that building. Third and finally, humans associated ideas through the
principle of “Cause or Effect.” Hume provided the example that “if we think of a wound,
we can scarce forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it.”88
Hume spent much of Enquiry examining the principle of cause and effect because
of its relationship with “matters of fact.” A matter of fact, Hume argued, referred to a
proposition that asserted the actual existence of some object. Matters of fact stood in
contrast to “relations of ideas” in that the opposite of some matter of fact was not false on
its face. The propositions of geometry, therefore, constituted relations of ideas that were
true because their opposite would be absurd. In contrast, one could assert the matter of
fact “that the sun will not rise tomorrow” without logically contradicting him- or herself.
“All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded in the relation of Cause and
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Effect,” Hume stated. Thus, for example, a man could be reasonably certain that his
friend was in Paris (a matter of fact) because he received a letter from the friend (the
friend was the cause of the letter).89
But how, Hume asked, did the mind arrive at this knowledge of cause and effect
which allowed for proposing matters of fact? After all, there existed no necessary
connection between some apparent cause and some apparent effect. Take, for example, a
human’s willingness to eat an object that resembled bread and his or her expectation that
eating the object would provide sustenance. No one could point to any necessary
connection between the “sensible qualities” of bread and the “secret powers” which led to
nourishment. Nevertheless, most humans would not hesitate to eat the bread-like
substance, and they would anticipate that eating it would be attended with the
nourishment that they had experienced in the past from a similar object. As Hume
summarized, no necessary connection existed between these two general propositions: “I
have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I
foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with
similar effects.” Indeed, why could humans assume that the future would resemble the
past? The underlying nature of the world could conceivably change without their taking
notice.90
Hume proposed to solve these discomfiting doubts by appealing to “Custom or
Habit.” Many observed instances of the conjunction of a supposed cause and a supposed
effect resulted in a more firm belief that the two objects were connected. Matters of fact
thus differed essentially from what humans called “fiction” in that “whenever any object
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is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by force of custom, carries the
imagination to conceive that object, which is usually conjoined to it; and this conception
is attended with a feeling or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of the fancy.” Or,
to put the point even more strongly, “belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, firm,
steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain.”91
This explanation of the origin of the knowledge of cause and effect, Hume argued,
demonstrated why humans believed something more strongly when they had experienced
many instances of it. “The concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints its
idea more strongly on the imagination; gives it superior force and vigour; renders its
influence on the passions and affections more sensible; and in a word, begets that reliance
and security, which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion,” he concluded.92
Returning to Hume’s scheme of impressions and ideas, these repeated observations
imprinted the objects more strongly on the human mind. As an example of this habit of
mind, Hume provided the following:
When a sword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of
wound and pain strike me more strongly, than when a glass
of wine is presented to me, even though by accident this
idea should occur after the appearance of the latter object?
But what is there in this whole matter to cause such a
strong conception, except only a present object and a
customary transition to the idea of another object, which we
have been accustomed to conjoin with the former?93
Hume’s epistemology thus provided a defense of induction in the sciences. All human
knowledge about the external world, including both studies of human nature and of
matter, derived from repeated observations of conjoined objects. Philosophers, therefore,
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could never discover some root metaphysical cause for some phenomenon in nature. At
most, they could say that some object was almost always attended with some other
object. Little wonder, then, that Hume’s critics bemoaned the “scepticism” at the heart of
his philosophy.94
Whereas Locke and Hume expressed varying degrees of skepticism regarding
man’s ability to achieve certain knowledge of the external world, Hutton gave a more
optimistic account of the power of human reason. As the title (An Investigation of the
Principles of Knowledge, and of the Progress of Reason, from Sense to Science and
Philosophy) of Hutton’s treatise proposed, he viewed the human race as proceeding from
simple sensation to science and finally to philosophy. Before reviewing the particulars of
Hutton’s account of this progress through reason, we should note the fundamental
distinction that Hutton made between the knowledge of animals and that of man.
Animals, Hutton argued, had the capacity to reason, reflect, and know.95 The operations
of an animal’s mind, however, were purely instinctive. An animal burned once by fire
would avoid it for the rest of its life simply because it associated the fire with the pain it
experienced.96 Man also reasoned instinctively, but he could rise above the simple
operations of the mind that animals performed. Hutton argued that “man...is only superior
in relation to the animal, or is properly man, in knowing himself; and this is the
knowledge which, it is here, advanced, is only to be acquired in reflecting upon the
operations of his own mind.”97 Only in knowing the general principles by which he
reasoned, Hutton argued, could man progress in knowledge.
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We have already reviewed Hutton’s response to Locke’s theory of ideas, in which
Hutton argued that reason took the raw materials provided by sensation and formed ideas
like figure and extension. Figure and extension, therefore, were not inherent qualities of
an external thing but ideas formed within the mind after sensation. For Hutton, human
knowledge proceeded progressively from the simple knowledge of sensation to the
general knowledge of “science.” Hutton defined science as the generalization of one’s
ideas as opposed to one’s simple sensations.98 For example, by comparing three
quantities, A, B, and C, one could form a judgment about their relation to each other. So
one could determine that A was equal to B and that B was equal to C, but “no number or
repetition of those opinions are here considered as producing science.” One only
advanced to science when one considered the two relationships together (A=B and B=C)
and thus came to the realization that A=C.99 Hutton offered an additional example of this
process in a discussion of humans’ ideas of color. Through observing the apparent color
in objects around them, humans could obtain a general abstract idea of the color green,
for instance. The idea of green was general in that anything we see might have the color
green in it, and the idea was abstract in that it was not, strictly speaking, a “thing,” but
“only an idea in our mind.” From this understanding of the idea of green, the mind could
take a further step of generalization and produce the universal idea of color itself. “Thus
we say,” Hutton explained, “What colour has such a body? And this is the voice of
science; or we say, That every body which is perceived by means of sight, must have a
colour; and this is a general physical principle, or an abstract scientific proposition.” As a
result, Hutton argued that humans attained science only if they reasoned about the ideas
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in their minds, not about actual physical things in the world. As he put it, “science,
therefore, is the judging of pure relations, distinct from actual things, or independent of
that knowledge which is considered as constituting the reality of things.”100 Finally,
following the attainment of science, humans could proceed on to “philosophy.” Hutton
argued that “philosophy is the application of science, in the exercise of wisdom. Wisdom
is the conception of an action which is leading to an end.” In order to achieve philosophy,
humans needed to combine several sciences, for achieving some end required more than
just an understanding of the relation between things. Thus, “the philosophy of moving
things...requires the science of space, time, and number, in order to ascertain the
directions and velocities of moving bodies.”101 Hutton saw human reason as proceeding
progressively from the particular (sensations of things) to science (generalizations about
the relations between things) and finally to philosophy (the application of the sciences in
order to achieve some end).
Hutton also took issue with Hume’s account of how humans come to have
knowledge of cause and effect. Hume had argued that knowledge of the relation between
cause and effect arose purely through experience by the mechanism of custom or habit.
Hutton, in contrast, contended that reason played a vital role in producing the knowledge
of cause and effect. Take the example of one object striking another object, Hutton
proposed. The first object strikes the second object, and following the collision the first
object stops its motion while the second object moves. Hutton argued that the perception
of the first object’s causing the motion of the second object could not be a result of
simple sensation. In order to obtain the idea that some power in the first object caused the
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motion of the second, a person needed to hold the memory of the first object’s changing
its position in his or her mind while he or she observed the second object’s changing
position. Indeed, the very idea of motion itself could only arise through the use of reason,
as the mind pieced together several images of the object to perceive that the object had
changed position. Thus, the determination that the first object caused the second object to
move could only result from the use of reason on the original materials garnered from
sensation. In sum, then, Hume’s argument that the knowledge of cause and effect arose
purely from experience could not hold.102
Out of all the authors reviewed so far, Berkeley perhaps gave the most strident
defense of the method of inductive reasoning which formed conclusions based on the
consideration of many particulars. Berkeley revealed his doubts about the reliability of
deductive reasoning in his denial of the existence of abstract ideas. Whereas Locke had
insisted on the ability of the human mind to abstract simple ideas from other ideas,
Berkeley found he was incapable of doing so. For example, Berkeley found it impossible
to think of pure motion in the abstract; he insisted that when he thought about motion, he
always imagined a particular body with some color, extension, and figure changing its
position.103 Along the same lines, Berkeley expressed doubts about the ability of
mathematics to provide an accurate portrayal of ideas. Arithmetic, Berkeley argued, was
merely a system of signs used to represent things, akin to a written language. Any kind of
mathematical inquiry in which philosophers used numbers in the abstract without having
them represent actual ideas was analogous to mere wordplay that failed to discourse
about the ideas that words were supposed to represent.104 In the same way that Berkeley
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attacked the existence of a corporeal substance that purportedly supported the sensations
that humans experienced, he objected to abstract mathematics because, he argued, such
investigations went beyond the ideas received from sensation or reflection and posited the
real existence of something that was not observable by the mind.
Berkeley thus offered a defense of strict induction in the sciences. Returning to
his argument that the mind of God willed certain ideas to arise in humans’ minds,
Berkeley explained that “the set Rules or established Methods, wherein the Mind we
depend on excites in us the Ideas of Sense, are called the Laws of Nature: And these we
learn by Experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such
and such other Ideas, in the ordinary course of Things.”105 Speaking specifically about
natural philosophy, Berkeley contended that this enterprise consisted merely of “an
Induction of Particulars” that resulted in a more complete and accurate description of
how bodies behaved.106 Natural philosophers flattered themselves, Berkeley asserted,
when they pretended to have uncovered some natural cause of phenomena. In truth, he
claimed, “there is no other Agent or efficient Cause than Spirit,” and in the case of the
study of nature, this efficient cause was God, not some hypothetical entity like matter.
Take for example the theory of universal attraction promulgated by Newton. Berkeley
argued that attraction merely described the behavior of some kinds of bodies; it could not
be a root cause of this behavior. Truly, he continued, claiming that the principle of
attraction was inherent in every body took the theory entirely too far, for “in some
Instances a quite contrary Principle seems to shew it self: as in the perpendicular Growth
of Plants, and the Elasticity of the Air.” Berkeley concluded that “it seems beneath the
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Dignity of the Mind to affect an Exactness in reducing each particular Phaenomenon to
general Rules.”107 Thus, Berkeley made his case for a strict induction that took nothing
for granted but the existence of ideas and minds. Even the assumption of underlying
corporeal substance could not be admitted in philosophy. Furthermore, philosophers had
to take care not to extend their descriptions of phenomena too far so as to think that they
had discovered a universal causal principle for all observable things, for the only cause
for phenomena in nature was God.
Reid and Beattie gave an account of reasoning that made it subservient to
Common Sense. As Reid argued, reasoning acted from the “first principles” that humans
received from their Common Sense.108 To return once again to the example of
mathematics, Reid argued that the “axioms” of that science could not be proved with
reason. A man believed that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other
because his Common Sense could not allow him to think otherwise. Reason operated on
these axioms to produce “propositions,” such as the theorems about triangles that we
have discussed above. In a similar manner, reason operated on the raw materials of
perception to deduce truths about physical objects. For example, Reid perceived the
moon to be different shapes at different times. “But from these various appearances of her
[the moon’s] enlightened part,” Reid insisted, “I infer that she is really of a spherical
figure.” He came to this conclusion by using his reason to combine the several
observations of the moon at different times. This conclusion, however, did not
demonstrate that the senses were untrustworthy, just imperfect. Reid utilized evidence
gained through several instances of perception, after all, to reason about the moon’s real
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shape.109 Thus, for Reid, all reasoning ultimately proceeded from the foundation of
Common Sense. In this way, he differed significantly from Locke and especially Hume,
who declared that experience formed the foundation for all reasoning.
Reid made his break with Hume most dramatically in his discussion of how
human beings came to the knowledge of cause and effect. Like Hume, Reid also
considered the question of why humans assumed that similar causes would produce
similar effects in the present and in the future. This understanding, Reid argued, could not
result from comparing ideas (Locke) or from experience (Hume). Instead, Reid located
the origin of this understanding in human instinct, or Common Sense. Consider the
example of knowing that “a certain degree of cold” would freeze water. A person could
surely not compare his ideas of cold and hardened water to obtain this knowledge
because these two objects had no necessary connection between them. Experience might
show that cold froze water today, but why must this cause operate in the same way in the
future? Only the existence of some instinct in every person could explain why human
beings felt justified in the belief that the future would resemble the past, and that
therefore experience could indeed provide a guide for future conduct. No argument from
reason could support this assumption; only Common Sense could provide a solid
foundation for this belief. Reid labeled this belief in the “constancy of nature’s laws” the
“inductive principle.” As Reid explained, obtaining knowledge of nature was like
learning a language; as a person gained more experience in studying nature, he or she
paid less attention to the sensations (the sound of words) he or she experienced and went
immediately to the things signified (the meaning of the words) by sensations. “For effects
and causes, in the operations of nature, mean nothing but signs, and the things signified
109. Ibid., 297.
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by them,” Reid argued. “We perceive no proper causality or efficiency in any natural
cause; but only a connection established by the course of nature between it and what is
called its effect.”110 Thus, although Reid disagreed strongly with Hume as to the
justification for humans’ knowledge of cause and effect, both of them defended a highly
inductive method of natural philosophy, in which philosophers developed an
experimental and historical account of the physical world.
Condorcet’s account of human reasoning emphasized the creation of
mathematical theories that explained natural and human phenomena. Throughout
Outlines, he continually attacked those philosophers who used the authority of authors
(particularly ancient Greek authors) rather than the authority of reason to support their
claims. In his narration of the rise of printing in the West, for example, Condorcet noted
that although printing made knowledge more transferable and accessible than before, “a
proposition was not adopted because it was true, but because it was written in this or that
book, and had been embraced in such a country and such an age.” Thinkers failed to
study nature itself and instead relied on the authority of books.111 Indeed, Condorcet held
that many ancient authors held up as authorities had practiced a primitive “empirical”
science that failed to achieve “a true theory founded upon general principles, drawn from
nature, and acknowledged by reason.”112 Newton, Condorcet argued, dispensed with this
slipshod empiricism by enunciating the true method of the sciences. “He taught men to
admit in natural philosophy no other theories but such as are precise, and susceptible of
calculation,” Condorcet explained, “which give an account not only of the existence of a
phenomenon, but its quantity and extent.”113 The efforts of Newton and mechanical
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philosophers like Alembert transformed natural philosophy into “nothing more than the
art of interrogating nature by experiment, for the purpose of afterwards deducing more
general facts by computation.”114 Although some men railed against the usefulness of
mathematical theories in practical fields of application, Condorcet assured his readers that
“it is not to the profundity of these theories, but, on the contrary, to their imperfection,
that we ought to attribute the inutility or unhappy effects of so many useless
applications.” “In all the arts,” he continued, “the results of theory are necessarily
modified in practice,” but this was no reason to dispense with theories that retarded the
progress of the arts.115 Finally, Condorcet advocated the creation of a “universal
language” that could communicate “the theory of a science or the rules of an art” and “an
account of a new experiment or a new observation.”116 The gradual improvement of this
universal language would result in unlimited scientific progress. “Then would the march
of every science,” Condorcet proclaimed, “be as infallible as that of the mathematics, and
the propositions of every system acquire, as far as nature will admit, geometrical
demonstration and certainty.”117 Thus, to a far greater extent than the British empiricists,
Condorcet advocated the construction of mathematical theories in all departments of
science. He denigrated an empirical method that stressed the collection of facts over the
creation of theories. Such fact collection was necessary, he admitted, but it was of little
use without the further step of rationalizing these facts by expressing them in a
generalized mathematical framework.
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The Authority of Testimony
Until now, we have considered the basic elements of each philosopher’s
epistemology. In this section, we will examine the application of these theories of
knowledge to a particular type of evidence: human testimony. Could oral or written
reports be a creditable source of knowledge?
Locke, in his discussion of humans’ knowledge of the physical realm, argued that
in most cases a natural philosopher had to make do with less-than-certain probability, not
knowledge, because a person could not produce a chain of ideas about physical things
that were necessarily connected with each other. He analyzed the authority of human
testimony in a similar manner. Locke defined two “grounds” for probability. First, a
person could declare a proposition probable if it lined up with his or her own
“Knowledge, Observation, and Experience.” Second, a person could make a judgment
about the probability of a proposition based on “the Testimony of others, vouching their
Observation and Experience.” In determining the credibility of testimony, a person
needed to consider several factors: “1. The Number [of testimonies]. 2. The Integrity [of
the testifiers]. 3. The Skill of the Witness. 4. The Design of the Author, where it is a
Testimony out of a Book cited. 5. The Consistency of the Parts, and Circumstances of the
Relation. 6. Contrary Testimonies.” As an example, Locke asserted that if he saw a man
walk on ice, “it is past Probability, ’tis Knowledge.” If another person told Locke that he
saw a man walking on frozen water in England during the winter, “this has so great
Conformity with what is usually observ’d to happen, that I am dispos’d by the Nature of
the thing it self to assent to it.” But now, Locke continued, consider the reaction to this
report of a man who has lived his whole life in a tropical region. In this case, the tropical
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man could not combine his own experience with the report to conclude that the report
was very likely true. To determine the probability of the report’s truthfulness, the tropical
man could only rely on the six criteria of credibility for testimony. In sum, then, human
testimony could only provide grounds for judging a proposition to be more or less
probable; testimony, combined with one’s own observations, might make some
proposition extremely probable, but it could not result in certain knowledge.118
Isaac Watts presented a similar analysis of the authority of human testimony in
leading to knowledge. He emphasized the reliability of certain information gained
second-hand, without direct observation or a conformity with nature. Testimony, whether
written or oral, could be relied upon as a source of truth if it came from “wise and honest
men” or “the concurring witnesses of multitudes who have seen and known what they
relate.” Thus, Watts could say with “moral certainty” that “the tea plant grows in China”
and “the Emperor of the Turks lives at Constantinople.”119
Hume also considered the issue of whether the testimony of others could be a
reliable source of knowledge. Holding fast to the idea that all ideas and knowledge
originated in experience, Hume argued that one trusted the testimony of others if that
testimony accorded with his previous experience. For example, if a man knew through
experience that the person testifying was trustworthy, he was more likely to believe him.
Alternatively, if the content of the testimony seemed likely to be true based on previous
experience, then again the hearer was more likely to believe it. Thus, for Hume,
testimony presented the same problem as evidence based on a person’s own senses; there
existed no necessary connection between what “really” happened and a person’s report of
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what happened. A person could only justify his belief in the truthfulness of some
testimony by appealing to his “observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the
usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses.”120
Hutton also expressed skepticism about the authority of human testimony. A
“perfect judgment” about some subject could only result from “data that are complete.”
Anything short of complete data could only lead to “probability, where conjecture in
some degree takes place.” He concluded that testimony “should be examined in reason
with regard to its credibility.” But one could only form a certain judgment of the
credibility of testimony from complete data. Lacking this, one could only speak of a
probability, not a perfect judgment, that the testimony was trustworthy or not.121
Although Locke, Watts, Hume, and Hutton put forward slightly contrasting
versions of empiricist epistemology, when they turned to the issue of the authority of
human testimony, they generally argued that testimony could only result in something
less than absolute truth. The Common Sense philosophers, however, presented a much
more optimistic account of the trustworthiness of human testimony which centered on the
natural instinct of a person to trust other people. In the same manner as his discussion of
mathematical axioms and sensory perception, Reid argued that an original instinct in all
persons gave them a propensity to speak truth and a willingness to believe what others
said. Just as making any conclusion about the operation of cause and effect would be
impossible if the underlying nature of the world constantly changed, human society could
simply not endure if this instinct did not exist. To bolster this point, Reid pointed to the
general credulousness of children. Only as they grew older and gained experience did
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they start to become more suspicious of the truth of testimony. If Hume was correct that
people trust testimony because they have experience that it was trustworthy, then
“children...would be absolutely incredulous; and therefore absolutely incapable of
instruction” because they would have very little experience in judging the trustworthiness
of testimony. Yes, Reid admitted, human beings could lie and obfuscate, but these were
learned behaviors that employed the operations of reason. As people grew older, they also
learned to use their reason to judge the credibility of particular testimonies. Experience
thus provided people with beliefs that guided their judgment of the truth of testimony, but
the original instinct to trust the testimony of others originated in Common Sense, not
experience. Indeed, how could everyday life proceed at all if people in their normal
dealings did not trust the word of others? They certainly could not rigorously investigate
every last statement for demonstrable veracity.122 Beattie recounted many of these same
arguments in his defense of testimony as a source of truth. Additionally, he pointed out
that if testimony was doubted as a creditable source of evidence, then the entire edifice of
natural philosophy, “a science not inferior to pure mathematics in the certainty of its
conclusions,” came crumbling down because, in that science, “testimony is admitted as a
sufficient proof of many facts.”123 For their part, Locke and Hume would almost certainly
argue that natural philosophy’s reliance on testimony meant that its conclusions could not
aspire to the certainty of pure mathematics.
In this brief overview of the Enlightenment works on epistemology in early
American libraries, we can divide the British works into two general categories. First,
Locke inaugurated what might be labeled the classical British empiricist tradition. This

122. Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind, 336–41.
123. Beattie, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, 131.

52

group of authors, which included Hume and Hutton, sought to develop a system of
epistemology that explained how the human mind operated on the ideas gained through
sensation or reflection. Although Locke, Hume, and Hutton differed on such issues as the
origin of ideas and the role of reason in shaping ideas, they all trained their focus on the
creation and manipulation of ideas within the mind. As all three pointed out repeatedly,
the connection between external objects and humans’ ideas about those external objects
was extremely problematic; Locke went so far as to doubt the potential of natural
philosophy to become a science that could produce definite truths. Certainty could only
be found in reasoning about one’s ideas, not in attempting to tailor one’s ideas to fit the
external physical world.
Reid and Beattie represented the second group of authors, the Common Sense
philosophers. In contrast with the classical empiricists, the Common Sense philosophers
expressed much greater confidence in the ability of the human mind to discover certainty
about the external world. By arguing that all knowledge ultimately rested on principles of
Common Sense that could not be defended by an appeal to reason, these philosophers
avoided the skeptical musings of Hume, who could abide no direct and necessary
connection between external objects and passions of the mind.
Despite these differences between the two groups, operationally their two rival
epistemologies worked in an extremely similar manner. Take Reid and Hume, for
instance. Reid argued that Common Sense provided persons with an original
understanding that nature would remain constant. Therefore, inductive reasoning about
the operations of the natural world was a perfectly legitimate means of investigation.
Hume, in contrast, grounded the belief in the constancy of nature’s laws purely in
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experience, not in instinct. However, Hume also contended that inductive reasoning was
the only means of pursuing knowledge of nature, for the only way to achieve something
resembling certainty was to observe which objects were constantly conjoined with one
another. Thus, despite the contrasting foundations of each theory, they remained
operationally very similar in their prescriptions for producing knowledge.
Which Newton?
As the towering symbol of modern natural philosophy, Isaac Newton made his
mark throughout the library catalogs. His Principia Mathematica and Opticks appeared in
several of the libraries, and these works were accompanied by separate commentaries on
Newton’s philosophy by Colin Maclaurin, professor of mathematics at the University of
Edinburgh, and Henry Pemberton, an English physician (see table 2.2). In addition, the
philosophers of mind invoked Newton’s illustrious name to support their accounts of
human knowledge. A review of Newton’s presence in early American library catalogs
provides another window onto the particular discourse about epistemology that
Americans imbibed in the late Enlightenment. Through commentaries on Newton and
Newton’s presence in the philosophy of mind literature, Americans received a summary
of his work that emphasized two aspects of his philosophy. First, Newton rejected
hypotheses in favor of practicing a strict induction from observations to general
principles. Second, Newton’s mastery of geometry allowed him to penetrate the secrets of
nature in a more precise manner than a philosopher who relied only on simple
observation.
In explaining Newton’s achievement to their audiences, authors argued that he
had exceeded the natural philosophy of the ancients by proceeding from observations to
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general principles, not the other way around. Pemberton claimed that the ancient
authorities on natural philosophy “[framed] conjectures; and if upon comparing them
with things, there appeared some kind of agreement, though very imperfect, it was held
sufficient.”124 Newton took the exactly opposite track. He determined to proceed upward
from the phenomenon to “the most immediate cause” of it instead of going downward
and deducing the phenomenon from some general cause or principle.125 Maclaurin
explained Newton’s method by dividing it into two parts: analysis and synthesis. Analysis
took observations and proceeded upward to discover general causes, while synthesis
involved taking these general causes and deducing effects from them. Newton conducted
his analysis before his synthesis, Maclaurin argued, which prevented him from indulging
in the conjectures of other philosophers.126 Many of the philosophers of mind agreed with
this interpretation of Newton’s method. Locke utilized the example of Newton in an
argument against the use of maxims in philosophy. Contrary to what some believed,
Locke stated, Newton did not begin with first principles and proceed to conclusions.
Instead, Newton advanced natural philosophy “by finding out intermediate Ideas, that
shew’d the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas, as express’d in the Propositions he
demonstrated.”127 Watts identified Newton’s law of universal gravitation as one of the
“general and fundamental truths” that all men seeking to improve their minds should
know and understand. But Watts reminded his readers that “we should be very curious in
examining all propositions that pretend to this honour of being general principles: and we
should not without just evidence admit into this rank mere matters of common fame, or
124. Henry Pemberton, A View of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy (London: S. Palmer, 1728), 4.
125. Ibid., 14.
126. Colin Maclaurin, An Account of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries, in Four Books
(London: A. Millar, 1748), 8–9.
127. Locke, Works, 1:280.
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commonly received opinions.” Newton’s discoveries only ascended to the status of
general principles because he based them in sound inductions, not a priori theorizing.128
Reid perhaps made the strongest use of Newton in arguing for an inductive method of
philosophy. He asserted that the method of “observation and experiment” and the
establishment of “general rules” from these “is the only one by which any real discovery
in philosophy can be made.” Both the Principia and the Opticks, Reid argued, had
employed this method, a procedure that other men used every day to understand the
world around them. “Conjectures and theories are the creatures of men,” Reid continued,
“and will always be found very unlike the creatures of God.”129 Reid so strongly opposed
the construction of hypotheses prior to observation and experiment that he even criticized
Newton himself for indulging in unjustified theorizing on occasion. Despite Newton’s
brilliant explication of attractive and repulsive forces, the great man sometimes attempted
“to conjecture” that “all the phaenomena of the material world depended upon attracting
and repelling forces in the particles of matter.” In this case, Newton’s “love of simplicity”
led him into error, for many examples from nature (such as the crystalline forms of
certain minerals and the organized bodies of living things) demonstrated that this single
principle did not govern the whole of creation.130
For many authors, however, Newton did more than apply an inductive method in
his investigations of nature. Crucially, his mastery of geometry allowed him to present his
findings with a precision that a mere description of the celestial motions could never
achieve. As Pemberton explained, Newton had proved by “indisputable geometrical
128. Watts, Improvement of the Mind, 254–55.
129. Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind, 2–3.
130. Ibid., 370–71; L. L. Laudan, “Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological
Thought,” in The Methodological Heritage of Newton, ed. Robert E. Butts and John W. Davis (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1970), 103–31.
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principles” that all the celestial bodies gravitated towards one another. In this manner, he
had “laid open those intricacies of the moon’s motions, which no astronomer, from
observations only, could ever find out.”131 While emphasizing that Newton had proceeded
from observations to general principles, Maclaurin nonetheless admitted that
“experiments and observations, ‘tis true, could not alone have carried him far in tracing
the causes from their effects.” Newton relied on “a sublime geometry” to lead him
towards the truth.132 Of the philosophers of mind, Condorcet in particular praised Newton
for his geometrical mastery. He argued that Newton had greatly advanced philosophy by
demonstrating that all theories in natural philosophy must be “precise, and susceptible of
calculation; which give an account not only of the existence of a phenomenon, but its
quantity and extent.”133
The invocation of Newton, then, took on two faces. Authors praised Newton for
maintaining a strict inductive method throughout his work. Unlike the flawed
philosophizing of old, Newton started with no hypotheses and allowed nature to lead him
towards general principles. At the same time, Newton structured his analysis of natural
effects with a geometrical framework that provided his philosophy with far greater
mathematical precision than those that settled for a merely descriptive account of nature.
Thus, Newton rationalized empirical observations by fitting them into a geometrical
account of the universe.
John Adams Against Condorcet
Americans did not passively absorb the Enlightenment thought contained in
libraries. In the spirit of the age of criticism, Americans engaged in conversation with
131. Pemberton, A View, 17.
132. Maclaurin, An Account, 8.
133. Condorcet, Outlines, 274–75.
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Enlightenment philosophers. John Adams provides an example of this transatlantic
discourse with his hand-written annotations to Condorcet’s Outlines. Adams read the
treatise at least twice, in 1798 and 1811. His comments around these two years reflect his
reactions to Condorcet’s progressive optimism both during the French Revolution and
during the Napoleonic Wars.134 Adams, who above all else argued for the necessity of
balanced political systems that pitted the society’s various interests against one another,
tore into the philosophe for his role in promoting a unitary legislature in France during
the revolution. Commenting on Condorcet’s death at the hands of Robespierre’s Terror,
Adams blamed Condorcet for his own demise. His death, Adams argued “was Suicide by
voluntary Passion. It was an Effect of his own System of a Government in one Assembly.
It was the Fruit of the Tyranny of his own pretended...simple Majority, without a
Ballance, or Check, which he abhorred.”135
But most crucially for our purposes, Adams attacked what he saw as Condorcet’s
overly abstract and theoretical method that ignored the lessons of human history. In his
review of the advancement of science in ancient Greece, Condorcet argued that Aristotle
and Plato had inaugurated the science of political economy by providing observations on
the operations of various kinds of governments. He criticized these philosophers,
however, by asserting that this early political economy was “a science rather of facts, and,
if I may so speak, empirical, than a true theory founded upon general principles, drawn
from nature, and acknowledged by reason.” Adams could hardly contain his
bewilderment. “Is there any Science, not of facts?” he asked. “Newton’s Science is
empirical. Principles drawn from Nature, are drawn from Facts. Wt [What] is Nature but
134. Zoltan Haraszti, “John Adams Flays a Philosophe: Annotations on Condorcet’s Progress of the Human
Mind,” William and Mary Quarterly Third Series 7, no. 2 (April 1950): 230–31.
135. Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet and John Adams, Outlines of an Historical View of the
Progress of the Human Mind (London: Printed for J. Johnson, 1795), iii.
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Fact? How can reason acknowledge any Thing but facts and Inferences from facts?
Beckman and Swedenbourg were not more mystical and unintelligible than this
philosophical and mathematical Charlatan.”136 Here Adams referred to Emanuel
Swedenborg, an eighteenth-century Swedish intellectual who had experienced a religious
revelation in the middle of his life and had published accounts of his prophetic visions.137
In a similar manner, Adams reacted to Condorcet’s analysis of how the ruling class
established its dominance over the rest of society. Condorcet argued that the rulers always
attempted to create “between the masters and slaves a real difference, which shall in a
manner render nature herself an accomplice in the guilt of political inequality.”
Inequality, Condorcet held, only arose because of human machinations, and thus societies
could dispense with it by instituting governments that protected the rights of all. Adams
cast doubt on this hope. “Is there any Nation of Indians, Negroes, Tartans or Hottentots,
in which the Mass is not guided by one of its portions?” he asked.138 For Adams, the
dazzling promise of rationality to usher in a new age of equality had blinded Condorcet;
he had ignored the lessons of history, which demonstrated that a part of society must rule
while the other part must obey.
In a similar vein, Adams repeatedly blasted Condorcet’s celebration of the rare
geniuses that had advanced science and society. Adams accused Condorcet of attempting
to set up the so-called geniuses as a new aristocracy that would rule. In Condorcet’s
narration of the decline of the sciences in Arab countries during the Middle Ages, the
philosophe told of “genius abandoning nations whom it had enlightened.” Adams shot
back, “Wt [What] a Pity! that this Man of Genius, cannot be King and Priest for the
136. Ibid., 89.
137. Inge Jonsson, Emanuel Swedenborg, trans. Catherine Djurklou (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1971).
138. Condorcet and Adams, Outlines, 147.
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whole human race! Has not Genius been employed to introduce Tyranny and
Superstition, as well as to extroduce them?”139 When Condorcet complained of the
construction of a ruling class that held a monopoly on religious doctrine and scientific
knowledge, Adams asked, “Are not the Pretensions of Genius, sett up by this Visionary as
dangerous and indeed in the End a worse System?”140 Adams thus questioned whether
putting enlightened intellectuals like Condorcet in charge would actually result in a more
just society.
Common Sense and the Question of Authority
Besides this quite direct response to Condorcet that Adams crafted in the margins
of Outlines, A number of Americans engaged in a proxy battle between Hume and Reid.
The several examples of Americans engaging in this dispute demonstrate that the divide
between the two Scotsmen constituted a key issue in the intellectual life of the Early
Republic.
Benjamin Rush, the prominent Philadelphia physician, took direct aim at Reid’s
account of Common Sense in a 1791 article that appeared in The Universal Asylum. Rush
first laid out Reid’s definition of Common Sense in a quotation from the Scotsman.
Common Sense, Reid said, denoted that faculty of the mind that allowed human beings to
assent immediately to some idea as true, without the use of logic or other intermediate
ideas. This faculty, then, was not opposed to reason but in fact the first operation of
reason, the foundation on which the other uses of reason depended. The Philadelphia
doctor could not accept this account of Common Sense. For Rush, Common Sense
simply meant “the perception of things as they appear to the greatest part of mankind. It

139. Ibid., 156.
140. Ibid., 27; See also ibid., 71, 88.
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has no relation to their being true or false.” He went on to give several examples of
Common Sense, including the observation that “it is agreeable to the common sense of a
great part of mankind, to revenge public and private injuries by wars and duels, and yet
no wise or just reason has ever been given to justify the practice of either of them.” Rush
thus insisted that Common Sense varied from place to place and from age to age
depending on the particular prejudices of societies. If by Common Sense, Reid had meant
that the “five external senses” provided all healthy persons the same information, Rush
could abide this definition. But by making Common Sense the foundation of reason, Reid
had erred. In truth, Rush continued, “the principal business of reason is to correct the
evidence of our senses. Indeed, the perception of truth, in philosophy, seems to consist in
little else than in the refutation of the ideas acquired from the testimony of our senses.”
Rush’s objections to Reid’s notion of Common Sense might seem like mere quibbling
with words, but this criticism reflected Rush’s interest in establishing himself and his
fellow intellectuals as authorities over the common people. As he stated in one of his
examples of how Common Sense could run against the truth, “The common sense of
mankind has generally been in favour of established modes and habits of practice, in
medicine. Opium, bark, and mercury, have all forced their way into general use, contrary
to this common sense. Their utility is a proof how little common sense accords with the
decisions of reason, and how improperly it is supposed to be a part of that noble power of
the mind.”141 As the dean of the emerging medical profession in America, Rush made sure
to head off any suggestion that the Common Sense of common people might serve as a
route to the truth.

141. Benjamin Rush, “Thoughts on Common Sense,” The Universal Asylum and Columbian Magazine 3
(April 1791): 211–14.
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Another example of an anti-Common Sense treatise comes from James Ogilvie, a
native of Scotland who tutored children of Virginia planters. Ogilvie had a rather odd
career in America; following his stint as a teacher, he undertook a multi-city tour across
the young United States to demonstrate and promote the art of oratory.142 In 1816, he
published Philosophical Essays, a strange mishmash of a book that included papers on
various subjects and a narrative of Ogilvie’s experiences in America. One of the essays,
“On the Nature, Extent, and Limits of Human Knowledge,” put forth a Humean
epistemology and answered the objections that Reid had raised against Hume. Ogilvie
agreed with Hume that all human knowledge consisted of the recognition that some
object followed another object (the relationship of cause and effect). Reid’s attempt to
base human understanding of cause and effect in instinct, or Common Sense, could not
succeed for several reasons. First, Ogilvie accused Reid of “a recurrence to extraordinary
causes” in his reliance on Common Sense when “ordinary causes are adequate to
explain...the phenomena we are considering.” Second, “if instinct means any thing, it
must mean the anticipated sequence of one event, on the appearance or occurrence of
another, before the actual order of succession has been perceived.” But “the most
superficial observation” demonstrated that this anticipation of one object following the
perception of another object only occurred after a person had experienced the conjunction
of these two objects and not before. For example, young children could not distinguish
between “those successions of events that are casual and separable, and those that are
indissoluble.” Even in older age, thinkers often found it difficult to determine the causes
of some event, especially when several events preceded the event in question. Finally,
142. See the “Supplementary Narrative” in James Ogilvie, Philosophical Essays; to Which Are Subjoined,
Copious Notes, Critical and Explanatory, and a Supplementary Narrative; with an Appendix
(Philadelphia: John Conrad, 1816), i–xci; “Review: Philosophical Essays by James Ogilvie,” The
North-American Review and Miscellaneous Journal 4, no. 12 (March 1817): 378–86.
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Ogilvie questioned how far Reid’s idea that Common Sense provided persons with
confidence that the future would resemble the past extended. Did Reid mean “that the
future will generally resemble the past, or is this assurance confined to particular
instances?” Ogilvie asked. “A general belief, can mean only, an instinctive assurance of
this sort, in a multitude of particular instances.” Thus, a general belief only differed from
a particular belief “by the number of instances.” Reid’s lack of precision on this point did
not recommend his conclusions, Ogilvie argued.143 Although Ogilvie defended a Humean
approach to knowledge, he did not adopt his entire program. A section near the end of
Ogilvie’s essay included an argument against Hume’s rejection of the possibility of
miracles. In brief, Hume had maintained that because a miracle was by definition a
violation of the laws of nature and because all human knowledge rested on the
assumption that the laws of nature were constant, miracles simply could not occur.
Ogilvie responded that because God had constructed the laws of nature, He could surely
suspend or control these laws for the purpose of giving a divine revelation to human
beings with limited senses. Thus, miracles could certainly happen.144
Ogilvie’s exposition of epistemology prompted a response from the high brow
Boston periodical The North American Review. The reviewer of Ogilvie’s book pointed
out that Reid had agreed with Hume that human beings could not discover the “necessary
connexions in the phenomena we witness.” In other words, Reid also held that humans
could not uncover the efficient cause of some object. Reid and his followers “opposed
only the sceptical conclusions, which Hume drew from a principle they admitted.”
However, Reid “holds it to be a first principle, that there must be an efficient cause for

143. Ogilvie, Philosophical Essays, 48–49.
144. Ibid., 145–47.
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every phenomenon we witness. He is merely saving men from dreary scepticism.” The
reviewer admonished Ogilvie that he “should have understood his countryman [Reid]
better, and remembered that Hume himself may possibly better deserve the charge of
‘sophistical artifice’ than such a straight-forward observer as Dr. Reid.”145 This review
provides an example of a defense of Reid’s Common Sense philosophy and shows that
disputes over the two Scotsmen’s accounts of truth continued into the nineteenth century.
Defenses of Reid went beyond the pages of journals. As historians have noted, the
Scottish Enlightenment, and particularly its Common Sense variant, found fertile soil in
American colleges.146 Samuel Stanhope Smith, president of the College of New Jersey
(later Princeton), provides an example in the published lectures he delivered on moral and
political philosophy, which appeared in 1812. His introductory lecture took issue with
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume’s theory of ideas. Contrary to the opinion of these thinkers,
Smith argued, persons did not perceive ideas of objects, but the objects themselves.
Recalling the Enlightenment interpretation of Newton’s philosophy, Smith contended that
the insistence that humans perceived only ideas and not real things was nothing more
than a “hypothesis” that Hume and others assumed without justification. If taken
seriously, this theory implied that objects outside the mind did not actually exist.147 Smith
went on to praise Reid for striking back against the skepticism of Hume and Berkeley and
for reviving “the calm and rational dictates of the common feelings of mankind.”148
Epitomizing the attraction of Common Sense philosophy for Americans who sought a
middle ground between cold skepticism and rigid ideology, Smith concluded that “we
145. “Review: Philosophical Essays,” 401–2.
146. May, The Enlightenment in America, 1976, xvi.
147. Samuel Stanhope Smith, The Lectures, Corrected and Improved, Which Have Been Delivered for a
Series of Years, in the College of New Jersey; on the Subjects of Moral and Political Philosophy, vol. 1
(Trenton: Daniel Fenton, 1812), 20–21.
148. Ibid., 1:138–39.
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have as much reason to avoid the dangers of a weak and suspicious scepticism, as of a
bold and positive dogmatism.”149
One final example will demonstrate the American interaction with the
Enlightenment philosophy of mind literature. In 1819, The Academician, a New York
journal dedicated to educational reform, published a piece “On the Baconian Method of
Induction.” This article argued that induction, the discovery of general principles through
the analysis of particular facts, was the only “natural” method of reasoning. “No man
ever taught an other his first Induction,” according to the author. “It is a mode of
inference which the human being is prompted to make, by the very constitution of his
mind.” Unfortunately, this method, adequate for both everyday life and philosophical
speculations, had fallen out of favor until Bacon revived it in his writings. The
application of this method almost immediately led to great strides in natural philosophy,
most notably in Newton’s discoveries. Locke had then applied Bacon’s inductive method
to the science of the human mind, and Reid, “the follower of Mr. Locke,” had continued
to progress this branch of inquiry. The author notably omitted Hume from this
pantheon.150 Hume’s absence from the piece combined with the author’s insistence that
the constitution of a person’s mind prompted him or her to apply the inductive method
indicated that the author was defending the Common Sense account of epistemology.

149. Ibid., 1:27.
150. “On the Baconian Method of Induction,” The Academician 1, no. 22 (September 25, 1819): 338–39.
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Table 2.1 Appearance of epistemological works in library catalogs.
Library Catalogs
Author and
Title

Charleston
Library
Society,
1770

Locke, Works

●

Library
Boston
Company of Library,
Philadelphia, 1795
1789

Charleston
Library
Society,
1806

Charleston
Library
Society,
1811

●

Hume,
various works

●

●

Berkeley,
Principles of
Knowledge
Reid, various
works

●

●

●

●

●

Boston Library
Library, Company of
1830
Philadelphia,
1835

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Hutton,
Principles of
Knowledge

Boston
Atheneum,
1827

●

Gregory,
Economy of
Nature
Watts,
Improvement
of the Mind

American
Philosophical
Society, 1824

●

●

●

Beattie,
Essay on the
Nature and
Immutability
of Truth

●

Condorcet,
Outlines

●

●
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●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Table 2.2 Appearance of commentaries on Newton in library catalogs.
Library Catalogs
Author and
Title

Charleston
Library
Society,
1770

Library
Company
of
Philadelphi
a, 1789

Pemberton,
View of Sir
Isaac
Newton’s
Philosophy

●

●

Maclaurin,
Account of
Sir Isaac
Newton’s
Philosophical
Discoveries

●

●

Boston Charleston Charleston
Library, Library
Library
1795
Society,
Society,
1806
1811

American
Philosophical
Society, 1824

Boston
Boston Library
Atheneum, Library, Company of
1827
1830
Philadelphia,

1835

●

●

●
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CHAPTER 3
A PATTERN FOR IMPROVEMENT: PATTERN FARMS AND SCIENTIFIC
AUTHORITY
Introduction: Enlightened Agriculture
Americans in the Early Republic spilled a staggering amount of ink in discussions
about agriculture. The early nineteenth century in particular saw the proliferation of
numerous rural journals and local agricultural societies all dedicated to the improvement
of cultivation. Within these sites, Americans engaged in lively debates on every
conceivable aspect of agriculture, from plowing to animal husbandry to manure.
Agricultural writings provide an ideal subject for examining the American Enlightenment
because they contain a record of Americans engaging in critique of farming practices and
attempting to determine the best ways to achieve progress in the art. How, in other words,
could one gain the knowledge to improve agricultural practice? Agriculture thus
constituted an an arena of clashing epistemological values.
Two seemingly contradictory themes flowed through discourses about American
agriculture in the Early Republic. First, writers and orators rarely hesitated to praise the
benefits of agriculture to the country and the virtue of farmers as a class. Agriculture
formed the very foundation of civilization, according to a representative item in a
Kentucky newspaper. “If the earth produced not, where were the materials for
manufactures—where were the objects of commerce; where the wealth of nations?” the
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paper asked.151 The cultivators of the soil, furthermore, constituted the virtuous core of
the American republic. As Thomas Jefferson argued, farmers depended on “their own soil
and industry” for their livelihoods, in contrast to merchants and manufacturers who relied
on “the caprice of customers.”152 Alexander Coventry, in an 1818 address to the
Agricultural Society of the County of Oneida, New York, praised the life of the farmer as
both physically healthier and psychically happier than the physician or mechanic. While
the mechanic needed to perform his work in a cramped position detrimental to health, the
farmer exercised all parts of his body to cultivate a good crop. The physician, in order to
gain the confidence of his anxious patients, deceived them by pretending to know cures
for fictional diseases. Farmers, in contrast, did not compete for customers, and therefore
they did not need to engage in the pretensions common in other professions. Finally, the
independent husbandman formed an essential bulwark of virtue against the ever-present
threats to republican government. “When the factious or ambitious demagogue would
raise his parricidal arm, he does not follow the farmer to his plough; but finds fitter
instruments in the crowded marts of the city, where vice erects her throne,” he
concluded.153
Despite these paeans the virtues of agriculture and of farmers, commentators
lamented the sorry state of the agricultural art as practiced in America. Physician George
Logan bemoaned the lack of progress in agriculture. “It is remarkable,” he told the
Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture (PSPA) in 1818, “that whilst agriculture
has been declared by virtuous and learned men, and by the most enlightened statesmen, in
all ages of the world, as an honourable occupation, as well as the most useful in civil
151. “Agriculture,” The Medley, no. 2 (February 1803): 37.
152. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Richmond, Va.: J.W. Randolph, 1853), 176.
153. Alexander Coventry, Address to the Agricultural Society of the County of Oneida: Delivered at
Whitestown, on the 27th Day of Sept., 1818 (Utica, N.Y.: William Williams, 1819), 26–27.
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society, yet it is too generally in the hands of poverty and ignorance.”154 Logan and his
fellows in the PSPA chastised farmers who, instead of seeking new and better methods of
cultivation, followed the imperfect ways of their fathers. These traditional practices not
only prevented farmers from achieving the greatest crop possible but also destroyed the
fertility of the soil. Worn-out lands required farmers to seek fresh fields in the West, thus
draining resources from the eastern states. The preservation of a strong and independent
agricultural class, advocates of improvement argued, required intelligent experimentation
and the assistance of sciences like chemistry and geology. Only then could the art of
agriculture progress.
To effect this progress, Logan and his fellows advocated for the construction of
what they called “pattern farms.”155 Many other agricultural societies and concerned
citizens took up the call, with the proposed institutions labeled as “model farms” or
“experimental farms” in addition to pattern farms. These institutions would serve as
experimental spaces for testing crops, manures, and machinery. Pattern farms would also
provide models of enlightened agriculture that farmers could emulate to improve their
lands. Many pattern farm advocates anticipated that these spaces could form the core of
agricultural schools that would systematically instruct young men in the intricacies of
scientific agriculture. Pattern farms thus constituted an early version of the American
agricultural experiment station, but only federal support from the post-1860 Morrill Acts
and the Hatch Act would establish these stations on a permanent basis.156 This chapter,
154. George Logan, An Address on the Errors of Husbandry, in the United States: Delivered Before the
Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture, at Their Annual Meeting, January 14, 1818
(Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1818), 3.
155. Stevenson Whitcomb Fletcher, The Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture, 1785-1955
(Philadelphia: Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture, 1976), 84–90.
156. Alan I. Marcus, “The Wisdom of the Body Politic: The Changing Nature of Publicly Sponsored
American Agricultural Research Since the 1830s,” Agricultural History 62, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 12–16.
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however, does not seek to develop a pre-history of the modern experiment station.
Despite the many calls to found pattern farms in the antebellum period, the pattern farm
remained for the most part a dream rather than a reality. Instead, by considering the
attempts to found pattern farms as an example of the effort to reform American
agriculture, this chapter uses the pattern farm as a window onto the values and anxieties
of agricultural reformers. Those who argued for pattern farms sought to tame what they
saw as a disorderly and ineffective discourse about agricultural knowledge in two ways.
First, they tried to use purportedly legitimate science to uncover general laws of
agriculture. No longer, the critics argued, would a haphazard empiricism, in which every
farmer who scraped in the dirt could advise his fellows, rule the field. The pattern farm
would introduce a rational system of agriculture that could standardize farming practices
by submitting all theories to the test of experiment. Thus, the pattern farm movement
attempted to shift scientific authority from the scattered farming population to a central
institution that could pronounce on proper agricultural practice. Second, by providing a
space to train young farmers in the correct methods of agriculture, the pattern farm would
aid in transforming the ordinary farmer into a gentleman farmer who could become a
virtuous citizen in the early republic. This new class of gentleman farmers would elevate
the respectability of agriculture by raising their eyes from petty concerns about making
money to the more profound questions about the nature of creation. Enlightenment would
come to the sowers of seed. Although the promoters of pattern farms never invoked the
names of Locke, Hume, or Reid, they believed that pattern farms would succeed in
instituting an effective form of the empiricism enunciated in the British epistemological
tradition. Their efforts did not go without criticism, however. The editor of the
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Massachusetts Ploughman took issue with the proposals to found pattern farms and
articulated a rival form of empiricism. This conflict arose over disagreement about who
could creditably produce facts about farming: leisured men of science or practical
working farmers.
Republicanism, Democracy, and the Improvement of Agriculture
The attempts to institute pattern farms occurred during a period of immense
upheaval in the structure of American society. These changes provided the backdrop for
the struggle over authority revealed in the discourse on pattern farms. The elites who had
led the American Revolution and established the Constitution had intended to create a
society based on republican principles. Though they rejected monarchy and denounced
hereditary nobility, American elites did not intend to equalize the status of all citizens.
Men of merit, the elites thought, would naturally rise to the top of society, and these
gentlemen would form the ruling class of the young nation. Distinguished from ordinary
men by their superior learning and civility, gentlemen believed that they had the
necessary disinterestedness to pursue the public good, the chief goal of a republic. Even
though they engaged in moneymaking through their landholdings or in professions like
the law and medicine, gentlemen downplayed their pursuit of wealth, for they desired to
become men of leisure who did not dirty their hands with labor. Thus, many urban
professionals dreamed of retiring to estates in the country and becoming leisured
overseers of their farmlands. Some men really were better than others, the American
elites believed, and although everyone should have the opportunity to become a
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gentleman, it would be ridiculous to suppose that the distinction between gentleman and
commoner would disappear.157
As the nineteenth century progressed, this distinction became increasingly
difficult to maintain. Egalitarian democracy gradually encroached upon the republicanism
of the founding generation. Instead of pursuing the public good, as good republicans
should have, the masses focused on getting ahead. They migrated westward to take
advantage of cheap land and demanded the printing of paper money to facilitate
commerce between distant parts of the union. Americans celebrated labor, which became
a means to achieve prosperity rather than a necessary evil to avoid destitution.
Gentlemanly leisure became contemptible idleness in the eyes of ordinary Americans.
Despite the variety in occupations, everyone had to work for a living, which reinforced a
sense of the basic equality of all men. In government, the people refused to be ruled by
their gentlemanly betters, and the expansion of the franchise led to the election of “the
lower sorts” to political offices. In short, a variety of forces conspired to make America
an egalitarian society. Although great disparities of wealth and the enslavement of
millions of blacks endured, Gordon Wood observes that white Americans “came to
believe that no one in a basic down-to-earth and day-in-and-day-out manner was really
better than anyone else.”158 Thus, for ordinary Americans, it became increasingly
ridiculous that a supposed gentleman would claim superiority over his fellow men by
virtue of his education or his particular tastes.
The elitist tendencies of revolutionary-era republicanism did not disappear with
the onset of nineteenth-century egalitarian democracy, and scientific discourse in the
157. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992),
194–98, 211–12.
158. Ibid., 234.
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Early Republic reflected the deep tensions between the two. In his analysis of natural
history in the Early Republic, Andrew J. Lewis discusses the conflict between the
“democracy of facts” and the “empire of reason.” For the most part, the practice of
natural history took on the character of the democracy of facts, in which every literate
male citizen, with or without special training in natural history, could contribute his
observations to the pursuit of knowledge about nature. Some citizens, however, lamented
this sometimes rowdy democracy, which could lend creditability to absurd claims, such
as the idea that swallows dove into rivers and ponds to hibernate for the winter. A few
professors, physicians, and others, therefore, formed an empire of reason, which fought to
centralize authority in well-trained experts. In contrast to the democracy, which
prioritized the collection of facts over systematic theorizing, this empire argued that
human reasoning and experiment could provide a productive means to pursue scientific
truth.159 This divide between the democracy and the empire thus paralleled the broader
social divide between would-be gentlemen who claimed a special ability to discover truth
and the masses who resented any pretensions to superiority. The gentlemen who tried to
establish pattern farms followed a similar program in an attempt to reform the practice of
agriculture in America.
Although opinions about the specific fertilizers farmers should use or the kind of
plowing methods they should pursue varied greatly, agricultural journals and agricultural
societies almost unanimously agreed on one proposition: American agriculture was
backward, wasteful, and far behind European standards. Nicholas Biddle’s 1822 address
to the PSPA enumerated several advantages that Americans enjoyed over Europe. Rents
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and taxes for farms around Philadelphia were much lower than those for farms around
London. Farmers outside Philadelphia could also manure their fields with lime more
cheaply than their British counterparts. Despite the advantages that Americans had,
English farmers produced more and better crops, as revealed in the quantity and quality
of English crops that reached American markets. This shameful result, Biddle argued,
only occurred because Americans “will not bestow on our lands the same well directed
labour, or the fiftieth part of the capital which they [Englishmen] intrust to theirs.”160
“Poverty and ignorance” characterized the practice of American agriculture, according to
George Logan’s speech to the PSPA in 1818. Thus, gentlemen in agricultural societies felt
a pressing need to improve agriculture by conducting experiments and bringing sciences
like chemistry to the aid of agriculture.161
A major irony, however, attended the calls for agricultural improvement in the
early nineteenth century: for the most part, the gentlemen bemoaning the state of
American agriculture and suggesting steps to improvement did not actually work the land
for a living. Out of the many agricultural societies across the country, the PSPA was
probably the most active group in promoting the establishment of pattern farms. Its
membership during the early nineteenth century consisted entirely of wealthy gentlemen
who did not farm for a living. For example, James Mease delivered An Address on the
Subject of Establishing a Pattern Farm in the Vicinity of Philadelphia to the PSPA in
1818.162 Mease was a physician by training, but he rarely practiced medicine because he
160. Nicholas Biddle, Address Delivered Before the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture, at Its
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had inherited a significant fortune. Instead, he devoted his time to the PSPA and to
geology.163 As a member of the New York Assembly, newspaper editor Jesse Buel called
for the establishment of a state agricultural school.164 Buel only began farming in earnest
after he had achieved a fortune as a printer, thus giving him the resources to experiment
on his own land.165 The backgrounds of many agricultural improvers, therefore, left them
open to charges that they lacked the practical experience of the typical farmer.166 In short,
the gentlemen of agricultural societies and journals often had little firsthand knowledge
of farming, but they knew that American agriculture could and must be improved, both to
maintain prosperity over the long haul and to establish a class of gentlemanly farmers
who took an interest in that long-term prosperity.167
The gentlemen’s lack of practical farming experience resulted in a curious
mixture of scorn, modesty, and advice in public statements that urged the improvement of
agriculture. For example, General R. G. Harper’s 1824 address to the Maryland
Agricultural Society began with a tribute to the importance of agriculture in ensuring an
orderly and prosperous community but quickly turned towards a lament for the sorry state
of American agriculture. Farmers “have generally been left to grope their way in the dark;
to overcome obstacles by their individual efforts; to find out errors by the experience of
their injurious effects; and to rely for their correction, as well as for the discovery and
introduction of improvements, on single divided and unassisted exertions,” Harper stated.
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The Maryland Agricultural Society was determined to address these problems. Harper
then adopted a tone of humility while reflecting on the society’s choice to delegate to him
the duty of making the annual address to its members:
In assigning this honourable task to me, they have, I fear,
formed much too favourable an estimate of my attainments,
in this department of knowledge. If fondness for
agricultural pursuits, and a deep conviction of their
importance to the prosperity and happiness of our country,
were alone sufficient, I might claim to be in some degree
qualified...But I am sensible how much more is necessary,
and how far I am from possessing that practical and minute
knowledge on agricultural subjects, which alone would
enable me to give useful lessons to farmers. Some hints I
may be able to suggest, which perhaps would lead to future
enquiries, and point the way to useful improvements. To
this I shall confine my endeavours, leaving to skilful and
experienced agriculturists the more important and difficult
task, of guiding the practical farmer in the details of his
profession.
Despite this initial modesty, Harper went on to deliver a lengthy speech full of advice for
farmers, including admonishing them to read up on all aspects of agriculture, not just the
topics that applied to their own lands. He also called for the establishment of “a pattern
farm, where the best animals of every breed, and for every purpose, might be brought
together, for constant inspection as well as propagation; and every new improvement in
tillage, husbandry and agricultural instruments, might be subjected to the test of
experience.”168 Gentlemen adopted a similar modesty in letters requesting membership in
the PSPA. In an 1817 letter requesting membership in the society, Condy Raguet, a
prominent Philadelphia banker, wrote that he had “no pretension to the character of an
agriculturist, further than what is derived from the ownership of distant lands, and from
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the cultivation of a fine crop of oats upon a lot of ground at the upper end of Chesnut
street.” Despite his limited experience, he wished “to cultivate a taste for that... [on]
which so much of the prosperity of this nation is dependent.”169 Thus, the statements of
gentlemen in the agricultural societies paradoxically downplayed the individual’s
practical knowledge of agriculture while insisting that they knew the steps to improve it.
A critic of the gentlemen of the PSPA pointed out their distance from the needs
and experiences of typical farmers. In an 1846 article, “I. U.” complained of the
gentlemen’s obsessive focus on introducing the foreign Durham breed of cattle to
America. Practical dairy farmers in the Philadelphia area, I. U. claimed, found the
Durhams no better than domestic breeds for milk and butter production despite the
promises of promoters. Yet the PSPA continued to focus exclusively on the Durhams in
premiums offered for fine cattle. I. U. blamed the impracticality of the PSPA’s members
for their ill-advised focus on Durhams:
Look at a list of their members—active members—and see
how few among them are practical farmers: by that term is
meant men who really till their grounds in the sweat of
their own brow;—but they are mostly gentlemen, and very
liberal gentlemen too, who have acquired fortunes at
mercantile and other lucrative pursuits; and who, wearied
with the dull round of money-getting, have determined to
improve agriculture by money-spending; but who have
failed to perceive that their experiments in stock-raising
and otherwise, do not influence, because they are not
applicable to the condition of the great body of farmers,
who have not the means to follow their example, even if
they were convinced of their utility—which, however, is far
from being the case.170
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I. U. thus advanced a potentially devastating argument against the ambitions of the
gentlemen-improvers. He labeled the gentlemen of the PSPA rich dabblers who did not
understand the practical limitations and challenges of actual, working farmers.
How, then, could elite gentlemen, who admittedly did not have much practical
experience in farming, claim the authority to repair the broken state of agriculture in the
young nation? In several ways, the pattern farm supplied a partial solution to this
quandary. In the promoters’ view, the pattern farm would shift authority in agricultural
matters from a loose and scattered network of farmers, journals, and local societies to a
central institution that could give order to the practice of husbandry. Pattern farm
advocates believed that this new institution could uncover general laws or principles of
agriculture through well-documented experiments. In this way, the urban gentlemen who
did not have experience in farming would not hold themselves out as an authority in
agricultural matters. Instead, the institution of the pattern farm would take over as the
authority. Just as important, by providing places to train young farmers in scientific
agriculture, the pattern farm would transform narrow-minded and materialistic farmers
into well-rounded, high-minded, and discerning citizens. Agricultural reformers thus
sought to improve people as much as agriculture. In this way, the gentlemen clothed their
elitist critique of American agriculture in egalitarian garments. By vesting scientific
authority in an institution rather than their individual persons, the gentlemen avoided the
charge that they lacked the necessary experience to instruct farmers in a pursuit about
which the gentlemen knew little. In addition, by envisioning the pattern farm as a training
ground to create a new class of enlightened farmers, the gentlemen indicated that through
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education most citizens could rise to a higher station in society. Thus would pattern farms
bring order to the agricultural democracy of facts.
Discovering the Laws of Agriculture
In their arguments for the establishment of pattern farms, promoters put forward
an account of agricultural science that stressed the discovery of the natural laws that
governed the growth of vegetables and animals. Farmers should not follow an overly
empirical method in which they exchanged time-honored rules of thumb amongst
themselves, the pattern farm promoters argued. In Newtonian fashion, the advocates of
pattern farms saw nature as a vast, complex machine that operated according to universal
laws. All agricultural practice, they argued, should proceed from an understanding of
these laws. The complexity of nature, however, made these laws difficult to uncover.
Only through precise and well-documented experiments would nature reveal herself to
man. The pattern farm provided the space to accomplish this reduction of agriculture to
fixed laws.
The pattern farm advocates expressed striking confidence that farming, a practice
beset by varying weather, mysterious crop failures, shifting soil conditions, ravaging
insects, and numerous other intricacies, could be reduced to general laws. In an address to
the PSPA in 1818, George Logan asserted that “like all other arts, agriculture is reducible
to fixed, unalterable principles.” Just as experiments had made chemistry into “a regular
system,” agriculture could also arrive at foundational principles through “accurate, welldigested experiments.”171 In the same year, James Mease urged the PSPA to establish a
pattern farm because, through the activities of the institution, “there would not be a single
principle in Agriculture, that might not be ascertained in the space of a few years, and
171. Logan, An Address on the Errors of Husbandry, in the United States, 3–4.
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farmers in the future, and especially the gentleman farmer, would have an invariable
standard to go by, which they might rely on with certainty.”172 The Cincinnatus, a journal
published by Farmers’ College near Cincinnati, argued in 1856 that the nation needed
agricultural schools with “a sufficient quantity of ground to test experimentally the
principles and doctrines taught.” Such institutions would enable agriculturists to
“investigate understandingly the laws, numerous and complicated as they are, involved in
agricultural science.”173 In order to improve their art, agriculturists needed to work from
sound principles established through experimentation, and pattern farms and agricultural
schools formed a crucial part of this endeavor.
In addition to establishing generally valid laws of agriculture, promoters of
pattern farms insisted that the institutions would apply specific sciences like chemistry
and geology to agriculture. Jesse Buel distinguished between three different kinds of
knowledge employed in agriculture, proceeding from the least to the most rigorous:
It has been said, that agriculture is a trade, an art, or a
science. That as a trade, it requires only the exercise of
bodily power.--That as an art, it employs the understanding
and the judgment; and that as a science, it comprehends a
knowledge of natural history, of chemistry, &c. so far as
these are subservient to the improvement of husbandry. We
have many who follow the trade, less who practise the art,
and but few who understand much of the science.
As such, Buel recommended establishing an agricultural school that instructed students in
mathematics, chemistry, geology, and veterinary medicine.174 An education in these
sciences combined with practical experience working on the experimental farm attached
to the school would produce graduates prepared to farm in a truly scientific manner.
172. Mease, Address on the Subject of Establishing a Pattern Farm in the Vicinity of Philadelphia, 8.
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Former American President James Madison, the president of the Agricultural Society of
Albemarle, Virginia, circulated a letter in 1822 to agricultural societies across the Old
Dominion asking for contributions to help establish a professorship of agriculture at the
University of Virginia. This professor would supervise a pattern and experimental farm
that would provide a model of judicious management and test out new methods.
Commenting that the improvement of agriculture required a combination of “theory and
practice,” Madison argued that the current professor of chemistry at the university could
aid the future professor of agriculture in “unveiling the processes of nature to which the
principles of agriculture are related.”175 The Cincinnatus, writing more than three decades
after Madison’s appeal, also argued strongly for combining theory and practice through
the mechanism of agricultural schools. Progress would only result, the journal claimed,
“from applied science.” Thus, the nation needed “institutions that shall not be satisfied
with mere theory, but shall unite theory and practice, after a most rigid analysis of facts
and phenomena, carried forward through numerous experiments, under a great variety of
circumstances.” Pattern farms and the agricultural schools attached to them could
accomplish this application of the sciences to agriculture, resulting in “a more rational
system” of cultivation.176
In stating their reasons for establishing pattern farms, promoters held out
“science” as the key to improving American culture. The promoters mobilized the idea of
“science” in two distinct but related ways. First, as Jesse Buel argued, the sciences of
natural history and chemistry could provide insights that could lead to more effective
techniques of cultivation. Second, the science of chemistry, for example, provided a
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model by which Americans could improve agriculture. Just as chemists had made their
science into a rigorous system through repeated experiments, agriculturists could improve
their art if only they had pattern farms that could conduct experiments, derive general
principles from these experiments, and disseminate these principles to the farming
community.
The Pattern Farm in Practice: The Wheat Experiments at Farmers’ College
The pattern farm advocates distinguished their proposed method of improving
agricultural knowledge from what they saw as the disorganized and shabby method
practiced in agricultural treatises and journals. Descriptions of experiments at the farm at
Farmers’ College provide perhaps the best example of this critique of the empiricism of
the agricultural press. Founded in 1846 near Cincinnati, Farmers’ College sought to
combine classical studies of Greek and Latin with a separate scientific course of study for
young men interested in pursuing a career in agriculture.177 As part of this course, the
college established an experimental farm and botanic garden in 1856.178 Freeman G. Cary,
the former president of the college, served as the principal of the farm department. Cary
had taught at schools near Cincinnati since 1833, and he had been an active experimenter
in agriculture and horticulture. He also edited the college’s journal, The Cincinnatus,
which covered agriculture extensively.179 On the experimental farm, Cary attempted to
determine once and for all the true and correct method of growing wheat, the great staple
of the West.
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Cary justified the college’s investigations of wheat culture by pointing to the great
divergence in opinions about how to grow wheat. In an 1856 article in The Cincinnatus,
Cary reported that the faculty had conducted experiments on 48 varieties of wheat. They
had done so in part, he stated, because of the wide variety of opinions in the agricultural
literature about how the farmer should go about raising the crop. The article reproduced
several passages on wheat culture from the authoritative sources Loudon’s Encyclopaedia
of Agriculture and the American Agriculturist, a prominent rural journal. Each example
differed widely as to the number of bushels of seed per acre to sow, the best time to plant
the seeds, and the proper way to plow and harrow the ground prior to planting. “Every
man has his own way, and is as tenacious of it as he is of the articles of his religious
creed,” Cary summarized. From this diversity of opinion, how could one decide which
practices would result in the greatest yield for the least expense? In these differing
examples of wheat culture, “every law of vegetable physiology is set at defiance, with a
practice strangely diverse and opposite. This is not science. There are laws in the
vegetable, as well as in the animal world. These laws are uniform, and will, if known, by
our faithfully conforming to them, be attended with no uncertain results.”180 Cary thus
took direct aim at the empirical method that prevailed throughout the agricultural
literature. Agricultural works simply recounted the practices of the past that seemed to
have worked. The college’s experimental farm, in contrast, would determine the single
best way to cultivate wheat, for the uniform laws of nature could only allow for one
optimum solution.
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This critique of empiricism sharpened in an 1857 article. Cary criticized a
program run by the United States Patent Office that distributed foreign seeds to farmers
around the country to test whether they would grow on American soil. Most of these
seeds went entirely to waste, Cary argued, because no one had established an organized
system to make experiments, draw conclusions, and disseminate results. The most
common method of exchanging agricultural knowledge—the rural press—only
perpetuated confusion and discord:
According to the present order of things, a farmer who
cultivates one kind of land, writes to a paper that he has
adopted a certain mode of culture for a particular kind of
crop, and has met with success, and hence recommends it
to all, as the result of his ‘experience.’ Another, with soil
totally different, is highly incensed at this, for he has tried
the same mode, and utterly failed. He therefore sits down,
and with a caustic pen, contradicts him. Now the strife must
go on forever, unless science stepped in and settled the
question, just as she has done in former astronomical and
other speculations...[Science] takes into view all attending
circumstances, and estimates their bearing. Two farms can
not, under ordinary circumstances, be cultivated exactly
alike. The only way is to establish general principles by the
aid of science, and not trust to individual experience.
Much greater progress would result if the Patent Office distributed seeds only to
established and respected “agricultural institutions” in the several states. “Scientific men”
in these institutions could then test these seeds and make regular reports of their results,
leading to enlightenment instead of confusion.181 Thus, Cary and his fellows at Farmers’
College sought to shift authority from the experience of the solitary cultivator to
institutions that could make definitive pronouncements about proper practices.182
Individual farmers could perhaps do the necessary experiments to advance agricultural
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knowledge, but most of them had “neither the time, means, nor qualifications to conduct”
these trials, according to Cary. Only “under the supervision and by the direction of men
of profound scientific attainments” could agricultural experiments prove useful to
improvement. Thus, the advancement of agricultural knowledge could only occur if the
right kind of men conducted experiments, drew conclusions, and published the results.
The typical farmer, in Cary’s view, simply did not have the requisite “extensive
knowledge of the physical sciences” to accomplish this feat.183
The college’s experiments in wheat culture attempted to sort through the
conflicting methods of growing the grain in the literature and to establish definitive
guidelines that farmers could follow in the future. After trials with over 40 varieties of
wheat, Cary felt confident in stating a few generally applicable rules in a report that
appeared in The Cincinnatus. First, a variety of wheat with “a thin transparent bran”
would always command a higher price than a variety with “a thick dark one.” The variety
called “White Pirk” met the standard for thinness of bran, and the college recommended
it “for all kinds of soils.” Second, Cary considered the question of when farmers should
plant wheat seeds. According to the table that recounted the results of the wheat
experiments, the college planted 41 of the 47 varieties tested between September 23 and
25. Two varieties were planted in early November, and both of these did not ripen. The
remaining four varieties “did not vegetate.--Sowed too late.” The college, therefore, did
not test a wide range of planting dates. “Experience is uniformly in favor, all other things
being equal,” the report stated, “of sowing wheat in this latitude during the month of
September.” Planting any later than September did not give the wheat enough time to
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“tiller and root well before winter.” For the question of the time of planting, the college
drew on both its own experiments (all the varieties sown after September failed) and,
apparently, the experience of local farmers.184
Cary then turned to the highly controversial question of how deep farmers should
plant wheat seeds. Claiming to break with typical practice, Cary came out strongly in
favor of shallow planting (no more than half an inch deep): “science can develop no more
obvious truth than this, and we are assured by the most obvious tests in our experience
that practice will confirm the same as most correct and proper.” Many farmers argued for
deep planting so that the seeds might be protected from the frost, which could eject the
nascent plant from the soil. Cary claimed that these farmers were attempting to solve the
wrong problem. In the winter, the water in the soil froze, which caused the water to
expand, which resulted in the frozen water ejecting the wheat plants from the soil. The
solution, then, was not to bury the seed below the reach of frost. “How deep would it be
secure against such casualty do you suppose, Mr. Farmer?” the report mockingly asked.
Answering the question, the report estimated that the seeds would need to be planted at
least a foot below the surface, an absurd depth that would prevent the plant from ever
emerging. Instead, farmers needed to drain their lands in order to move the water away
from their fragile wheat plants. To illustrate, Cary provided cross-sectional diagrams that
depicted wheat growing in undrained land, wheat growing in drained land, and the
development of wheat when planted at different depths. This last diagram showed that
wheat planted at greater depths than half an inch did not reach near the same level of
development as wheat planted near the surface. Furthermore, the college had found that
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six weeks after planting, the product of wheat planted at the surface outweighed by a
factor of eight the product of the wheat planted two inches below the surface.185
Cary’s report on the wheat experiments thus provided farmers with generally
applicable rules to follow when cultivating the grain. The report stated its conclusions in
rather stark terms. Perhaps some of their views were mistaken, the report admitted, “but
before retraction we must have demonstration and that united with practice.” The report
then summarized its findings in a single blunt paragraph, providing rules for choosing the
seed, preparing the soil, and planting the seed. Cary made little allowance for the
diversity of situations that farmers faced. As long as the farm’s soil was of “proper
composition” for wheat, following the rules would result in a “rich harvest.”186 In this
way, Farmers’ College attempted to tame the democracy of facts by stating clear and
generally applicable rules derived from well-documented experiments. The college tried
to rationalize agricultural knowledge by providing its own (hopefully) definitive
judgment that dispensed with the innumerable claims and counterclaims of farmers that
wrote to the agricultural press.
Cultivating Land, Cultivating Men
The experimental farm at Farmers’ College sought to improve agriculture through
the application of the sciences and rigorous experiments. Promoters of pattern farms,
however, had more in mind than just an increase in soil fertility and crop production.
Along with this desire for a more rational science of agriculture, pattern farm advocates
wanted to cultivate a new kind of farmer, one who contemplated the profound secrets of
creation instead of focusing exclusively on the year’s profit. As an 1856 article in the
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college’s Cincinnatus put it, educating farmers in agricultural schools would lead to both
“the improvement of our Agriculture” and “the mental and moral elevation of those
engaged in it.”187 Learning the art and science of agriculture at a school attached to the
pattern farm, promoters thought, would transform the young farmer into a gentleman.
Pattern farms and agricultural schools would, their proponents insisted, create a
new class of enlightened farmers. Elkanah Watson, famous advocate and chronicler of the
Erie Canal, included a call for pattern farms in his 1820 history of canals and agricultural
societies in New York. Agricultural schools established in different districts across the
state could teach students the theory and practice of agriculture along with the useful
aspects of chemistry, botany, and mineralogy. Watson envisioned that men could receive
an agricultural education at a flagship institution, and then these agriculturists could teach
more students at branch schools in different locations around the state. “In the process of
time, under the operation of this benign system...the great mass of our citizens will
become scientific farmers,” he argued.188 Anthony Morris lauded the combination of
scientific studies and agricultural labor that would be required of students at a pattern
farm. The union of learning and labor in the student, he argued, would “form a character
as different from that of the uninstructed, undisciplined, and often intemperate clown, as
the free, industrious, and intelligent farmer, mechanic and laborer of a republic ought to
be, from the dependent, degraded, and ignorant slave.”189 Farmers’ College argued in the
same vein. An agricultural course that combined the teaching of scientific theory with
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experimental tests of that theory would improve the students’ minds in addition to
improving agriculture:
Through the instrumentality of the frequent and rigid
analysis made, and the various experimental tests applied,
on the farm, and in the garden, the mind would be inured to
close investigation, patient thought, and constant
reasonings; and they would induce a habit of scanning
profoundly every subject entered upon, so that, instead of
sciolists, the tendency would be to make sound thinkers,
and active and efficient men in every department of life.190
The pattern farm promoters thus sought to make a new kind of farmer that combined the
manly qualities of intelligence, reflection, industriousness, and forthrightness in the same
person. Farmers would become gentlemen.
Agriculture provided a particularly fertile subject for expanding men’s minds, the
pattern farm advocates argued. Only a proper education, however, could lead to this
happy result. In an 1825 address to the PSPA, Roberts Vaux criticized flowery pastoral
literature that gave the impression that mere residence and labor in the country inevitably
resulted in a virtuous life for the farmer. “By ascribing to mere locality all that ennobles
our nature and constitutes our best estate,” these uncritical praises of country life “arrest
the development of those principles, and the exercise of those habits, which are every
where necessary to the attainment of moral excellence.” Achieving such virtue required
an active and disciplined intellect. “To the mind opened by liberal studies, and rectified
by christian discipline,” Vaux asserted, “a country life affords abundant food for
reflection and improvement, but, without these preparations, cannot conduce to virtue,
more than the busy scenes of a metropolis.” The nation, Vaux argued, needed institutions
like pattern farms and agricultural schools to enable farmers to achieve an enlightened
190. “Difficulties and Discouragements in the Establishment of Institutions for the Promotion of Scientific
Agriculture—Plan to Be Pursued,” 168.
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view of their work.191 Pronouncements from Farmers’ College expanded on this view. In
an 1856 address during the dedication of a new building for the Agricultural Department
of the college, Cary admitted that farmers could indeed make money without much
education. Farmers, however, wasted the opportunities their profession presented when
they eschewed learning. No profession “affords the materials of a richer or more varied
culture, or a more profound and thorough development of all that constitutes true man—
and the truly great man too—than does Agriculture.” Indeed, agriculture “is the
embodiment of all science.”192 An article in The Cincinnatus earlier that year made even
grander pronouncements on this theme. Agricultural schools with pattern farms would
encourage students to employ their minds when cultivating the soil. Such an education
would “greatly elevate the present standard of man’s intellectual and social condition” by
making agriculture more than just a means to make money. Unlike mere book learning, a
student’s study of agriculture would put him in direct communion with nature, which
would give him “a power of investigation and a vigor of thought.” This contact with the
book of nature would “[turn] every object and occurrence which he meets into an
instrument of instruction, and he will find the world around him no longer a dull,
desolate, inanimate chamber, but its walls over radiant with lessons of wisdom, and every
object with which it is crowded vocal with the teaching of a divine spirit.”193 In these
statements about the intellectual possibilities of the study of agriculture, the pattern farm
promoters argued that scientific education would elevate the view of the farmer, allowing
him to rise above the petty day-to-day concerns of moneymaking and turn his attention to
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the wonder of creation. An enlightened farmer did not just raise a better crop; he
cultivated his mind by contemplating nature, the site of his labor.
Finally, advocates for pattern farms held that institutions for educating farmers
would turn them into virtuous citizens in the American republic. Giving farmers a sound
education would enable them to represent their class effectively in public offices, Jesse
Buel argued. An agricultural school “would soon furnish a body of men, whose feelings,
habits and interests would be purely agricultural—whose education would fit them to
perform the highest public trusts—and whose influence in our councils, and among the
people at large, would afford the best guarantee of a popular—of an honest
administration of public affairs.”194 Farmers’ College worried that the agricultural class
was subject to manipulation by the educated few. “Any demagogue that knows enough to
flatter their prejudices against wealth and aristocracy...is entitled to crawl into power and
use it for his own rather than his country’s good,” an 1856 article in The Cincinnatus
stated. If only farmers as a class received a high level of education, they could resist the
designs of these troublemakers.195 The pattern farm promoters sought to tame not just the
democracy of facts, but the democracy of the American polity.
In Defense of Mammon
It is tempting to see the movement to establish pattern farms as a logical and
necessary step to bring the definitive judgments of “science” to agriculture. Benjamin
Cohen points out, however, that in the early nineteenth century, agricultural writers
“[questioned] whose science was valid, the farmer’s or the philosopher’s.”196 Articles in
the Massachusetts Ploughman of 1850 provide an account of agricultural science than ran
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counter to the method proposed by the pattern farm advocates. In doing so, the editor of
the journal defended an account of science that placed authority in practical working
farmers rather than the experiments at a pattern farm. He also stood up for working
farmers who did, in fact, desire to make money and rise in society.
All the talk of bringing “science” to agriculture alerted the editor to potential
pitfalls in plans to establish pattern farms and agricultural schools. The farmers of
Massachusetts would not, and should not, take instruction on scientific agriculture from
foreign professors, he remarked. Although any agricultural school that Massachusetts
might establish should teach scientific subjects like agricultural chemistry, geology,
botany, and entomology, he wrote, the school should also employ “actual, practical,
hardhanded men to teach the best practices in Husbandry—in New England Husbandry.”
The state could identify such men by their ability “to make money by farming.”
Employing these practical farmers, who made a decent living on their own, would
prevent the school from becoming a seat of corruption by attracting ambitious pretenders
with the promise of a sinecure. Referencing the state-funded agricultural survey of
Massachusetts conducted by Henry Colman in the late 1830s and early 1840s, the editor
claimed that Colman “learned more in traversing the State as far as Berkshire, than he
had before ever learned of the Art in so short a time.” Practical and experienced farmers,
therefore, already had solid knowledge of agriculture, and they, not foreign savants,
should take the reins of any institution that sought to improve the state of the art.197
The editor of the Ploughman reiterated many of these points in a response to a
letter from a correspondent in Watertown, Massachusetts. In the letter, which the paper
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did not publish in full (“we think the writer, on reflection, would not like to have it go
before the public with his name attached to it”), the correspondent took issue with the
editor’s opposition to the employment of foreign professors in a proposed state
agricultural school. From the correspondent’s liberal quotations of Greek, the editor
surmised that “he is one of those very professors who would like employment here.” The
correspondent further “laments that we have so little of Science in the Ploughman.” The
paper noted his letter, the editor wrote, “merely to show that we have such men among us
—men who assume to know more about our agriculture in consequence of the books they
have read, than the most intelligent owners and occupiers of our best farms.” Then the
editor launched into a critique of the glamorization of science. Many foreigners, he said,
talk much of Scientific Farming. Men who cannot write our
native language correctly are the most clamorous to
introduce what they call science. If we rightly understand
the meaning of the term Science it is nothing more or less
than knowledge. It comes from the Latin word Scio (to
know.) If we are not right our learned friend will correct us.
If we should be in the practice of using the term
knowledge for science people would not be so often
imposed upon. They imagine some mystery is covered in
the fluent phrase, “Scientific Agriculture.”198
The editor thus argued that the practical knowledge gained through actually farming in
New England trumped the “science” brought from the outside by European savants. This
“scientific” knowledge in learned treatises could not claim superiority over the
knowledge gained through experience in the fields. The editor’s response defended an
empirical science that put the emphasis on the observations culled from working farmers
who had achieved success in New England, not somewhere else. This approach
contrasted with the pattern farm’s attempt to uncover general principles of agriculture that
198. Massachusetts Ploughman and New England Journal of Agriculture 9, no. 21 (February 23, 1850): 1.
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farmers could then apply to their situations. The editor did not speak of uncovering fixed
and permanent principles of agriculture; he wanted New England farmers to teach in a
New England agricultural school.
Finally, the editor repeated that actual profits ought to be the sole criterion for
judging farmers and farming methods. “We adopt no system that is not to result in profits
to the farmer,” the editor proclaimed. “We cannot afford to throw away a great deal for
fancy.” He cited the example of a “Mr. French of Braintree,” who “has expended lots of
money on his farm. He is rich enough and can afford to amuse himself in this way.”
Despite this farm’s great reputation, French had not published the actual profits he had
obtained through farming, and if he did, the editor estimated that he would need to admit
to having costs that tripled his revenues.199 The editor, in contrast with the gentlemen who
advocated for pattern farms, did not concern himself with creating an agriculture of
permanence that maintained the fertility of the soil over the long haul, nor did he speak of
knowing creation more fully through the practice of agriculture. In true democratic style,
he defended the ambition of ordinary farmers and vowed to maintain his focus on helping
them to get ahead. He unapologetically endorsed the pursuit of wealth and private
advancement.
From a traditional reading of the Enlightenment, the Ploughman’s account of
agricultural science might be considered decidedly unenlightened. The editor displayed
marked anti-elitist tendencies that, from a certain vantage point, might seem like
opposition to science itself. This interpretation would be mistaken, however. In the first
place, the editor and the promoters of pattern farms agreed in their basic methods. Both
advocated for an empiricism that sought to use the lessons of experience to improve
199. Ibid.
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agriculture. They differed in who exactly had the creditability to produce legitimate facts.
For the promoters of pattern farms, the experience of the lone cultivator toiling away on
his farm could not produce the complete and accurate information that a pattern farm run
by leisured men of science could. In contrast, the editor of the Ploughman thought that
these pattern farms already existed in the form of profitable working farms in New
England. The experience that successful farmers gained throughout their working lives
would result in much more accurate knowledge about how actually to cultivate the land
than the knowledge promulgated by men of science schooled in the intricacies of
chemistry but not in the rigors of plowing and hoeing. The editor’s single criterion for
choosing teachers for an agricultural school—the ability to make money by farming—
meant that he did not concern himself with discovering the universal laws of agriculture;
he only cared about what worked. This epistemological pose, with its rejection of the
search for general or abstract ideas, reflected the skeptical attitude towards natural
philosophy articulated by Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and much of the rest of the British
Enlightenment thinkers.
Conclusion: Unfulfilled Expectations
Although the PSPA never succeeded in founding their pattern farm, several
agricultural schools that included pattern or experimental farms were started in various
states, including Maine, Connecticut, and Ohio. Many of these institutions only survived
a few years. The few that made it past 1860 eventually succumbed to the deprivations of
the Civil War.200 Most of the agricultural community seems to have responded to these
pattern farms and agricultural schools with indifference. For example, Daniel Lee
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founded the Western New York Agricultural School in Wheatland, New York, in 1846.201
In January of 1847, Lee wrote a plea to the agricultural community asking for $300 “to
purchase chemicals for the Laboratory, and aid a little in diminishing the tax on the
Principal for the high rent for the premises.” Lee wanted to ensure that all classes of
students, not just sons of the rich, could attend the institution.202 Lee failed to obtain
enough funds, and the institution closed.203 Ensuring the permanence of experimental
farms and agricultural schools would require the patronage of the state and federal
governments, which came in the Morrill Acts and the Hatch Act. As Alan I. Marcus notes,
the first state-funded experiment station, the New York Agricultural Experiment Station,
was explicitly dedicated to increasing the profits of farming through scientific methods.204
Perhaps, then, in order to garner popular support for these experimental farms, their
proponents needed to emphasize the improvement of farmers’ material condition over the
improvement of natural knowledge and the moral elevation of farmers.
The reaction to the closing of the Mount Airy Agricultural Institute perhaps
epitomized the tensions in the scientific culture of the young country. As principal of the
Dutchess Agricultural Institute, John Wilkinson moved this school and its students from
Dutchess County, New York, to Germantown, Pennsylvania, in 1848. In close proximity
to Philadelphia, the school seemed to prosper at first. The institute occupied the farm of
James Gowen, a highly regarded agriculturist who had purchased the Mount Airy farm
following a career in business.205 Prominent agricultural papers published attractive
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engravings of the institute’s buildings, thus providing advertising for the school.206
Wilkinson reported in 1849 that Jose Tell Ferrao, a young man “sent by the Brazilian
Government,” had enrolled in the institute so that he could gain the knowledge to open an
agricultural school in his native country.207 In the same year, several gentlemen made a
positive report of the public recitations of the students in many subjects. “The
catechetical exercises on practical agriculture were very interesting,” they reported. “By
the promptness and accuracy of their answers it was evident that they were not only
familiar with the agriculture of their own country but also with that of others.”208 In May
of 1849, Wilkinson boasted of a profit of $741.70 from the 70 acres of land managed by
the institute.209
Despite all of these positive reports, the institute closed in 1853. The Southern
Planter expressed its dismay in a biting editorial comment:
We are sorry, but not surprised, to learn...that the
Agricultural School at Mount Airy has turned out an
unprofitable speculation, and that the Principal, who has
been working there and elsewhere for the last eight years
without pecuniary profit, is about to abandon the business.
So long as it is thought by the agricultural community that
farming comes from nature they will not receive much
instruction from schools. The sordid bumpkin, ignorant as
his beast, and hardly superior to him in taste, grows rich
with his narrow income in spite of his bad farming. The
man of liberal expenditure cannot, with his good farming,
more than balance his outgoings. The result, in a mere
pecuniary point of view, is, perhaps, in favor of the former;
and men of sense, as if habits and modes of life were to go
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for nothing, refer the art of growing rich to the possession
of a lucky secret, and set down the practices of each class
as equally commendable, or give the preference to the
farming of the clown.210
This response to the institute’s failure contained all the elements of the gentlemanly
critique of ordinary American farmers. The typical farmer arrogantly assumed that
farming came “from nature” and that no serious study of scientific principles was
necessary to achieve success. To his dismay, the editor of the Planter noted that those
farmers who spent as little as possible on their farms usually made more money than the
gentlemen who sought to preserve the fertility of their land through greater expenditures.
Since the miserly farmer could boast greater profits, at least in the near term, compared to
the more liberal farmer, society judged the former a greater success. The ordinary farmer,
according to the editor, could not elevate his view from a blinkered focus on profits to the
permanent natural laws that might aid him in improving his cultivation.
Ultimately, as the Southern Planter’s reaction revealed, the argument came down
to who had the authority to collect and disseminate information about agriculture. Could
working farmers improve their art through the give and take of their experiences in the
fields, or did men of science need to step in to impose order on the agricultural
democracy of facts? Empirical Enlightenment science in America, therefore, found itself
bound up in questions about the social status of the investigators of nature.
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CHAPTER 4
GEORGE BLACKBURN, CELESTIAL TRAVELER
Introduction
From 1800 until his death in 1825, Irish native George Blackburn applied his
skills as a mathematician and astronomer in various posts in the southern states. He
taught mathematics, astronomy, and natural philosophy at the College of William and
Mary in Virginia, the South Carolina College, and several other academies. In addition,
he served as the astronomer on two projects undertaken by the state of South Carolina, an
1813 expedition to determine the boundary line between North Carolina and South
Carolina and an 1816 survey in preparation for the construction of a map of the entire
state.
Blackburn’s career in America allows for an examination of the practice of
mathematics and astronomy in the Early Republic. The Irishman left behind an eclectic
collection of records that provide for a close consideration of his attitudes towards
American society and the place of science in the young republic. For example, Blackburn
wrote a lengthy poem about his experiences during the boundary expedition that mocked
the representatives of the two states and criticized what he saw as the rampant religious
bigotry in Columbia, South Carolina, the home of South Carolina College. Blackburn’s
writings reveal a man with great confidence that the progress of sciences, particularly
mathematics and astronomy, would triumph over the forces of superstition and
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intolerance. He also advocated the employment of astronomical methods on the two
South Carolina projects in order to obtain a true account of the state’s geography that
would allow for internal improvement.
The Light of Science
Blackburn’s experience in teaching mathematics, astronomy, and natural
philosophy at several colleges and academies provided the background to his surveying
activities. His reflections on the value of these sciences in the education of young men
and women recalled Condorcet’s optimism that the progress of learning would go hand in
hand with the progress of society. The diffusion of science, Blackburn argued, would
clear away the clouds of superstition and bigotry, especially in matters of religion.
Before beginning his career as a teacher, Blackburn received his education at
Trinity College, Dublin. Here, he received his first taste of the sectarianism that he would
oppose throughout his life. Born in County Wicklow, Ireland, in 1765, Blackburn
probably entered Trinity sometime around 1780.211 Around this time, Trinity was known
as the university of the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland. Raised in a Catholic family,
Blackburn would have been ineligible to receive a degree unless he took an oath
renouncing his inherited faith.212 Blackburn would firmly reject Catholicism, and his
writings include satires of church shrines and doctrines. But he also recoiled against the
authoritarianism of the Anglican Church, a position that would shape his distrust of
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Episcopalian leadership in South Carolina. “The oppressions and avarice of the Episcopal
clergy in Ireland exceed perhaps those in any other portion of the globe, not excepting
Italy, Portugal, or Spain,” he railed in his journal. “They are doing wonders in So. Car.”213
Trinity provided its students with a thorough grounding in astronomy. Dr. Francis
Andrews, Provost of Trinity from 1758 until his death in 1774, left money in his will to
improve the school’s astronomical resources. His last testament endowed a professorship
of astronomy and gave Trinity land and money with which to erect an observatory.
Trinity included a variety of mathematical and scientific subjects in its curriculum,
including “Euclid, astronomy, mechanics, hydrostatics and optics.” A Trinity student’s
notes on an astronomy lecture in 1777 made plain that the professor regarded astronomy
as both useful and morally uplifting:
Q. What is the use of studying Astronomy?
R. …without it we could have no Geography or Chronology of
consequence, no certain declaration of History, navigation
has received the greatest improvement from it…
Q. What is the moral use of studying astronomy?
R. Because it leads us to entertain just notions of the infinite
wisdom and goodness of our Creator.214
Blackburn would take a similar position in his reflections on the value of science. He thus
encountered at Trinity the two forces that would shape much of his life: sectarianism and
a belief in the beneficent power of science to overcome such intolerance.
Blackburn immigrated to Philadelphia in 1800. The turbulent closing years of the
eighteenth century in Ireland may provide a clue for his decision to depart. In 1798, Irish
republicans, inspired by the American and French Revolutions, had risen up to fight the
Protestant Ascendancy and British rule. Britain put down the Irish Rebellion in a matter
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of months, but life in Dublin took a turn for the worse. Martial law was declared in the
city, and Trinity was unable to hold examinations. In the aftermath of the rebellion, the
Acts of Union fully united Ireland with the rest of Britain and stripped the Protestant
Ascendancy of its dominance in Ireland. Trinity suffered through this action; it lost some
of its representation in Parliament, and its intellectual life declined.215 Although
Blackburn did not explicitly name these events as the reason for his departure from
Ireland, he did mention that he came to America in part because he “was weary of the
sanguinary and tumultuary scenes of Europe.”216
Blackburn carried with him letters of introduction from persons familiar with his
knowledge of science and his skill as a teacher, and in his writings Blackburn cited these
references as proof of his status as a man of science.217 Blackburn established academies
in Philadelphia and Fauquier County, Virginia.218 His letters of introduction proved
valuable when Bishop James Madison, President of the College of William and Mary,
wrote Benjamin Rush to inquire about Blackburn’s availability to fill the professorship of
mathematics. Thanks to Rush, Blackburn was duly elected to the position in 1804. At
least one student remembered Blackburn as a skilled teacher, and students took to calling
him “Old Triangle,” probably a reference to his mathematical teachings. He apparently
needed all of his skill as a teacher, as he found the students unprepared for courses in
higher mathematics, and many needed remedial attention in the subject.219
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Blackburn expanded on the challenges he faced at the college in a printed
broadside that he presented to the board of visitors, the governing body of William and
Mary. The Irishman admitted that his initial attempts to instruct students in the
mathematical sciences had failed, and he had turned to “a more familiar and popular
method of instruction.” His students, Blackburn explained, underestimated the effort
required to achieve “even a moderate degree of excellence” in the mathematical sciences.
He understood why many students were unwilling to give these subjects the attention
they deserved. The student entering the college “observes that these sciences had not the
easy, attractive, and accommodating charms of Metaphysicks to recommend them; that
they seldom introduce their votaries to places of emolument, or of political importance,
and that they hardly receive even the agreeable incense of applause.” America presented
these obstacles in abundance, Blackburn argued, because the country had not caught up to
the nations of Europe. “In Europe,” he explained, “many centuries elapsed between the
establishment of regular government, and the diffusion of literature; in America, a few
years has sufficed to produce a similar effect; it is therefore rational to presume that the
sciences will advance with equal rapidity as soon as the general mind is awakened to
their importance.” The sooner the promotion of the sciences occurred the better, he
contended, for “their advantages are not confined to purposes of practical utility; to
attract and fix the attention, and to enable the mind to discover within itself those solid
resources which opinions not founded on demonstration, can seldom afford, are amongst
their ordinary effects.”220
But in order to obtain the beneficial effects of the mathematical sciences, students
needed to come to college prepared. Blackburn had found that most of the students that
220. Blackburn, “To the Governors and Visitors.”
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entered his courses lacked even a basic knowledge of such minor branches of
mathematics as arithmetic, algebra, and geometry. To alleviate this state of affairs,
Blackburn proposed that he be put in charge of a school of mathematical sciences within
the college. Here, Blackburn could teach “all the necessary branches prepatory to a
regular course of mathematicks, and of Natural and Experimental Philosophy, such as the
mae [more] abstruse parts of Arithmetick...Algebra, and Geometry.” All students entering
the college ought to take an examination in mathematics, and if found wanting, should
attend this school until they were prepared for the higher branches of the science.
Blackburn also proposed that this school could “be open to such persons not being
students or not intending to become such as may wish to acquire a knowledge of
particular branches as Navigation, Military mathematicks, Surveying &c.” Besides
preparing the children of the elite with a liberal course of mathematical science,
Blackburn suggested that the school could also instruct men from more “moderate
circumstances” who had an interest in teaching the youth of the state. Only men from
these middling backgrounds would “submit to the task of instructing youth” and
“discharge the painful duties implied in that profession with zeal and fidelity.”221
Blackburn spoke from many years’ experience in struggling to impart knowledge to
young people. He reiterated the lack of preparation he observed in Virginia students in
two newspaper advertisements for academies he ran in Williamsburg while attending to
his college duties. In soliciting students for private lessons in mathematics, Blackburn
commented that “the strangely defective state of preparation in which many of them
commence their studies in my classes, have compelled me to reject much of the ancient
method of demonstration, and many things in modern mathematicks which are more
221. Ibid.
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properly objects of speculation than of utility.” He mentioned the works of Charles
Hutton and John Bonnycastle as models for his teaching. These two Englishmen had both
published a series of mathematical textbooks on a variety of subjects in the late
eighteenth century.222 Blackburn also placed an advertisement for a female academy in
Williamsburg that he and his colleague Professor Plunkett ran. He promised to teach the
young ladies in his charge “as much of Astronomy & of almost every branch of Natural
Philosophy as can be understood by popular methods of illustration, and without
mathematical investigation.” Blackburn planned to add “some minor branches of the
mathematics, such as Algebra, Geometry, Spherics, &c.” for those young women who
displayed promise. This course of study for young ladies might seem odd, Blackburn
admitted, “but the experience of ten years in Virginia, and of a much longer period in
other countries, has taught me that females are, in many instances, at least as capable of
acquiring that kind of learning which demands patient investigation, as the other sex.”223
Blackburn’s statements in regards to the female academy stood in contrast to those about
his male students. The advertisement for the female academy did not emphasize the
practical uses of mathematics. His male students’ resistance to abstract mathematics led
Blackburn to downplay the more abstruse branches of mathematics in favor of a study
that could be applied to practical problems of navigation and surveying.
In 1811, after more than half a decade in service to William and Mary, Blackburn
applied for and received the professorship of mathematics and astronomy at South
Carolina College.224 Several factors likely contributed to this decision to transfer to the
222. G. Blackburn, “Mathematical School--William and Mary College,” The Enquirer 7, no. 57 (September
14, 1810).
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new state college in Columbia. During Blackburn’s tenure at William and Mary, the
college faced an identity crisis. Thomas Jefferson’s attempt in the late eighteenth century
to modernize the college’s curriculum set off a long conflict between traditionalist
Episcopalians and secular republicans for control of the college. Bishop Madison, the
president of the college, embodied this struggle. He was a political ally of Jefferson, but
the Archbishop of Canterbury had given him his title. As one historian puts it, “Where
liberals saw a relic of monarchy and an established church, conservatives saw a hotbed of
freethinking, Francophilism, and disorder. Led by a living anomaly, a Jeffersonian
bishop, suspected by both ends of the ideological spectrum, William and Mary had
something to offend everyone.” The effort required to keep the college functioning wore
on Madison’s health, and in 1807 he actually wrote President Jefferson to ask for an
appointment as collector of customs at Norfolk so that he could resign as president of the
college. Jefferson had already offered the customs post to someone else. Based on his
later criticism of South Carolina College’s growing sectarianism, Blackburn likely
realized that Madison would not be around much longer to stem the tide of Episcopalian
attempts to retake the college. The resources for science at the College were unimpressive
as well. Although Madison taught courses in natural philosophy with a conviction that
science was both useful and morally good, the college owned only one telescope and
some apparatuses. Attempts to found a society for the study of natural history at the
college floundered. Once a respected bastion of learning in America, the old college was
on the decline from infighting and lack of funds. South Carolina College, generously
supported by state appropriations, must have seemed like a welcome change.225
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Almost immediately upon arriving in Columbia, however, Blackburn began to
regret his decision. South Carolina College offered an environment for teaching and
science that was in some ways worse than William and Mary. The college charged him
with teaching the older students a course on mechanical philosophy, but he found that
they lacked the prerequisite mathematical knowledge to begin. Large numbers of students
ceased attending his lectures. A student reported that Blackburn commented “that it might
be that half of his class were smart fellows, for he never saw them; but the half who
attended his recitations were as laborious as oxen, but as stupid as asses.” The college
possessed as few if not fewer scientific apparatuses than William and Mary, a situation
that Blackburn worked to remedy. “I had completed an observatory with its proper
furniture,” he lamented, “but this useful project must fail” for want of a telescope. The
standing committee of the college required Blackburn to submit weekly reports of
students’ progress, a task that greatly annoyed him. Members of the standing committee
overturned Blackburn’s decision to suspend certain students for various offenses.
Blackburn argued that the faculty should be in charge of the day-to-day operations of the
College, and he maintained that the constant infringements of the standing committee
were degrading the authority of the professors.226
Just as he had done at William and Mary, Blackburn felt the need to set forth the
reasons for studying the mathematical sciences in an attempt to convince his classes of
their value. In an address to students in the mathematical department at South Carolina
College, Blackburn again lamented that the students sought an easy and basic
understanding of mathematics instead of applying themselves to a mastery of the higher
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branches. His attempts to reform the mathematical department along more rigorous lines
had received resistance from students who did not wish to make the necessary effort.
Blackburn insisted that “I shall do what I conceive to be my duty, without any regard to
idle prejudices, sometimes erroneously dignified with the appellation of public opinion.”
Getting down to specifics, Blackburn argued that any understanding of “sound
philosophy” required the mastery of three “abstract” kinds of mathematics: “numbers,
algebra and fluxions, or the infinitesimal calculus.” Each of these three branches “grow
naturally and regularly out of each other” in the order that he listed them.227 Blackburn
went on to list other branches of mathematics, such as geometry, logarithms,
trigonometry, spherics, and conic sections, that students needed to learn prior to entering
into the study of natural philosophy and astronomy. He intended to teach “such parts of
astronomy as are wanted to determine the latitudes and longitudes of places, such as lunar
distances; solar and lunar eclipses, transits and occultations of stars by the moon.” In
natural philosophy, he intended to cover “all the branches directly dependant on the
mathematics,” such as the motion of bodies, forces, optics, and the tides.228
Blackburn argued that although this course might seem expansive and difficult,
such studies had incalculable benefits for training the minds of young men. Proceed
through the course he had outlined, Blackburn stated, and you “will then look down upon
the gloomy vale of ignorance which you have quitted, with self gratulation and applause,
and elevated above the clouds and mists of error, enjoy a world peculiarly your own.”
Presently, the study of the sciences in America did not serve as “passports to places of
honour or emolument,” but “they serve a more important purpose; they teach us to think
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and reason for ourselves; instructed by them, we reject unfounded theories and
hypotheses, though sanctioned by the rust of ages; they remove from our eyes the films of
prejudice; they prepare our minds for the reception of great truths; and they shew us
where to find the true source of mental independence.”229 Blackburn’s advocacy of
mathematics and natural philosophy thus reflected Condorcet’s account of the mutual
progress of the sciences and of the mind in general. The sciences combated ancient
prejudices and bigotry and taught men to accept only those ideas that met the test of
reason.
Despite Blackburn’s optimism about the enlightening power of the sciences,
affairs quickly took a turn for the worse in Columbia. In February of 1814, in response to
Blackburn’s disciplining of students who attempted to steal the college bell, the student
body began rioting. The students burned Blackburn in effigy, damaged Blackburn’s house
with brickbats while his wife and daughters were inside, and succeeded this time in
destroying the bell. Authorities were forced to call on the militia to restore order at the
college.230 Blackburn also clashed with citizens outside the college boundaries. One
Sunday, a shop keeper refused to sell him “some emollient” to relieve his “Billious
fever.” In anger, he wrote a note to the shopkeeper “intimating that the Jews were told it
was lawful to do good on the Sabbath day.” These “heterodox” remarks apparently
caused quite a scandal in Columbia.231 Religious citizens also took issue with Blackburn’s
lack of church attendance, and the various sects attempted to claim him for their own.
Blackburn sarcastically retorted that perhaps his lack of piety made him an inept
professor of mathematics. “What right have these people, who have no connxcion [sic]
229. Ibid., 57–58.
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with the college nor its professors, to dragoon them into their churches?” Blackburn
asked.232
Blackburn in fact did possess some unorthodox religious views, as his interest in
Emanuel Swedenborg demonstrates. Denouncing the attempt by various sects in
Columbia to pressure him into attending their churches, Blackburn stated, “Perhaps I
have chosen a different route, and am a pupil of Swedenbourg, the celestial traveller.”233
Swedenborg, a Swedish man of science who experienced prophetic visions in the middle
of his life, put forward an alternative account of Christianity that incorporated scientific
ideas into his interpretations of his visions and the Bible. For example, Swedenborg
utilized contemporary scientific ideas in anatomy and physiology to explain his account
of the structure of heaven and hell and the nature of the body of Christ. Blackburn, as a
man of science struggling to bring the Enlightenment to South Carolina, must have found
Swedenborg’s scientifically informed religious teachings intriguing.234 Swedenborg’s
theology compared favorably with the sectarianism of Columbia, Blackburn argued. “His
religion has some good features, that these good people might profit by,” Blackburn
stated, “since he makes Benevolence the sum of all virtues; and comprehends all the
vices in sordid, selfish, malevolence.”235 Swedenborgians believed that those who led a
life of good works but did not belong to the Swedenborgian church would nonetheless
receive salvation. As a man who despised sectarianism and the machinations of various
sects, Blackburn likely appreciated Swedenborg’s liberal Christianity. Swedenborg and
his followers had founded a church, but Blackburn does not seem to have been a fully
fledged member. In part of his journal containing a copy of a letter sent to a friend,
232. Ibid., 7–8, 16.
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Blackburn declared, “About that Book of Universal Salvation I have too much to say to
put it in a Ballade, one thing I think – I would not be very fond, bad as I am, - of
belonging to a society in the New Jerusalem, where I should meet everyone I see in the
old one.”236 This passage likely referred to Swedenborg’s descriptions of heaven.
According to Swedenborg, heaven, or the New Jerusalem, very much resembled life on
earth, so much so that some recently deceased people did not know that they had died. In
heaven, the spirits of the dead actually formed societies with people they had known in
life.237 Ever the cantankerous chap, Blackburn worried that he might have to spend
eternity with those he already knew all too well. Swedenborg’s religious thought thus
reflected Blackburn’s hope that “science” would lead to “universal benevolence,” a more
open and tolerant religious life.238
Throughout his career as a teacher of mathematics and natural philosophy,
Blackburn lamented that science did not receive its just due in America. In his view,
because of their lack of understanding of the sciences, and especially the mathematical
sciences, his American students came to his courses unprepared and unwilling to exert the
necessary efforts to achieve even a modest understanding of them. The poor status of the
sciences in South Carolina went hand-in-hand with Columbia’s religious intolerance, and
Blackburn put forward Swedenborg as a response to the prejudice that he experienced.
Blackburn did succeed, however, in applying his mathematical knowledge to two state
surveying initiatives in South Carolina, and an examination of his work on these projects
provides further insight into Blackburn’s account of science that placed mathematical
methods at the head of scientific inquiry.
236. Blackburn, Astronomer’s Journal, 42.
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The Boundary Line Survey, 1813
In 1813, Blackburn served as the astronomer on an expedition to determine the
boundary line between North Carolina and South Carolina. The boundary dispute
between the two states had remained unresolved since colonial times because of errors in
determining the 35th parallel of northern latitude. Many persons along the western part of
the supposed boundary line did not know in which state they resided. An 1808 agreement
between the two states stipulated that the course of the line would depend on where the
35th parallel struck the Blue Ridge Mountains.239
In Blackburn’s journal that recounted the expedition, he emphasized the
difficulties under which he labored. To determine the latitude at different points near the
boundary, he wanted several instruments that he could not obtain in South Carolina: “a
circle of Borda, a good circumferentor, a small Theodolite and a zenith sector.” All of
these devices provided various ways to measure the angle between points. Instead, he
could only procure a “sextant of which the short tellescope had been mislaid, and which
in its perfect state could be of no use in taking the sun’s mer. [meridian] altitude at that
season of the year in that latitude.” The meridian altitude was the point at which the sun
(or any other celestial object) passed through the north-south line. Like the other devices,
the sextant, a 60-degree curved instrument, allowed the user to measure the angle
between two points. This device found its most common use in determining the latitude
of a ship at sea by finding the angle of elevation between the horizon and the North Star.
In Blackburn’s case, however, the North Star was often not visible because of natural
obstructions like clouds, trees, or mountains. In this case, the user could measure the
239. Marvin Lucian Skaggs, North Carolina Boundary Disputes Involving Her Southern Line (Chapel Hill:
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elevation of various other stars and planets. He or she would then consult published
tables to translate his or her measurements into latitudes. Because Blackburn could not
use the sextant to determine the elevation of the sun, “all my observations were made in
the night, - the stars also that passed the meridian during the night were few in number,
and of small magnitude. On the mountains too the clouds rise so quickly and spread with
such rapidity, that the observations were frequently lost.” All of these obstacles “render’d
the work much more difficult than it would otherwise have been. It was however
executed in a correct and satisfactory manner.”240
Blackburn took pride in his astronomical observations, and he contrasted his
method of astronomical surveying with ground surveys. In the poem he composed about
the expedition, Blackburn mocked Robert Macnamara, his assistant surveyor, for his lack
of astronomical knowledge. The Irishman complained that Macnamara was called an
astronomer even though he only had experience as a surveyor. He sarcastically predicted
that soon misguided public opinion, which ruled America, would declare Macnamara a
professor even though the surveyor had no qualifications for the post.241 In a pamphlet
that Blackburn wrote that blasted the governing board of South Carolina College for
interfering with the authority of professors, he stated that “I find there is here a set of men
who affect to put a wonderful value, upon what they call public opinion. I call it the
humour of the day, and when it meddles with subjects beyond its reach of understanding,
I laugh at it.”242 In Blackburn’s view, his knowledge of astronomy and natural philosophy
gave him expertise that ought to place him in a position of authority over ordinary men in
240. George Blackburn, “Report, Poem, and Notes on the Boundary Expedition of 1813,” 1813, South
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matters of science. The elevation of a mere surveyor to the position of astronomer served
as one example of Americans’ penchant for giving authority to those who did not deserve
it.
Blackburn did not limit his criticism to a lowly assistant surveyor. North Carolina
provided its own astronomer on the expedition, Joseph Caldwell, a Presbyterian minister
and president of the University of North Carolina.243 In his poem, Blackburn threw jabs at
his counterpart: “His life was so fram’d in morality’s school / He had scarce any use for a
compass or rule / Besides as the company traveled in state / ‘Twas important that we
should have grace to our meat.” Caldwell may have been a professor of mathematics at
the university, but Blackburn criticized his religiosity and his apparent inexperience with
scientific instruments. Blackburn mocked his regular prayers at mealtimes, but he
credited Caldwell for serving “as a powerful antidote against corrupt doctrines from
another quarter,” by which he probably meant himself.244
Despite the difficulties that attended his observations, Blackburn performed his
duties to the satisfaction of the South Carolina contingent on the expedition. As the
agreement between the two states on the location of the boundary line depended on the
location of the 35th parallel, Blackburn set about to measure latitudes a various points
near the supposed boundary. First, he found that the boundary line surveyed in 1772 was
at 35 degrees, 11 minutes, 36.9 seconds. To make this determination, Blackburn
conducted a series of observations of the elevation of stars near the “Block House,”
which was near the 1772 boundary line. Blackburn’s report to the commissioners
representing South Carolina on the expedition gave latitudes for this location derived
243. William S. Powell, ed., Dictionary of North Carolina Biography (Chapel Hill: University of North
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from three stars: a star in the Ophiuchus constellation, Formalhaut, and Antares.
Blackburn then averaged these three latitude measurements together to obtain a mean.
Finally, he added some seconds of latitude to this mean which corresponded to the length
between his observation point and the Block House itself.245 Later, in a petition he sent to
the South Carolina legislature, Blackburn commented that, regarding latitude
determinations, “by a mean of many observations, he may, with bad instruments, come
near to the truth, but there will be an immense waste of time, and toil, and very little
certainty in the result.” He made sure to note that, in his observations of the boundary
line, “the principal point in dispute, was determined true to a second, but it was by a
reiteration of observations, which sometimes employed us a fortnight, in doing what,
with better means” he could have accomplished in a day.246
This measurement of latitude along the 1772 line undermined the terms of the
boundary agreement between the two states. This line was supposed to be at 35 degrees
exactly. The initial agreement stipulated “that from the termination of the line of 1772, a
line shall be extended in a direct course to that point in the ridge of mountains which
divides the eastern from the western waters, where the 35th degree of north latitude shall
be found to strike it nearest to the termination of the said line of 1772.”247 Blackburn’s
observations demonstrated that the 35th parallel lay entirely inside of South Carolina,
since the 1772 line was actually slightly north of the 35th parallel. “I have found that the
35th degree of latitude does not anywhere in this state, intersect the ridge dividing the
Eastern from the Western waters,” Blackburn concluded.248 A modified agreement
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allowed South Carolina to lay claim to several beautiful mountains in the upstate,
including Caesar’s Head and Dismal Mountain. Robert Mills declared in 1826 that “we
have won them from North Carolina by fair and honorable means, and they are an
ornament to our state. To the talents, industry, and zeal of Professor George
Blackburn...South Carolina is indebted for its present possession of these noble
mountains.”249 Blackburn agreed that the outcome of the survey constituted a triumph for
South Carolina. “So. Car. Gains all she has been 40 years contending for,” he declared. “I
have good reasons for asserting that the amicable adjustment of this business is
principally owing to the steps which I took, in order to prevent any dispute about the
observations.” He further added that his measurements of latitude nearly matched the
observations of Caldwell, “tho I observed und[er] greater disadvantages than he did.”250
The State Map Survey, 1816
Blackburn resigned his professorship at South Carolina College in July of 1815.251
Later that year, he sent a petition to the South Carolina legislature proposing the
construction of a map of the entire state. Such a map, Blackburn argued, would prove
invaluable to the legislature in governing the state. Furthermore, out of all the states east
of the Appalachians, South Carolina alone had failed to create an official state map.
France, England, and many other European countries had also taken great pains to draw
maps, for a map “renders the state respectable in the eyes of other nations, and is useful
to them in their intercourse with us, as it presents, at one view, a variety of circumstances,
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which when verbally explained, require much circumlocution, and yet leave no distinct
impression on the mind.”252
Blackburn insisted that a “well constructed” map required accurate astronomical
measurements. Before anything else, the latitudes and longitudes of fifty points
throughout the state should be determined through astronomical observations. These
points would “serve as the basis of the map.” These astronomical calculations constituted
the essential first step in creating the map. Only after the state completed this task could it
proceed on to survey roads “by actual mensuration” and to survey the course of rivers,
which Blackburn suggested could be accomplished through the use of “waywisers and
perambulators.” These instruments consisted of a single wheel attached to a long handle
that recorded distances. The user counted the number of times that the wheel made a
complete rotation while he or she was walking over ground in order to obtain the distance
traveled. This part of the task would require surveyors “to run the length and breadth of
the state many times, perhaps three or four thousand miles in all.” Near the end of his
petition, Blackburn reiterated the importance of astronomical measurements for
constructing the map. Beyond the practical benefits from the creation of a state map, the
South Carolina government’s support for the project would provide a powerful rebuttal to
“the idle opinion” that the sciences “cannot flourish, in perfection, near the torrid zone.”
“A good map of a country,” he continued,
is one proof that science is estimable there, for, without
science, such a map cannot be formed. Astronomy is, in
most cases, made subservient to Geography; one of its
primary objects is to ascertain the true position of a point
upon the surface of the earth or of a ship at sea; and it is
only by the aid of Astronomy that this can be correctly
done. By the rude and common methods something
252. Blackburn, “Petition of George Blackburn, Relative to the State Map.”

118

resembling the truth may be produced, but it is not the
truth, and may be widely different from it.253
Blackburn thus placed the determinations of astronomical measurements above surveying
techniques that only measured distances on the ground. The former, in Blackburn’s view,
resulted in truth; correct measurements of latitude and longitude gave the exact location
of a point upon the earth. Surveys without astronomical calculations, in contrast, could
only provide a relative location of a point; for example, the summit of a mountain was
some distance from another summit and some distance from a town. This kind of survey
could only strike near to the truth; an astronomical survey could provide an absolutely
true determination of a point on the spherical earth.
Blackburn argued that he had the proper qualifications to direct this survey for the
state map. “None but a good mathematician and practical astronomer” could overcome
the obstacles to the completion of this survey in a correct manner. He cited his experience
in working under great difficulties on the boundary survey and his duties as the surveyor
of a district in Virginia during his time at William and Mary. Blackburn also listed his
academic posts in Virginia and South Carolina. “I have therefore all the theory and all the
practice; there is nothing wanting but the patronage of the state, and the encouragement
of liberal and enlightened patriots,” he concluded.254
The government of South Carolina agreed with Blackburn about the usefulness of
a state map. Legislative committees charged with reviewing Blackburn’s petition
enthusiastically approved of his proposal. A state map, the legislators argued, would
prove invaluable for the accomplishment of military, agricultural, and legislative
purposes. They made particular mention of how a state map could facilitate the drawing
253. Ibid.
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of congressional and judicial districts. The committees charged the governor with
overseeing the project.255
Governor David R. Williams appointed Blackburn to head the survey for the state
map in February of 1816. In his letter to Blackburn that announced the appointment,
Williams began by telling Blackburn that “you are at liberty to add to the knowledge
which, a map, made according to these instructions, will contain, but not to lessen the
number of objects directed to be ascertained.” The legislature, Williams explained, had
only appointed Blackburn for a single year; Williams needed to provide the legislature
with “exhibits of a just regard to economy of money and time” in order to convince them
to extend Blackburn’s appointment. Williams demanded that Blackburn keep a journal of
his activities and send him reports weekly. “Failing to perform these, and the duties
which follow, I shall not hesitate to dismiss you from the service of the state,” Williams
warned.256
Williams’s specific instructions to Blackburn about how to conduct the survey
clashed with the Irishman’s emphasis on astronomical measurements. The governor did
agree that Blackburn’s “first business” should be the determination of latitude for many
points and longitude for a few points to serve as the basis of the map. Following this
point of agreement, however, Williams went on to make detailed demands for other tasks
that Blackburn should execute in his year’s employment with the state:
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You are to take the distances and bearings of the roads you
travel. You are to mark all the watercourses that intersect
your route; all the ferries, bridges &c that you cross,
together with all the noted points, such as cities, towns,
villages & court houses upon these routes; and the
residence of such land holders, as may appear upon the
map without incumbrance; also, extensive mills,
manufactories & iron works. These routes will be on the
principal market and mail roads.
Williams was not finished. He also wanted Blackburn to mark “the points at which, your
route intersects the boundary lines of the primitive divisions of this state, into districts,
and the lesser divisions of the same, into Parishes.” Blackburn should also note the
topographical character of the places he passed through. The governor next moved on to
information he desired on rivers. He not only wanted facts about “their various bendings
and distances” but also sought intelligence about the obstacles that prevented navigation
along their courses. “You will perform an acceptable and not less important service,”
Williams continued, “to ascertain where canals may be best constructed, so as to open
water communication from the various principal rivers to Charleston.” Williams then
requested information about “the principal navigable inlets to the sea ports of the state,”
particularly the latitudes of these inlets. Oh, and if that were not enough, if Blackburn
found the time, he should note “the actual variation of the magnetic needle,” or the shift
in magnetic north, over the course of his route.257
Blackburn apparently did not meet these requirements to the South Carolina
government’s liking. From March to August of 1816, Blackburn traveled throughout the
state making latitude measurements. His reports from this period are not available, but a
copy of his latitude measurements survives in the 1821 report of the Board of Public
Works for South Carolina. This report listed around thirty latitude measurements for
257. Ibid.
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points around the state, including cities, towns, and courthouses.258 In December, the
legislature refused to appoint Blackburn for another year. Historian Gene Waddell
convincingly surmises that Blackburn had concentrated too much on astronomical
calculations, and even then Blackburn had only provided latitudes, not longitudes.259
When the map was completed in 1822, however, Blackburn received credit for
“astronomical observations.”260 Given Blackburn’s other written records, we can imagine
that the cantankerous Irishman complained that the government had given him an
impossible task; the determination of latitudes required extremely careful measurements,
which would leave little time to gather all the other sundry pieces of information that the
governor demanded.
Although the lack of records directly pertaining to Blackburn’s performance on
the 1816 survey makes interpretation of this episode difficult, it seems that Blackburn and
the government had conflicting visions of the proper way to conduct the survey. In his
petition, Blackburn had stressed above all the necessity of accurate astronomical
determinations of latitude and longitude that could form the basis of the map. Governor
Williams’s letter to Blackburn, in contrast, demanded that Blackburn supply details of
such important state resources as rivers, roads, and towns. For Williams, the creation of a
state map provided an opportunity to conduct a physical inventory of the state and to
consider possibilities for improvement, especially in the construction of canals.
Blackburn saw the survey as a way for South Carolina to demonstrate its commitment to
science. The Irishman pointed to the practical uses of such a map, but he also insisted that
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astronomical calculations would result in a map that precisely reflected the truth. The
same could not be said, Blackburn argued, of a survey that only took note of distances
between landmarks. Blackburn prioritized placing the lands of South Carolina in their
true positions as reflected by the stars, while Williams desired a map that gave a
rendering of the state’s physical resources. The government of South Carolina agreed
with Blackburn that the state needed a map, but it favored a map that led quickly to
practical uses. The government probably thought Blackburn’s painstaking astronomical
observations were important but not so important as to put the gathering of more useful
knowledge of the location of roads, rivers, and towns on hold until the latitude and
longitude determinations were completed.
Conclusion
Blackburn’s career as a professor and his service to South Carolina on two
surveys revealed a man who had great faith in the power of science, and particularly the
mathematical sciences, to bring enlightenment to mankind. He found this ambition
frustrated again and again in America. His students had neither the skill nor the
inclination to attempt to master the mathematical sciences, and the state of South
Carolina spurned his opinions on the proper, scientific method of constructing a state
map. Blackburn’s struggles, then, provide an almost too-perfect example of nineteenthcentury Americans’ rejection of the theoretical and the abstract in favor of the useful and
tangible.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ENSLAVED ANTS AND THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION
“Go to the ant”
An examination of a strange episode involving ants provides an opportunity to
consider how knowledge from natural history influenced the controversy over slavery. In
1810, Genevan naturalist Pierre Huber published a book on the habits of European ants.
Among his remarkable findings, Huber discovered that two species of ants undertook
expeditions to capture other ants and make them their slaves. Numerous publications on
both sides of the Atlantic retold Huber’s astonishing discoveries, and several made the
obvious comparison between the slavery of the ant and the peculiar institution of man.
Proslavery and antislavery commentators’ reactions to the enslaved ants allows for an
examination of how knowledge from natural history influenced a highly charged political
controversy. This episode spoke to the question raised in Enlightenment philosophy of
how one could properly employ empirical evidence in moral and political questions.
Several scholars have noted connections between knowledge about insects and
knowledge about human beings. Brian Ogilvie has examined European studies of insects
during the seventeenth century. He shows that naturalists often discussed the
“emblematic” qualities of insects; the industrious bee, for example, provided a moral
lesson about the value of hard work.261 Christopher Hollingsworth has analyzed the uses
261. Brian W. Ogilvie, “Nature’s Bible: Insects in Seventeenth-Century European Art and Science,”
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of insects as metaphors in literature from Antiquity to postmodernism.262 J. F. M. Clark’s
work on understandings of social insects in nineteenth-century Britain touches on the
themes of this chapter most closely. As Clark argues, observations of the habits of social
animals like ants and bees “is often inextricably entangled in anthropocentric and
ethnocentric assumptions.” As such, accounts of ant behavior tell the historian more
about the observer than the observed. Clark also notes how the enslaving ants provided
Darwin with an example of how natural selection could give rise to complex behaviors
that helped to ensure the survival of the species. Darwin also held that the advanced
social instincts of even the lowly ant indicated a link between the vaunted intelligence of
human beings and their insect cousins. Thus, human beings could not be exempted from
the mechanisms of natural selection.263 This chapter attempts to clarify the cultural uses
of facts from natural history by focusing on the impact of a particular fact from natural
history on a particular place and time.
Natural history in the nineteenth century enjoyed a high status in transatlantic
culture because of its ability to reveal the presence of the divine in nature. In a review of
a natural history of ants, a writer in Britain’s Eclectic Review in 1821 declared that the
authors had “disclosed new proofs of the wisdom and beneficence of the great Organizer
of existence; and they have dissected out new ramifications of that grand system of
intelligence which, while in its fulness and prevalence it resides in man as the lord of the
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creation, actuates...all the tribes of animation from the elephant to the mite.” The
National Recorder, a Philadelphia newspaper, reprinted this review for American
audiences.264 In other words, natural history uncovered the designs of nature’s God. Ants,
in particular, demonstrated an extraordinary instinct for social organization clearly gifted
to them by the creator.
For centuries before Huber’s investigations, ants fascinated human beings with
their complex social structures, their amazing ability to construct intricate habitations,
and their selfless devotion to the collective. The book of Proverbs advised, “Go to the ant,
thou sluggard; consider her ways, and be wise: which having no guide, overseer, or ruler,
provideth her meat in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest.”265 In the
nineteenth century, naturalists easily drew analogies between the social structures of
humans and the ants. Thus, the ant-hill was divided between the workers and the royal
court, and the ants made war on rival tribes for patches of ground.266 A contributor to The
Friend, a Quaker journal published in Philadelphia, held up the worker ants as worthy
examples. They “appear to be actuated in the care and concern they evince towards those
under their protection, by the most exquisite sentiments of maternity, unalloyed by
passion—living, thinking, and acting...solely for the offspring of another [the queen],
with a disinterested devotion truly astonishing.”267 Ants, then, seemed to provide positive
models of behavior. Their enslaving practices would complicate the opinion of this
otherwise laudable insect.
Huber’s book, translated into English in 1820, described two different ant species
that practiced slavery. The first, the pale red rufescent ant (also called the Amazon or
264. “Huber on Ants and Bees,” The National Recorder 5, no. 23 (June 9, 1821): 354.
265. Prov. 6:6-8 KJV.
266. Clark, “Complete Biography,” 250, 252.
267. Huber, “Insects,” The Friend 8, no. 41 (July 18, 1835): 321.

126

legionary ant), went frequently on expeditions to capture the larvae and pupae of the ashcolored ant and the mining ant, both mostly black in color. At certain times of the year,
the rufescent ants poured out of their hills and went in search of colonies of black ants. A
struggle would ensue, and the rufescent ants inevitably triumphed. The victors spirited
the larvae and pupae of the opposing species back to their colony. Once the black ants
hatched, they served the colony just as they would in their native nest.268 In fact, Huber
remarked, it seemed that the enslaved ants did all the work for the colony except going on
expeditions for more slaves, which the rufescent ants continued to do.269
An experiment conducted by Huber demonstrated how much the rufescent ants
depended on their slaves for basic necessities. He placed thirty rufescent ants in a case
with some larvae and pupae of both their own species and the ash-colored ants. The
rufescent ants did nothing to construct tunnels or care for the young. In two days, over
half of the rufescent ants died because they did not even eat the honey placed in the box.
Finally, Huber deposited a single black ant into the case. He reported that this ant
succeeded in performing all the necessary labor to ensure the well-being of the colony.270
Huber also described the same slave-making behavior in the blood-red sanguine ant,
although this species seemed to capture fewer slaves, and they continued to work for the
colony even after taking a number of captives.271
Huber’s sensational account of the enslaving habits of ants appeared in numerous
publications, including natural history texts and general interest periodicals. Although
proslavery theorists did cite the enslaved ants as an example of nature ordaining the
268. P. Huber, The Natural History of Ants, trans. J. R. Johnson (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme,
and Brown, 1820), 248–77.
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peculiar institution, they used this fact from nature sparingly. The writings of William
Van Amringe, a New Yorker who composed a treatise on the natural history of man,
provide an indication for why proslavery Americans were hesitant to employ the slave
ants in their defense of the peculiar institution.
“By a most unerring law”
Van Amringe’s An Investigation into the Theories of the Natural History of Man
(1848) entered into an already rollicking transatlantic debate over the question of human
origins. In the early nineteenth century, several Americans took the lead in promoting the
theory that mankind consisted of not one but multiple species that had completely
different ancestries, or polygenism. Adam, then, was not the common ancestor for all of
humanity, and blacks and whites actually belonged to different species, not just varieties
of the same species. Historians have noted the importance of the “American school” of
anthropology in arguing for polygenism. This group included such noted men of science
as Samuel G. Morton, who measured cranial capacity as a proxy for intelligence, and
Josiah C. Nott, a southern physician who in 1854 published the polygenist treatise Types
of Mankind.272 The debate between polygenists and monogenists touched on a wide
variety of issues, not least of all the compatibility of polygenism with the account of the
creation in Genesis and, of course, racial justifications for African slavery.273 Adrian
Desmond and James R. Moore have argued that Darwin’s antislavery views and his
distaste for the implications of polygenist theories drove him to develop his account of
human evolution, which explained the varieties of man as a result of both natural and
272. William Stanton, The Leopard’s Spots: Scientific Attitudes toward Race in America, 1815-59 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960); Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: Norton,
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sexual selection rather than separate creations.274 Crucially, however, support for
polygenism did not equate with support for slavery, or vice versa, and the same went for
monogenism and antislavery. For example, John Bachman, a South Carolina minister and
naturalist who supported slavery and the secession of the southern states, conducted a
personal crusade against polygenists by publishing The Doctrine of the Unity of the
Human Race in 1850.275 Van Amringe’s book took the opposite position, and although he
clearly argued for the inferiority of black people, he felt slavery was an obsolete
institution.
Van Amringe dedicated one chapter of his treatise to a critique of naturalists who
used analogies to argue for the unity of the species. He took particular issue with James
Cowles Prichard, an English physician whose The Natural History of Man (1843) had
maintained the unity of the human species. Prichard, Van Amringe wrote, had fallaciously
used the noted variation in plant and animal species under domestication to argue, by
analogy, that human beings could undergo the same variation over generations, thus
producing the dramatically different races of man. To show the danger in using analogies
as the basis for a science, Van Amringe launched into a discussion of the definition and
proper uses of analogies. A philosopher, he said, should not confuse similarity with
analogy. As he put it, “Having the whole organic kingdom for a range, it would be strange
if a man of even superficial knowledge of science, could not find some animal, or
vegetable, to prove any, the most absurd position, if he were permitted to regard every
similitude as an analogy.” As an example of “the absurdity of this mode of reasoning,”
274. Adrian J. Desmond and James R. Moore, Darwin’s Sacred Cause: How a Hatred of Slavery Shaped
Darwin’s Views on Human Evolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009).
275. Peter McCandless, “The Political Evolution of John Bachman: From New York Yankee to South
Carolina Secessionist,” The South Carolina Historical Magazine 108, no. 1 (January 2007): 16–18;
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Van Amringe pointed to the resemblance between human slavery and the ant slavery
discovered by Huber. By analogy, then, “we have an example, by a most unerring law,
derived directly from the Creator, manifested in the instinct of these insects, that slavery
is permitted, if not ordained.”276 But a proper view of this subject, Van Amringe
continued, would demonstrate that this behavior of ants merely resembled the slavery of
humans; one could not make an analogy between the two. Although people used the
terms “resemblance” and “analogy” interchangeably in everyday conversation, they
meant quite different things in science. “Resemblance is an apparent likeness of sensible
qualities,” Van Amringe explained, “but analogy is an agreement of proportions, or
relations of a property, or properties, common to two or more subjects.”277 As an example,
Van Amringe asserted that “all mammalia agree in suckling their young, and are, in this
respect, analogous; but some have the mammae in the breast, others over the
abdomen...in which respects they do not agree, and are not analogous.” By carefully
attending to these various analogies between animals and plants, naturalists classified the
diversity of living things in the world. In this practice of classification, “two animals of
the same genus have analogous generic properties; of the same genus, but of different
species, the generic properties are analogous, and their specific properties diverse.”278
Finally, Van Amringe presented an example of the proper use of analogy to make
philosophically sound inductions. “All the planets of the solar system,” Van Amringe
stated, “agree in so many particulars, in the laws known to govern them, that, because our
planet contains organic beings, and from the known wisdom and benevolence of the
Creator in forming them, we may infer from analogy that all the planets contain organic
276. William Frederick Van Amringe, An Investigation of the Theories of the Natural History of Man (New
York: Baker & Scribner, 1848), 311.
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beings.” He stressed that such an inference could not rise to “a matter of science,” but
only “a highly probable speculation.” A philosopher could only reach this sound
speculation by knowing the “points of agreement” between the various planets, such as
their relative proximity to the sun and their obedience to the universal laws of gravity.
Without this prior knowledge, the speculation that life existed on other planets “would be
only a visionary saying of a dreamer, and not the sober reasoning of a philosopher.” Thus,
speculative analogy, when employed correctly, could serve as a powerful method in
pursuing truth, especially “when the subject is of such a nature as not to be susceptible of
positive proof; or when circumstantial evidence has been given of a fact, and it is
desirable to add other probable circumstances, to give to it additional weight.” Even then,
speculative analogy could only yield probability, not certainty. Analogy certainly could
not form the “basis” of an argument, and Van Amringe claimed that the advocates for the
unity of the human race were doing precisely this in their analogy between domesticated
animals and humans.279 He went on to argue that, at the foundation of Prichard’s
argument, the domestication of animals was not analogous to the domestic or civilized
habits of humans. The physical and mental powers of animals, Van Amringe argued,
degenerated when humans domesticated them. Domestication, for animals, was “a
slavery so absolute and perfect that their very natures are subdued.” In contrast, man
actually achieved improvement of both his body and mind within a domestic, or civilized,
setting. Thus, the two “domesticated” states were completely dissimilar, and therefore the
analogy made between them to argue for the unity of the human race failed at its
foundation.280
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In this analysis, Van Amringe closely reflected the discussions about the
usefulness of analogy in the Enlightenment philosophy of mind literature. Locke argued
that philosophers could employ analogy when discoursing about things that human
beings could not directly observe with the senses. These unobservable subjects consisted
of two categories. The first category included the existence of certain material or
immaterial beings that, for various reasons, human beings could not observe with their
senses. Secondly, Locke noted the use of analogy to investigate “the manner of Operation
in most parts of the Works of Nature: wherein, tho’ we see the sensible Effects, yet their
Causes are unknown.” Propositions about these cases “can appear more or less probable,
only as they hold proportion to other parts of our Knowledge and Observation. Analogy
in these matters is the only help we have, and ‘tis from that alone we draw all our
grounds of Probability.”281 George Gregory, who drew from David Hartley’s discussion of
the use of analogy in comparative anatomy, pointed out that claims about the operation of
the stomachs of different animals only had credibility to the extent that the animals
resembled each other.282 George Berkeley also warned of the dangers of extending
analogies too far. Natural philosophers, Berkeley explained, attempted to discover
“Analogies, Harmonies, and Agreements” in nature. They must exercise caution,
however, in applying these analogies to disparate phenomena. For example, large bodies
clearly obeyed Newton’s law of gravitational attraction, but some phenomena, such as
“the perpendicular Growth of Plants, and the Elasticity of the Air” seemed to run counter
to this law. Thus, philosophers could not use analogies to derive real phenomena from the
general laws that they had promulgated to explain particular phenomena.283 James Hutton
281. Locke, Works, 1:313–14.
282. Gregory, Economy of Nature, 3:536–37.
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reflected Van Amringe’s analysis very closely. Philosophers could only form a “perfect
judgment” from “data that are complete,” and thus the strength of an argument by
analogy depended on how closely the two cases under examination agreed with each
other.284 Finally, Thomas Reid also employed a similar analysis as Van Amringe. There
existed two ways to investigate the human mind, Reid argued: “the way of reflection” and
“the way of analogy.” The first of these involved the philosopher attending closely to the
operation of his own mind and observing how it was affected by external objects. The
second merely required philosophers to find some resemblance between the operations of
the mind and some other phenomenon in nature and draw conclusions from this
observation. Only the first method could lead to truth in philosophy, Reid maintained. He
even provided the same example of the probable existence of life on other planets in the
solar system to demonstrate that analogy could only result in a degree of likelihood, not
certainty. Reid provided another example; the potato plant, he explained, had a great
resemblance to another plant with poisonous properties, but experience demonstrated that
the potato was not, in fact, poisonous. Relying only on analogy, therefore, could easily
lead to mistakes.285
Although Van Amringe did not return directly to a discussion of the enslaved ants,
his analysis of the function of instinct in animals provided an indication as to why one
could not make an analogy between the slavery of ants and the slavery of humans.
Although insects such as ants and bees could display a remarkable capacity to adapt to
different circumstances, they operated purely on instinct and made no improvements to
their methods over time. Human reason, in contrast, was susceptible of improvement, as
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the entirety of human history demonstrated: “The Greeks improved upon the Egyptians
and Phoenicians; and most assuredly the present age has improved upon the Greeks and
Romans, to say nothing of the middle ages.” Van Amringe concluded that man possessed
“a universality of mental power, different in kind and degree, from the specific,
instinctive, limited mental powers of animals, which never have a range beyond their
physical necessities.”286 Thus, one could not draw an analogy between ant slavery and
human slavery because the ants enslaved purely by instinct, while the human institution
was a creation of reason. For his part, Van Amringe expressed his hope that the continued
improvement of the steam engine, a product of the progress of the human mind, would
eventually make human slavery a relic of a bygone era.287
Van Amringe’s analysis of the uses of analogy in science indicated some reasons
why proslavery ideologues did not make the enslaved ants the foundation of their case for
the justice of slavery. Van Amringe, along with several Enlightenment philosophers,
stressed the fragility of arguments by analogy. An analogy could only point the way
towards objects for investigation or provide support for an argument that already had a
strong empirical foundation. Thus, those proslavery commentators who did employ the
enslaved ants in their writings cited them as merely one more brick in the edifice of solid
evidence for the naturalness and justice of slavery. Antislavery writers attempted to goad
the proslavery contingent into using the ants in an argument from analogy, without
success.
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“Natural distinctions in society is the rock on which American Republicanism is built”
In 1851, Samuel A. Cartwright, a prominent southern physician, penned an article
for De Bow’s Review that drew on the empirical tradition to strike back against the attacks
on slavery originating in the North. Cartwright composed this piece as an open letter to
Daniel Webster, the antislavery politician from Massachusetts who was then secretary of
state. The slavery question, Cartwright wrote, was tearing the union apart. He argued that
the source of this rift lay in the incompatible epistemologies employed by the North and
the South. Some northerners, he explained, had adopted the “hypothesis” of the equality
of the races of man without any empirical justification. This hypothesis had previously
led to the disastrous experiment in Haiti of blacks attempting to govern themselves.
Observation of the different capabilities of the races also provided evidence against the
hypothesis. “Free negroes will not work, (having tried the experiment),” Cartwright
claimed, and white people, unlike blacks, could not work effectively in the torrid
environments of sugar cane and cotton plantations. The doctrine of racial equality “has no
foundation in Truth or Nature. All history disproves it. The science of comparative
anatomy bears positive testimony against it.” To further underscore his empirical stance,
Cartwright argued that “our admirable system of government is founded on the Baconian
philosophy carried into politics, and not on impracticable abstractions...Natural
distinctions in society is the rock on which American Republicanism is built.”288 He
reiterated this point about the empirical origin of American government: “It is worthy to
be remembered that our fathers were practical men, and founded our government on the
truths taught by experience, and rejected the sophisms of the a priori logic of the
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Illuminati. Unfortunately those sophisms have outlived the many republics they have
killed.” Cartwright specified that one of these fallacies was the idea that “the negro is
only a lampblacked white man debased by slavery,” which was a “Jacobinical sophism
picked up amongst the ruins it so largely helped to make of republican institutions in
France.”289 Thus, according to Cartwright, antislavery and abolition stood on nothing but
unconfirmed theory, while the South had learned through experience that only slavery
could enable blacks to thrive.
Cartwright made this distinction between the empiricism of the South and the
abstraction of the North even sharper in his interpretation of the modes of reasoning that
each section used. “The southern mind has adopted the a posteriori method of reasoning
on the slavery question, and the northern the a priori,” he explained.
These two methods of considering the subject have brought
the two sections to exactly opposite conclusions. An
admixture of the two modes of reasoning for a long time
gave the great mass of the people, North and South, mixed
and indefinite notions on the merits of the question. The a
priori logic leading them to look upon domestic slavery as
an evil, while the facts, observations, and experience of the
inductive mode of investigation clearly proved, that if it be
an evil, it is one of theoretical evils for which there is no
remedy without incurring greater evils—in other words, no
evil at all.
Unfortunately, Cartwright continued, some southerners amongst the founding generation,
most notably Thomas Jefferson, had adopted the view that slavery was a necessary evil,
not a positive good. Jefferson had racked his mind to find a way to deal with the inferior
black population in Virginia, Cartwright wrote, but the rise of cotton, sugar cane, and rice
had provided an outlet for these people in the Lower South. Cartwright continued to press
the difference between the North and South in the consideration of the slavery question.
289. Ibid., 189–90.
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“Neither party, North or South,” he asserted, “has viewed the question of negro slavery in
a philosophical point of view. It has been mere experience on the one side, and mere
theory on the other.” If only “statesmen” like Webster consulted “comparative anatomy,”
they would see the fundamental physical differences that existed between the races. The
science of anatomy, therefore, could supply the knowledge that could justify the “paradox
of slavery in a free republic, and demonstrate the reason and justice of our political
institutions, in not according to all classes the same privileges.” In particular, Cartwright
pointed to the great knowledge of the physical differences between blacks and whites that
southerners had gained over long experience amongst the two races. This knowledge
could only ease sectional tensions, however, if a respected statesman like Webster
diffused it to the masses.290 Cartwright expressed confidence that “comparative anatomy,
physiology, chemistry, and history” would all testify that “the higher law, which keeps the
negro in servitude” was “written in his organization.”291 These sciences, which combined
experience and theory, could finally put an end to the incessant controversy over slavery.
In his repeated emphasis on the difference in reasoning between the two sections,
Cartwright took a firm stand for an empirical or a posteriori method of inquiry that
privileged observations drawn from experience over abstract theory. Reality, he claimed,
had rudely demolished the abolitionists’ fanciful reasonings on the subject.
As part of Cartwright’s turn to empirical science as a solution to the slavery
controversy, he cited the presence of slavery amongst the ants. Contrary to the moralistic
claims of the abolitionists, slavery was not a sin: “The white and the red ants make slaves
of the black ants, yet they are the very insects to which the Holy Scriptures refer us to
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learn wisdom...Slavery, therefore, of the black to the white man is not incompatible with
the economy of Nature...If it be a sin, it is unlike any other sin, in doing good to the
whole world instead of evil.”292 Cartwright did not expand much on this passing reference
to enslaved ants; much of his letter to Webster implored the Massachusetts politician to
seek answers to the sectional conflict in history, comparative anatomy, and medicine. The
citation of the enslaved ants functioned as just one more pebble in the mountain of
evidence for the compatibility of slavery with nature generally. Naturalists’ discovery of
enslaved ants, Cartwright seemed to say, provided just one more testimony from
empirical science that demonstrated the naturalness of slavery in both the animal and
human realms. Cartwright had no need to make an analogy from the natural world the
cornerstone of his case.
Georgia lawyer Thomas R. R. Cobb also utilized the example of slave ants in his
1858 magnum opus An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery. Cobb contended that
critics of slavery used a faulty definition of natural law to claim that slavery violated such
law. One particular error these critics committed was arguing that the law of nature
consisted of “those deductions which may be drawn from a careful examination of the
operations of the natural world.”293 Such a definition, Cobb claimed, would justify
cannibalism because many uncivilized human tribes engaged in this practice. But even if
this definition were accepted, the presence of enslaving ants would show slavery to be
compatible with the law of nature. Cobb cited French entomologist Pierre André
Latreille’s observation that the rufescent ants did not have adequate jaws and mouths to
do the work needed for the nest’s survival, thus reflecting Cartwright’s justification of
292. Ibid., 189.
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slavery by the supposed greater aptitude for labor among blacks.294 Cobb settled on his
own definition of natural law: “when applied to man in his intercourse with his fellowman, [natural law is] that obligation which reason and conscience impose, so to shape his
course as to attain the greatest happiness, and arrive at the greatest perfection of which
his nature is susceptible.”295 Adopting a similar strategy as Cartwright, Cobb cited a
plethora of authorities from various fields that confirmed that blacks had a particular
nature that fitted them for servitude instead of freedom. Cobb brought forward numerous
authorities from medicine, anatomy, natural history, and human history to demonstrate
that blacks required the guidance of a superior race to bring them to a state of
improvement. He concluded that slavery indeed provided blacks with the best chance to
achieve the height of what nature allowed them in physical, intellectual, and religious
terms.296
New Yorker Samuel Seabury, a clergyman of the Episcopal church, also crafted an
argument in favor of slavery based on natural law. A misunderstanding of the Justinian
Code of Roman law, Seabury contended, had led many antislavery advocates astray.
Although the Romans practiced slavery, the Justinian Code indicated that slavery was
“contrary to natural right.”297 This declaration seemed to indicate that slavery was
inherently immoral and unjust. Seabury argued, however, that this conclusion was
incorrect if one understood the actual meaning of natural law according to the Romans.
They held that the law of nature referred to the operations of the natural world:
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procreation, the raising of young, and other behaviors of animals. Seabury concluded,
“To say that slavery is against Nature, or the law of Nature, in this sense, is merely to say
that no precedent or analogy could then be drawn in favor of slavery from the brute
creation.” But if the Romans had known about the enslaved ants, Seabury claimed that
this fact “would have restrained them from saying slavery was contrary to Nature.”
Quoting a work of natural history, Seabury highlighted “the mutual good-will and
affection, which prevails between the negro ants and their masters, and that, too, mauger
the fact that the relation had its origins in hostility and violence.”298 Seabury went on to
justify slavery by an appeal to the law of nations, which governed human beings living in
society. Thus, Seabury argued that although slavery might not be a beneficial institution
for every society, it was not in itself unjust. Seabury worried that the abolitionists’ zeal
for progress and change would lead to a breakdown of orderly society. Will the
abolitionists, he asked, “who reject Revelation, because it allows slavery, go farther and
proclaim war upon the common sense of mankind? But for particular men, or even for a
single age, to set up their own reason as the measure of all human reason, what is this
better than insanity?” Surely the beliefs of a small minority of antislavery fanatics did not
outweigh the opinion of men throughout the ages who did not find slavery or involuntary
servitude contrary to justice.299 Seabury’s concern about the attack on common sense
revealed a broader anxiety amongst the proslavery contingent. According to Seabury,
Cobb, and Cartwright, abolitionists only consulted their own consciences and rejected the
lessons of experience and the authority of anyone besides themselves. Such arrogance
could lead only to radical changes with unforeseen, and likely nefarious, consequences.
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In all of these works, the enslaved ants provided at most an auxiliary piece of
evidence for the increasingly confident proslavery argument. The example of slavery in
the animal kingdom seemed to function as just another notch in the proslavery theorists’
belt. Taking their cue from Enlightenment epistemology, proslavery Americans knew that
an argument by analogy could only add strength to an already solid case; such an
argument could never form the basis of their case, especially because so much empirical
knowledge already pointed to the justice of slavery. Indeed, antislavery writers brought
up the enslaved ants, hoping that their proslavery adversaries would take the bait and
make an argument by analogy.
“The Anglo-Saxon need only eat the negro”
Some antislavery commentators, dripping with sarcasm, ridiculed the supposed
connection between ant slavery and the peculiar institution and dared proslavery writers
to take up the enslaved ants as proof of the compatibility of slavery with natural law. An
1846 article in the Boston Recorder that reviewed Huber’s discoveries asked why
slaveholders had declined to make more out of the enslaved ants. The correspondent
declared, “It has seemed to us a little remarkable that slaveholders and their apologists
have never built upon these facts, an argument from analogy. The ant hill, though
generally sandy, would be a rather better foundation for a proslavery argument than the
Bible.” This writer elaborated on the possible arguments masters might draw from the
insects in bondage, including that one race was meant for leisure while another was
meant to labor; that the existence of slavery in nature meant that God established and
approved of the institution; that, like the rufescent ants, wealthy planters could not
perform the required labor to provide for themselves; and that, like the black ants, black
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human slaves performed labor happily and without complaint. The article concluded with
a tongue-in-cheek defense of its modest proposal:
If it should be said again, that the negro ants have no
reason, and no knowledge of rights, and no sense of
degradation, and that therefore the analogy fails, how easy
it would be to reply that this was all intended to teach us
that the negro slaves have in fact no rights, and that they
ought to be kept so ignorant that they would have no more
idea of rights or injustice than an ant has, that tugs all day
in and about the hill of its dignified and lazy owner.300
A correspondent to the Philanthropist, an Ohio antislavery newspaper, also noted the
intriguing similarities between southern slaveholders and the slave-making ants. The
story of the rufescent ants’ attacks on the black ants, the correspondent argued, taught that
the master class was “too lazy to work,” but “are first rate fellows to fight.” On Huber’s
experiment that took all the black ants away from the rufescent ants, the correspondent
wrote that the rufescent ants’ behavior demonstrated that the master class was “so
unskillful, effeminate and lazy, that though the materials were furnished them, they could
not build a House—nor feed their young” without the tireless labor of blacks.301
A British writer also got in on the act, noting that the slavery of the ants compared
favorably to that of southerners. Miss L. M. Budgen, who wrote a book about insects for
general audiences under the pseudonym “Acheta Domestica,” noted that “our Lilliputian
slave-owners are wofully [sic] behind-hand, as compared with those of larger stature,
especially with the dwellers in a certain Trans-Atlantic Land of Freedom. They know not
the meaning of Lynch-law, the sound of a whip is never heard within their territories. The
slaves live as well as their possessors, and on some occasions, the common rule of such
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relationship being reversed, would seem to take the chief authority into their own
hands.”302 In an article for Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine, Budgen wondered, as her
American antislavery brethren had, why southern slaveholders had failed to employ the
enslaved ants in defense of slavery. The ants, Budgen continued, “attend more to the
injunctions contained in Paul’s Epistle to Philemon, than the slave-holders of the southern
States.”303
In another example of this use of the enslaved ants to ridicule slaveholders,
Presbyterian minister Robert L. Stanton crafted a direct response to Seabury’s discussion
of natural law and slavery in 1864, near the end of the Civil War. Stanton, the brother-inlaw of abolitionist and women’s rights activist Elizabeth Cady Stanton, savaged Seabury
for defending the rebel slaveholders of the South. Referencing an address by Confederate
Vice President Alexander Stephens in which he proclaimed slavery the cornerstone of the
Confederacy, Stanton wrote that “this great New York Doctor tells us what this ‘cornerstone’ rests upon—an ANT-HILL.”304 If the behaviors of the animals provided a guide to
the law of nature, Stanton reasoned, then cannibalism would also be justified. He darkly
suggested to starving Confederates that “even though it were true, that the carnivorous
animals eat other species only than their own...we could get along with that difficulty
very easily. The Anglo-Saxon need only eat the negro.”305 By this derision, Stanton
successfully ignored much of the substance of Seabury’s argument, for Seabury had
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maintained that it was not necessary to demonstrate the presence of slavery among
animals to justify slavery as compatible with natural law.
Edward Hitchcock, naturalist and president of Amherst College in Massachusetts,
produced History of a Zoological Temperance Convention, an allegorical tale of a
temperance convention attended by representatives from the animal kingdom. He wrote
that he hoped “that this allegorical mode of exhibiting Temperance and some other
important subjects, may excite more interest than a method more didactic.”306 At this
convention, the rufescent and sanguine ants made an appearance to argue for the
advantages of slavery. The rufescent representative admitted that man had given slavery a
bad name, but he insisted that the ant version of slavery was much less cruel because only
infant ants were taken. He wondered, furthermore, why some of the larger animals had
not adopted slavery. The rufescent ant “had no doubt but nature intended that the strong
and the wise should thus compel the weaker and less important animals to sustain
them.”307 Following the rufescent ant’s speech, the anteater denounced his offensive
ideas. Reflecting common critiques of slavery’s negative effect on slaveholders, the
anteater claimed that the constant war the rufescent ants waged to gain slaves made them
violent, proud, and lazy. They were easily insulted and often dueled. The anteater also
rejected the intimation that the particular physical characteristics and innate attitude of
the rufescent ants made them naturally disposed to take slaves. “But I will not waste time
in attempting to prove to this Convention,” the anteater continued, “that the Author of the
Universe never created animals of any sort for the purpose of making them kidnappers,
slave-holders...or...licentious gluttons and revelers.”308 Another speaker blamed man’s
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Fall in the Garden of Eden for this wicked enslaving behavior and all other vices and
cruelties in the animal kingdom.309 Hitchcock thus challenged the notion that slavery in
the natural world justified the enslavement of human beings.
Other antislavery responses to the reports of enslaved ants consisted of more
nuanced discussions of the proper uses of natural historical facts. An 1832 commentary
on a textbook of natural history in the highbrow North American Review anticipated
mischievous uses of the enslaved ants. Defenses of human slavery based on enslaved
ants, the author argued, were no more valid than defenses of monarchy based on the
habits of bees. Monarchy might work for the bees, the commentator continued, but
monarchy could not satisfy the “wants and improvement of man.”310 In other words, the
analogy between human and ant slavery did not hold. This conclusion did not stop the
author, however, from commenting approvingly on the feminine modesty of queen ants:
“The female ants, when they become mothers of a family, cut off their wings and throw
them away, thinking, doubtless, that domestic cares and duties will leave them no time to
fly round as in former days.”311 Similarly, a correspondent in the Quaker journal The
Friend sought to defend natural history even as the science revealed the dark underside of
animal behavior. In response to letters to the paper expressing uneasiness at its
publication of facts about ant slavery, which could be used to prop up the peculiar
institution, the correspondent attempted to reconcile the study of natural history with
Christian moralism. God made man, the writer claimed, with faculties of observation and
reason to explore the world. The discovery of the enslaving behavior of ants reminded
men of the necessity of the saving power of Christ: “We should never be deterred in
309. Ibid., 139.
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consequence of discovering in these inferior natures an evidence of dispositions, which
Christianity alone can enable us to subdue within ourselves.”312 Far from being evidence
for slavery’s compatibility with natural law, the barbaric slaveholding instinct in ants
revealed that man must constantly struggle to overcome his own beastly tendencies. In
this case, the editor accepted the analogy between human and ant slavery, but instead of
agreeing that it justified the peculiar institution, the editor took it as a lesson in the need
for humans to turn to the better angels of their nature to overcome sinful predispositions.
Conclusion
What are we to make of the role of the enslaved ants in the slavery controversy?
For proslavery theorists, the example of the enslaved ants served merely as a minor
supporting fact, if that. The sarcastic reactions of Stanton and the correspondent in the
Boston Recorder partially explain why proslavery did not take this tack: they would have
left themselves open to claims that they saw ants as equivalent to humans. In addition,
putting an argument for slavery by analogy at the front and center of their rhetoric ran
counter to the warnings about the fragility of analogy in the philosophy of mind
literature.
But the significance of their reluctance goes beyond potential rhetorical pitfalls.
As Cobb’s book demonstrated, proslavery theorists saw human beings as social creatures
embedded in a society. Seabury warned against following the abolitionists’ argument to
its logical conclusion. Declare slavery contrary to the law of nature because it deprived
certain individuals of freedom, and soon the abolitionists and their ilk would be
attempting to liberate women from the tyranny of marriage or to outlaw private property.
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These meddlesome reform impulses, according to the defenders of slavery, stemmed
from a flawed notion of natural law, one that attempted to impose an excessively
individualist vision of what was natural onto society. For the proslavery theorists, natural
law followed from man’s nature as a social being, not an atomized individual. Thus, to
understand what was natural and just, one needed to observe society and study human
history, not draw analogies between the natural and human worlds. The defenders of
slavery, therefore, had no need to find the peculiar institution amongst the animals to
know that the institution was just; their examinations of human nature through
observation and the study of history accomplished this task. This episode of the enslaved
ants, then, demonstrated the ambiguous status of natural history in the nineteenth century.
On the one hand, the science could reveal the presence of the divine hand in nature. On
the other, both pro- and antislavery advocates recognized that it was ludicrous to apply
the creator’s designs for insects to human society.
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CHAPTER 6
INDIAN CORN, METEORS, AND RACIAL HAIR: THE SCIENCE OF PETER A.
BROWNE
Introduction
Peter Arrell Browne (1782-1860) practiced law in Philadelphia and served as
professor of geology and mineralogy at Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania.
Throughout his career, Browne published on a wide variety of scientific topics, including
Indian corn, meteors, and the hair and wool of animals. At first blush, it seems that these
diverse interests could have nothing in common with each other. But a consistent
philosophy of science pervades Browne’s corpus. In short, Browne operated in a natural
historical mode of investigation.313 In each subject he undertook, Browne attempted to
gather as many relevant facts as he could, and for the most part he hesitated to construct
complete theories from these facts. Browne also displayed a strong interest in
classification of natural objects; his work on hair and wool in particular shows him
organizing hair and wool by type, and he used these observations to contribute to the
classification of the types of mankind.
Three particular themes stand out in a review of Browne’s work. First, Browne
emphasized the necessity of gathering numerous accurate facts prior to systematizing and
theorizing. As he stated in an 1826 lecture that advocated for a geological survey of
313. Lewis, A Democracy of Facts.
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Pennsylvania, “all correct reasoning upon natural history, must be founded upon facts,
and these facts must be laboriously collected by the practical mineralogist and geologist,
before they can be analyzed, compared, and reduced to a system.”314 Second, Browne
repeatedly underscored the constancy of nature’s laws, and he argued that science should
seek to reveal these laws. In his address on the potential for a geological survey, Browne
stated that “the laws of geology can be deduced with more certainty, from the rocks of the
United States, than from those of any other country hitherto examined.”315 Finally, many
of Browne’s works advocated the pursuit of science in service to the United States.
Several of Browne’s publications bore the motto “Ducit Amor Patriae” (“love of country
leads me”) on the title page.316 His treatise on hair and wool in particular emphasized how
a greater knowledge of the natural history of wool would enable Americans to compete
with foreign sheep breeders. As revealed in his scientific publications, Browne practiced
a science that echoed the British empiricists in its emphasis on the collection of facts and
its assumption of the constancy of nature’s laws. Browne also reflected Condorcet’s
optimism in his argument for the ability of careful measurement to lead to unlimited
progress in the sciences and, in turn, society in general.
The Nativity of Indian Corn
In 1837, Browne read a paper on corn before the Chester County (Pennsylvania)
Cabinet of Natural Science. He made plain to his audience that he was speaking on the
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Indian corn, known by the binomial name Zea mays, and not generic corn, which could
refer to any kind of grain that had seeds growing “on ears, and not in pods.” In this way,
British statutes concerning any kind of grain were labeled as “corn laws.” Browne thus
dedicated his speech to the plant that we call corn today.317 A large portion of the paper
consisted of an extended discussion on whether corn originated in the New World or
somewhere else. According to Browne, he undertook this investigation of corn’s nativity
because of the disturbing lack of consensus on the subject. Francis Lieber’s
Encyclopaedia Americana, Browne said, stated that the birthplace of corn was unknown.
“It is a reflection upon, not only the learned, but the mass of the community,” Browne
complained, “that their great staple commodity—the plant that demands and receives the
patronage, the skill, and the industry of a large agricultural part, of a great agricultural
nation, should be so imperfectly known.”318 Browne thus argued that the natural history
of Indian corn would never be complete without an understanding of the plant’s origin.
Browne proceeded to give an exhaustive summary of what writers had said on the
subject. He demonstrated that the “corn” spoken of in the Bible could not have been the
Indian corn known to Americans, but rather a kind of wheat or other small grain. A
review of histories of European contact with the Americas followed, and Browne cited
sources from the Spanish, French, and British. All of these writings pointed towards an
American birthplace for corn, for the writers continually testified that explorers and
settlers either had seen corn cultivated by Indians or had witnessed Indians making use of
corn as a major part of their diets. Browne also analyzed an Indian language, which gave
evidence that the Lenni Lennape Indians considered corn “the ORIGINAL GRAIN,” or a
317. An illustration that accompanied the published speech depicted an ear of Indian corn found in the
tomb of a Peruvian mummy. Browne, An Essay on Indian Corn, 5.
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native plant. Finally, Browne brought Peter Kalm, a student of the great Linnaeus
himself, to the witness chair. Kalm, who traveled to North America in 1748, wrote in a
narrative of his trip that the Indians had been unfamiliar with European crops such as
wheat, barley, and oats, but they had planted corn extensively. Browne insisted that Kalm
“was a pupil of Linaeus, and a good botanist, and therefore his evidence is very creditable
upon this subject.”319
The sum of all of these testimonies, Browne argued, gave strong support for the
American origin of corn. In defending his reliance on the testimony of other men,
Browne made similar arguments as the philosophers of mind did when discussing the
authority of human testimony in seeking knowledge:
What are the inferences to be fairly adduced from this body
of concurring testimony? It must be recollected that it
emanates from many persons of different habits and
propensities, and belonging to different nations, civilized
and savage; among whom there could have existed no
connivance or collusion: it has been made public at
different periods of time, and under various circumstances;
and relates to different parts of a widely extended territory,
and it is therefore not obnoxious to the objection of having
been an ancient error originally fallen into by accident, and
unintentionally adhered to and copied by subsequent
writers. Standing as it does on independent ground, each
piece of testimony corroborates and strengthens the others;
and the whole taken together, establishes in a way that
defies refutation that the Indian corn claims this hemisphere
for the place of its nativity.320
In particular, this small disquisition on the authority of testimony recalled the analyses of
John Locke and Isaac Watts, both of whom argued for the credibility of testimony that
came from multiple witnesses that concurred in the facts that they related.321
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Browne concluded his essay with hints on how agriculturalists could improve the
culture of Indian corn. He quoted a letter from Thomas N. Baden, a planter in Maryland,
who claimed to have improved his corn crop by only selecting the finest kernels for from
his present crop to use as seeds for the next year’s crop. Those farmers who had used his
corn seed, Baden claimed, had greatly increased their corn yield per acre. If Chester
County farmers followed Baden’s principles, Browne claimed, they could also greatly
increase their output of corn to the great benefit of the state and the country.322 Thus did
Browne’s essay include a patriotic call to improvement in addition to its detailed
discussion of corn’s nativity.
The Natural History of Meteors
In 1843, Browne presented an essay on meteors, solid objects that traveled at
great speed across the sky, to the National Institute for the Promotion of Science. This
paper offered no original observations of meteors from Browne. Instead, he undertook a
comprehensive review of observations of meteors by others, and he scrutinized the
theories that attempted to account for them. The essay displayed several noteworthy
epistemological strategies. First, as in his essay on corn, Browne combined the
testimonies of many observers to provide evidence for his contentions about meteors.
Second, Browne relied on the constancy of the laws of nature to reject accounts of
meteors that he found flawed. Finally, Browne concluded his essay with a statement of
his own suggestion for the origin of meteors, but he offered this account only as a
“supposition,” not a fully fledged “theory,” for he argued that the “natural history” of
meteors was not complete enough to warrant such a definitive statement.323 All in all,
322. Browne, An Essay on Indian Corn, 25–27.
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Browne’s essay on meteors exhibited a highly inductive method that drew from the
British empirical tradition.
In a similar manner as his review of the evidence for the nativity of corn, Browne
brought forth the concurring testimony of numerous witnesses to argue that, contrary to
some accounts of meteors, these objects were completely solid, not gaseous or of
electromagnetic origin. Browne claimed that “there is a body of evidence, consistent in
all its parts, emanating from numerous eyewitnesses, living in different countries and
ages, persons of known integrity and of sufficient skill and knowledge to guide the
judgment” that the pieces of meteors, called aërolites, were made up of “iron, nickel,
silex,” and other solid substances. Naturalists had collected these aërolites and had
deposited them in natural history museums, and chemists had analyzed them closely.
“Upon this solid basis of human testimony the learned have pronounced, that aërolites,
and the meteors from which they are ejected, are Solids,” Browne concluded.324 Once
again, the concurrence of all these witnesses provided solid support for Browne’s
description of meteors.
At several points throughout the essay, Browne pointed to the constancy of the
laws of nature to argue against certain accounts of meteors. For example, Browne
reviewed the observations of Tiberius Cavallo, who described a meteor that passed over
England in 1783. Cavallo wrote that the meteor initially appeared almost still before
traveling at a rapid rate across the sky. Browne explained this strange behavior by
pointing out that an object moving directly towards the observer often appeared still even
if it had great velocity. Furthermore, “if the meteor was at rest when Cavallo first saw it,
there is no possibility of accounting for the prodigious velocity which it was immediately
324. Ibid., 12.
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afterwards known to have had. On the contrary, it would have fallen in a direct line to this
earth in obedience to the universal law of gravity.”325 Later in the essay, Browne
evaluated theories that argued for the terrestrial origin of meteors. According to some
men of science, the constant and immense heat provided by the sun could transform
normally solid substances on the surface of the earth into gases, which would then rise
into the atmosphere and recombine into solid masses, finally emerging as the meteors that
observers had identified. Browne pointed out several flaws in these theories. First, the
sun’s rays lacked the necessary magnitude of heat to vaporize solid substances like iron.
Second, chemists had found that aërolites were composed of metals that were never or
rarely found together in the earth. Finally, even if the sun somehow had the power to
vaporize solid substances, Browne could not conceive how the particles could recombine
in the atmosphere to form the large meteors that observers had reported. These particles
could only recombine with each other, Browne explained, if they were attracted to each
other “according to that law which says that every particle of matter in the universe
attracts every other particle, with a force directly proportioned to the mass of the
attracting particle and inversely to the square of the distances between them.” If the
meteors were formed in this way, they should have immediately become attracted to the
earth and should have proceeded to the earth’s surface, “as takes place with rain, hail and
snow.” But, as many observers had attested, meteors traveled at a very great velocity
through the air and were not observed to crash into the earth. Browne concluded,
“Before, therefore, we can admit this theory of solid meteors being formed in our
atmosphere, we must believe that a fundamental and universal law of nature has, in their
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cases, been abrogated, or at least suspended.”326 He thus took the constancy of nature’s
laws as a given; any explanatory narrative of natural phenomena needed to accord with
these generally applicable laws.
After pointing out numerous flaws in many of the theories that purported to
explain the origin of meteors, Browne concluded his essay with a defense of his own
proposition. He argued that the sun ejected meteors from its body at a great velocity, and
that after running a course throughout space and through the peripheries of planets, they
returned to the sun. Browne proposed this idea, however, in a modest manner that urged
the collection of more facts before making any attempt at a definitive judgment. Indeed,
Browne refused to call his idea a “theory.” As he explained, “Sufficient facts have not yet
been collected in relation to the natural history of these extraordinary objects whereon to
find an hypothesis.” He put forward his proposal as “a more possible supposition than
any theory of their origin yet promulgated.”327 As an example of Browne’s desire for
more facts, earlier in the essay he had stated that “as that the rate at which solid meteors
move is a feature of the greatest importance, in their natural history, it is to be regretted
that upon it more attention has not been bestowed.” Only five out of the many observed
cases of meteors included information about their velocity. Many accounts merely
remarked that the meteors had a “very great velocity” or some similar imprecise
statement.328 In this case, Browne desired a quantified observation of the meteor in order
to make a better supposition about its origin. Thus, Browne adopted an empirical stance
that emphasized the more complete collection of the facts of an object’s natural history
before making theoretical judgments about it.
326. Ibid., 27–28.
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Hair and Wool Studies
In the early 1850s, Browne published a book, two pamphlets, and several
newspaper articles on his exhaustive investigations of hair and wool, which he referred to
together as “pile.”329 His studies aimed for nothing less than a complete natural history of
the hair and wool of all animals. Browne’s investigations in this area revealed his concern
with the classification of the varieties of pile. As Peter Dear has argued, scientific
classification during the Enlightenment aimed for more than just an organized
arrangement of natural objects like plants, animals, and minerals. Taxonomists attempted
to create classificatory systems that revealed the fundamental order of nature. In botany,
for example, naturalists argued over how to arrange the numerous species of plants so
that the result would demonstrate the very design of God in creating the different species.
Should botanists look to the form of the flowers to organize plants, as Linnaeus did, or
should the classificatory system take account of the minute differences between all parts
of a plant, as several critics of Linnaeus argued? In addition to these philosophical
disputes about the proper order of things, some naturalists attempted to claim that a
legitimate classificatory system would also serve useful purposes. In botany, this concern
with practicality meant that the best system of classification would simultaneously put
plants in the correct philosophical order and place plants with similar medical, dietary, or
ornamental qualities close to each other.330 Browne contended that his classification of
wool and hair would serve these two purposes. Defending his focus on such a peculiar
aspect of natural history, Browne argued that his studies of hair and wool could both
inform debates about the “unity of the human species” and improve the raising of animals
329. Browne, Trichologia Mammalium, 7.
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for wool and hair.331 Thus, his work on pile would accomplish the philosophical purpose
of distinguishing between the different types of mankind and fulfill the practical purpose
of enabling American sheep breeders to compete with the rest of the world. Besides this
concern with classification, Browne revealed his intellectual descent from the
Enlightenment epistemological literature throughout his writings on pile.
First, Browne gestured to the Enlightenment discussion about the nature of ideas
and, in particular, Locke’s analysis of complex ideas of substances. In the first chapter of
his treatise Trichologia Mammalium, Browne attempted to define exactly what he was
studying. To his knowledge, no one had supplied “an accurate definition, nor even an
exact description, of pile, hair or wool.” Browne found that he also could not compose
such a definition. He stated that “a definition, to be logical, should furnish a general idea
of the nature of the genus of the object defined, with all the essential specific differences.
To do this, we are not, at present, prepared. But a description may pass examination, if it
contains the most remarkable properties of the objects described.” He then provided a
complex description of pile that attempted to include numerous characteristics that all
specimens of hair and wool shared.332 In this brief discussion of the definition of pile,
Browne recalled Locke’s argument about complex ideas of substances. Locke had
pointed out the problem that the human mind encountered when discoursing about
substances. Complex ideas of things in the world, Locke argued, could only be made up
of simple ideas that “have been discover’d to co-exist in Nature.” Philosophers erred, he
continued, when they attempted to claim that underneath the observable qualities of a
thing lay some real “essence” that could explain all of its properties. “The Names of
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Substances then,” Locke explained, “whenever made to stand for Species, which are
suppos’d to be constituted by real Essences, which we know not, are not capable to
convey Certainty to the Understanding.”333 Using Locke’s vocabulary, Browne formed a
complex idea of pile by including many of the simple ideas excited by the object. He
noted, for example, pile’s great “ductility, flexibility, elasticity and tenacity.”334 Much of
the rest of Browne’s treatise consisted of exhaustive descriptions of hair and wool
specimens, thus reflecting Locke’s emphasis on finding the simple ideas that coexisted in
nature rather than uncovering some root essence of a natural object.
In order to construct this descriptive science of pile, Browne created an elaborate
method of classification and description that recalled the classification systems of
Linnaeus and other botanists. Browne listed nineteen items that the trichologist should
include in his description of a specimen.335 He followed this system in each specimens he
described. For example, Browne provided a description of hair from a three-toed sloth
specimen kept at the Academy of Natural Sciences in Philadelphia.336 In constructing this
descriptive system, Browne attempted to bring standardization to the studies of pile.
From these observations, Browne made a fundamental distinction between two kinds of
pile: hair and wool. The two differed in at least eleven ways, Browne argued. In brief,
hair had a rounder shape than wool; hair had fewer scales that jutted out from the central
shaft when compared to wool; hair hung straight or curled while wool kinked and
“frizzled”; and “the coloring matter of a perfect hair” was found in a “central canal,”
while wool always had the coloring matter distributed throughout the entire strand.337 In
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elaborating on the specific characteristics that defined the difference between hair and
wool, Browne perhaps drew from the method of the great French zoologist and anatomist
Georges Cuvier. The Frenchman had effected a revolution in the classification of animals
by attending to the specific differences in the structure of various organs used for the
survival of the species, such as the teeth, which served as essential appliances in enabling
animals to receive nutrition. Close analysis of different animals’ teeth, for example, had
enabled him to argue that varieties of animals thought to have been the same species
actually belonged to completely different species.338 Hair and wool might seem
superficially similar, Browne argued, but close examination revealed important
differences. We will see shortly how Browne used these small differences to argue that
the different races of mankind were actually different species.
Browne’s descriptive system required more than just naked-eye observations of
strands of hair and wool. The cross-sectional shape of the hair or wool constituted a
crucial characteristic of the specimen in question. One could not determine, however, the
cross-sectional shape of a strand of hair or wool by simply viewing the sample. Browne
argued that the investigator needed to view the cross section under a microscope in order
to ascertain the true shape of the hair. This observation could only be accomplished with
a special device that could cut cross sections from the strands.339
From these observations of hair and wool cross sections, Browne constructed a
classification system for the pile of the human head. He divided human pile cross
sections into three categories, which, he argued, corresponded with the three “species” of
humankind. The first category, the “cylindrical” pile, included pile cross sections that
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approximated a circle. Second, Browne named the “oval” pile, which had a cross section
in which the longest diameter was one-third greater than the smallest diameter. Browne
called the third category “eccentrically elliptical” pile, which had a cross section in which
the longest diameter was two-thirds longer than the smallest diameter. Some specimens
fell in between these three divisions. Browne included particular names for those piles
that fell between the cylindrical and the oval or between the oval and eccentrically
elliptical. He remarked that intermediate cases should be included in whichever main
division was closest to it.340
The three main categories, Browne explained, nicely corresponded with the
“direction” of the pile, or the “path which a filament of pile pursues from the point where
it pierces the epidermis to its apex.” Cylindrical pile always hung “straightly and lankly
from the head.” Oval pile “must inevitably flow or curl.” Finally, eccentrically elliptical
pile “must always be crisped or frizzled, and sometimes spirally curled.” Browne
explained these three different directions by pointing to the action of the “fibres” within a
single strand of hair or wool. In cylindrical pile, all of the fibers resided equidistant from
the center of a single strand. Thus, cylindrical pile hung absolutely straight from the head.
But oval pile “has a greater number of fibres on its two flattened sides than upon the
ellipses,” and therefore the pile flowed or curled “in the direction of one of these flattened
sides.” Eccentrically elliptical pile had an even flatter shape than oval pile, and therefore
the pile curled even more dramatically to result in a frizzled or spirally curled
organization. To convince the reader of these “laws” of the direction of pile, Browne
made an analogy between oval and eccentrically elliptical pile and a spatula. One could
easily bend the spatula “in the direction of either of its flattened surfaces,” but one found
340. Ibid., 51–52.
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it impossible to bend in the opposite direction. In the same way, oval and eccentrically
elliptical pile flowed in the direction of either of the two long sides. Finally, Browne
reviewed the “inclinations” of pile, or the angle by which the strand of pile exited the
skin. Although the inclination of pile did not depend on the shape or the direction,
Browne found that cylindrical and oval pile always made an acute angle with the skin,
while eccentrically elliptical pile always made a right angle with the skin.341
Browne used these three distinctive types of the pile of the human head to argue
that each type represented a different species of mankind. As Browne wrote, “if we can
prove that there are three portions of men who now exist, and who from time immemorial
have existed, the covering of whose heads, respectively, do, and have, uniformly,
corresponded with these three species of pile, there will be no difficulty in pronouncing
that (judging from the pile of their heads) they belong to three distinct species of men.”342
Browne proceeded to describe the results of his examinations of the pile of living
American Indians and Indian mummies from North and South America, and he
concluded that all of them were of the cylindrical type. Indians in both the present and the
past, then, displayed the same characteristics in their hair. He wrote that his collection of
Chinese pile also followed the cylindrical prototype.343 Browne proffered a similar
analysis for oval and eccentrically elliptical pile. His many examinations of hair from
white Europeans and Americans demonstrated that they all were of the oval type. He also
cited the ubiquitous appearance of flowing and curly hair in classical poetry and
mythology as evidence for the ancient heritage of oval hair amongst the white race of
man.344 Finally, Browne turned to the eccentrically elliptical pile. He prefaced his analysis
341. Ibid., 57–59.
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by writing that “it might easily be supposed that in a city like Philadelphia, abounding in
black faces, no difficulty would be encountered in procuring pure negro hair. It is quite
the contrary.” Browne admitted that he could only obtain fifteen specimens of “pure”
negro pile, and all of these came from either slaves in the United States or present-day
Africans. These specimens all displayed the characteristics of eccentrically elliptical
pile.345 “We have thus shown,” Browne concluded, “by the pile of the head, that there are
three distinct species of human beings inhabiting this globe, and whose ancestors have
been its inhabitants for at least from 2,700 to 3,000 years—probably from the first
creation of man.” Using his distinction between hair and wool, Browne held that the pile
on the heads of Indians and whites was hair, while the pile of blacks was wool.346 Browne
confidently asserted this conclusion about the antiquity of these species of man even
though he admittedly did not have ancient specimens of negro hair. Furthermore, Browne
pointed out the superiority of the hair of the white man compared to the wool of blacks.
Filaments of whites’ hair, Browne asserted, contained a central canal that carried the
coloring matter within it. Blacks’ wool lacked this canal; the coloring matter was instead
suffused throughout the filament. “According to the rules of science,” Browne
proclaimed, “one organ is considered more perfect than another, if it employs a greater
variety of apparatus in the performance of its functions.” The inclusion of a coloring
canal in whites’ hair, then, made this pile superior to blacks’ pile.347 Here, Browne clearly
applied Cuvier’s differential analysis of organs to make distinctions between the pile of
whites and blacks. Although both kinds of pile covered the head, and thus served the
345. Ibid., 65–66.
346. Ibid., 66.
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same function, the white man’s pile displayed a completely different, and superior,
organization when compared with the black man’s pile.
Browne utilized this three-species classification of man to launch into a
discussion of hybridization. In his treatise on hair and wool and a smaller pamphlet,
Browne put forth a complex system of nomenclature for human hybrids based on the
fraction of black, white, and Indian blood that an individual possessed.348 Returning to the
subject of the pile on the human head, Browne asserted that “the pile of the head of
human hybrids does not exhibit one uniform new variety, varying from that of both
parents; but generally, perfect filaments which resemble that of the one parent, and other
perfect filaments which resemble that of the other parent; for example, the progeny of a
white and black will have some perfect oval hairs, and some perfect eccentrically
elliptical wool.” At other times, “the constitutional energy of one parent outweighs that of
the other,” and then the hybrid would only have one category of pile on his or her head.
Browne further explained that, “in accordance with the general laws of hybridism,” these
hybrids could not form a self-perpetuating intermediate race. In some cases, multiple
generations of hybrids breeding together gradually lost the ability to reproduce entirely.
In other cases, the union of two or more species resulted in the offspring tending towards
the species of one parent, and thus the offspring of this hybrid fell back into one species
rather than forming a new hybrid species.349 He warned, however, that even if the hybrid
offspring resembled a member of one of the pure species, the blood of the “inferior”
species still remained in his or her veins. Thus, Browne urged whites to avoid marrying
mulattoes who appeared white, “for fear of finding ourselves, some day, blessed with a
348. Browne, Trichologia Mammalium, 67–72; P. A. Browne, The Classification of Mankind, by the Hair
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black heir.”350 Browne supported these arguments with citations of William Van
Amringe’s An Investigation of the Theories of the Natural History of Man (1848), which
defined the several races of man as different species. Van Amringe, for example, pointed
out that the offspring of mulatto parents usually did not maintain the intermediate color of
their parents, and they often appeared either completely “white” or entirely “black.”
Browne added that he had discovered a similar phenomenon in the pile of mulattoes;
some strands of their pile appeared to be similar to their white parents while the others
had the characteristics of their black parents. This evidence, Browne argued, amply
demonstrated the “natural abhorrence to the amalgamation of species.” He continued,
“The natural disgust planted in the minds of all animals to the mixture of species, seems
to have been wisely pre-ordained, in order to preserve the purity and beauty of
creation.”351
Armed with these observations, Browne entered into the controversy over the
unity or plurality of the human species. In 1849, he read a paper before the American
Ethnological Society that took direct aim at James Cowles Prichard’s contention that
black and white people were of the same species. First, Browne took issue with
Prichard’s contention that unions between the different races of man could form selfperpetuating intermediate races. The cases Prichard had brought forward, Browne argued,
failed to demonstrate this proposition, thus showing that the different races of man were
in fact different species, not just different varieties of the same species. Second, Prichard
attempted to argue that because domesticated animals could produce numerous varieties
of the same species, the same process could occur with man. “Change of climate and
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habits” could also lead to the differentiation of the same species. Browne contended that
Prichard’s attempt to use an analogy between the “lower animals” and man also failed to
prove his argument. Historical sources, Browne explained, demonstrated that the races of
man had remained basically constant over a long time period. For example, Herdotus’s
description of black men matched the current appearance of Africans. Furthermore, long
experience had shown that a “tropical climate” could not turn white men into black ones.
“To these unyielding facts,” Browne declared, “all reasoning from analogy must
succumb, and all biases of religion and humanity must give way.” Reflecting a
Newtonian disapproval of preconceived theories, Browne accused Prichard of wedding
himself to his “hypothesis” instead of allowing himself to be led by facts towards the
truth.352
Browne also objected to Prichard’s contention that the covering of the heads of
blacks was hair, not wool. In a systematic analysis of Prichard’s observations of the pile
of human beings, Browne pointed out several confusing passages and mistakes. In the
first place, Browne argued that Prichard, despite citing several authors on the subject of
hair and wool, never specifically gave a precise description of the difference between the
two. Prichard’s descriptions of pile specimens that he examined, then, were filled with
imprecise claims about their characteristics. For example, Prichard claimed that a sample
of a black’s hair when viewed under a microscope “was extremely unlike that of wool.”
Browne replied, “This is not the language of a naturalist, examining an object with the
microscope. He either explains the particulars in which an ‘extreme unlikeness’ exists, or
he furnishes drawings and descriptions of both objects, and leaves the reader to judge of
the discrepancy for himself.” Other claims made by Prichard, such as his assertion that
352. Browne, The Classification of Mankind...with an Answer to Dr. Prichard, 11–13.
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“the hair of the negro had the appearance of a cylinder,” completely contradicted
Browne’s observations. “Where the negro blood is pure,” Browne wrote, “they are
always eccentrically elliptical or flat.”353 Prichard went on to claim, according to Browne,
that even if naturalists rejected his claim that blacks had hair, not wool, on their bodies,
this opinion would make no difference for his main contention that all the races of man
shared a single species, for many animals grouped into a single species could display
variations in their coverings, with some having wool and some having hair. Browne
rejected this assertion outright. If one variety of an animal always possessed hair, and
another always possessed wool, then a naturalist could offer no argument why the two
should not be considered species instead of varieties. “Since the white man has hair upon
his head, and the negro has wool,” Browne concluded, “we have no hesitancy in
pronouncing that they belong to two distinct species.”354 For this reply to Prichard,
Browne earned the admiration of Thomas R. R. Cobb, a Georgia proslavery theorist.355
Browne applied these admonitions against hybridization directly to the practical
question of the improvement of American sheep breeding. According to Browne, there
existed two completely separate species, not breeds, of domesticated sheep. The first
species produced hair, and the second species produced wool. The hairy species yielded a
fabric that would not shrink, and thus the fleece of this animal could be made into flannel,
worsted, blankets, and hose.356 The fleece of the wooly species could be felted and fulled;
in brief, manufacturers matted the wool fibers together “to form a compact mass.”
Browne explained the felting and fulling processes by relating observations of wool
under the microscope, which revealed numerous scales on the wool fibers that jutted out
353. Ibid., 15–17.
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from the central shaft. These scales allowed the wool fibers to become entangled with one
another, thus forming a single piece of fabric. This operation required the wool fibers to
shrink, and thus the wooly sheep provided a completely different material than the hairy
sheep, whose pile did not shrink.357 Yes, Browne admitted, there existed sheep that
possessed both hair and wool, but he argued that these were likely hybrids, exactly
analogous to mulattoes who had both hair and wool on their heads. In conclusion, then,
Browne urged the American sheep breeder to breed only the best hairy sheep together and
only the best wooly sheep together. Careful breeding practices that followed this “golden
rule” would result in “a permanent, self-producing stock.” Hairy sheep would produce
hair, and their offspring would produce only hair without the chance of blood from the
wooly sheep ruining the purity of the product, and the same would apply for the wooly
species.358
In addition to Browne’s discussion of the implications of his pile studies for the
natural history of man and the science of breeding, he put great emphasis on precise
measurement of pile specimens. Browne invented several instruments for measuring
different characteristics of pile. First, he offered a method to ascertain the fineness, or
thinness, of pile. In the wool business, the finer the wool, the more valuable it was. An
exact measurement of the fineness required one to cut an individual filament into disks
before using the micrometer, a tiny ruler used in conjunction with a microscope, to
measure the diameter.359 Before this method came into use, Browne contended that “the
fineness (diameter) of wool was a mere guess, founded upon the experience of the wool
357. Ibid., 154–56.
358. Ibid., 158, 171.
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stapler.” With the advent of these instruments, the fineness became “a matter of
mathematical certainty.” Because these apparatuses cost a large sum, Browne suggested a
shortcut method for breeders. He recommended the construction of a “series of tubes”
that could be “[drawn] out one from another, like those of a telescope.” The user would
then take one strand from the sample of wool and place it on a card. After attaching this
card to the end of the tubes and looking through the other end, he would lengthen the
nested tubes until he could no longer see the strand of wool. Then, he would replace the
sample card with another card that contained a number of strands of wool already
measured by the micrometer. Upon determining the thickest strand on the card that he
could no longer see, the user would obtain an estimate of his wool’s fineness. This device
thus provides a particularly explicit example of embodied technology. As Browne
acknowledged, the vanishing point of the hairs depended on the eyesight of the individual
user.360
Second, Browne described a method of measuring the ductility, elasticity, and
tenacity of pile. His measuring instrument consisted of two clamps that stretched between
them a single strand of pile a little longer than one inch. These clamps were mounted
vertically and one inch apart on a brass plate that also held a ruler divided into small parts
of an inch which could be shifted up and down. The bottom clamp included a small
suspended disk on which the user would place weights during the measurement of the
pile’s characteristics. To determine the ductility, or the ability of the pile to be stretched,
the user added weights to the disk until the strand began to stretch. The user then
measured how far the strand stretched using the ruler. For elasticity, or the ability of the
pile to return to its original length, the user removed the weights added to the disk and
360. Browne, Trichologia Mammalium, 102–3.
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measured how far the strand returned towards its initial one-inch length. Finally, the user
repeated this process until he determined what weight caused the strand to break. This
weight constituted the measure of the tenacity, or the strength of the pile. The more
ductility, elasticity, and tenacity the wool possessed, the more valuable the sample, for the
first two characteristics stood in for softness, while tenacity stood for the overall
strength.361
Efforts to quantify the qualities of wool, Browne and agricultural reformers
argued, would necessarily improve American production by determining the caliber of
wool exactly, without relying on the experiential knowledge of manufacturers and
breeders. A committee from the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture inspected
Browne’s trichometer in 1849 and pronounced it inexpensive and easy to use. Most
importantly, it would “enable farmers to select the best wooled sheep with much more
certainty than can be done by the eye or hand alone, and consequently to improve their
flock by rejecting those of inferior quality.”362 In his treatise, Browne claimed that his
instruments would allow the breeder and manufacturer to “determine the four most
essential properties of fleece” without relying on the word of the purchaser regarding the
fleece’s value. “It is to this platform of independence that we desire to elevate the
American farmer and manufacturer,” Browne claimed. Usually, he continued, the softness
of the fleece was “judged by passing it through the fingers or over the inside of the lips,
but may be determined with the trichometer.”363 The editor of the Philadelphia journal
The Plough, the Loom, and the Anvil agreed that measurement could bring great
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improvements in American sheep breeding. “Hitherto the qualities of wool have been too
much a matter of loose comparison and conjecture, without any certain test,” the editor
wrote. “The mathematical precision with which its fineness is ascertained by Mr.
Browne, leaves no room for cavil.”364 Browne then provided a list of his measurements of
the fineness of wool from around the world. The fineness of wool samples originating in
certain American states rivaled that of the supposedly finest wool in the world, which
came from eastern and central European states like Russia and Saxony. With careful
breeding that avoided the creation of hybrids, Browne argued, the United States could
easily compete with the rest of the world in wool production, for “the sheep, like the
sheep’s master, improves in this free and happy country.”365 In a letter to the Pennsylvania
Agricultural Society, Browne reported his measurements of the hair of the Rocky
Mountain goat. Because of the hair’s great fineness and strength, Browne urged the
society to lobby the federal government to promote the domestication of the goat, for
careful breeding could render the goat a competitor of “the celebrated Goats of Cashmere
& Thibet.”366 Quantification, Browne and his supporters argued, would free farmers and
manufacturers from the uncertain judgments of practical experience and provide a precise
and definite measurement of the pile’s quality.
Browne’s extraordinarily detailed studies of hair and wool depended on the many
individuals who donated pile specimens to him. His preface to the treatise on pile claimed
that “after years of untiring exertions, we have at length the largest and most valuable
known cabinet of pile.”367 This cabinet included several specimens from famous men,
364. P. A. Browne, “The Wools of Various States and Countries Compared,” The Plough, the Loom and the
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including none other than George Washington. Browne used the cross-sectional shape of
Washington’s hair as the prototype for the oval category of human pile, thus making him
the model for the hair of the white man.368 In 1851, The United States Magazine
published Browne’s trichometer measurements of a strand of hair from the first president,
then nearly 52 years in the grave. The paper noted that the strand “finally broke with the
enormous weight of 1120 grains.”369 The citizens of mid-century America surely enjoyed
the knowledge that the hair from the father of their country retained its great strength
decades after his death. Browne’s treatise included measurements and descriptions of
other eminent individuals, such as Henry Clay, Andrew Jackson, and James Madison.370
In the tradition of natural history, Browne had brought together pile specimens from a
wide variety of sources so that he could measure, compare, and classify them.
Conclusion
Browne’s natural history put him squarely in an Enlightenment mode of scientific
practice. In all of his works reviewed here, Browne emphasized the collection of facts,
and in the British empirical tradition, he mostly foreswore constructing elaborate theories
in favor of letting the facts lead him to some plausible conclusion. Many of his scientific
interests did not stop at academic questions but extended to the practical problems of how
to advance the interests of the United States in a global market system. His interest in
classifying the world’s hair and wool also revealed his intellectual debt to Enlightenment
taxonomy. Finally, and not least of all, his account of the types of mankind put him right
in the thick of the heated dispute over the unity or plurality of the human race.
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CHAPTER 7
POLITICAL REASONING
Introduction
Although interpreters of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century America
have called into question the impact of the Enlightenment in the wider society, they
generally agree that in the realm of political philosophy, Americans drew heavily from
Enlightenment thinkers, as the very words of the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution testify. This chapter attempts to demonstrate that Americans drew on more
than just Enlightenment ideas about government; Americans also applied Enlightenment
epistemology to their analysis of the relationship between state and citizen. Their methods
of argumentation thus reflected the patterns of deductive and inductive reasoning outlined
in the philosophy of mind literature.
A brief review of political treatises published in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century provides a window onto the ways in which Americans were making
use of Enlightenment epistemology to support their accounts of the nature of government
and society. In doing so, this chapter builds on the rich historiography of ideology in the
Early Republic, but instead of entering into the well-worn debate over the conflict
between republican and liberal ideologies in this period, my analysis focuses on the
particular epistemic methods that authors used to support their arguments.371 This chapter
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thus brings the history of the science of the human mind to the political history of the
Early Republic.
Universal Laws of Government
In the years following the adoption of the Constitution, a number of New England
citizens took to pulpits or pages to enunciate the universal laws that determined the
workings of governments throughout history and to show how the Constitution accorded
with these laws. Samuel F. Dickinson, Samuel W. Dana, and Nathaniel Chipman all
followed a similar method in their treatises on the nature of government. First, they
identified a principle or set of principles within man or society that explained the
operation of governments. Second, they used historical cases to demonstrate the
applicability of these principles to the establishment and maintenance of governments.
These writers thus employed a Lockean deductive method that chained intermediate ideas
together to arrive at a conclusion. Importantly, Dana and Chipman were members of the
Federalist faction in the first party system. Wary of the excesses of popular government,
Federalists generally argued for the rule of a natural aristocracy to restrain the passions of
the mob. A review of the writings of Christopher Manwaring, a Jeffersonian Republican
from Connecticut, provides an alternative account of government that employed a
Common Sense analysis of human equality and thus attacked the Federalist attempt to
institute a ruling class for the young country. Finally, Dana and Manwaring both
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employed a gendered discourse in their writings that equated sound reasoning with
masculinity. As Carroll Smith-Rosenberg has argued, Americans in the Early Republic
tended to masculinize virtues like bravery, industriousness, and self-reliance while
feminizing vices like corruption, frivolity, and wastefulness.372 Dana and Manwaring’s
accounts of reasoning utilized similar tropes.
Samuel F. Dickinson’s speech given in Massachusetts on July 4th, 1797, sought to
“show the connection of civil government with manners and taste.” Dickinson, a law
student, proceeded on the assumption that “the laws...which regulate the changes in civil
government and manners, are as fixed and certain, as those, which regulate the
revolutions of nature.”373 Civil government, he argued, arose in tandem with the manners
and taste of particular societies. Thus, “the savage, whose form of government is as
simple as his manner of life, reposes with confidence his rights, in the bosom of his chief,
or in the council of his fathers.” As civilization advanced, the form of government needed
to grow in complexity, and therefore systems of checks and balances were introduced to
frustrate the designs of “intriguing politicians.”374 Dickinson provided several historical
examples of this connection between government and manners, dwelling in particular on
how the barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire caused a decline in civilization, which
in turn led to irrational practices like the trial by ordeal.375 Only in the twelfth century,
with the rise of independent cities in Italy and the corresponding improvement in the arts
and sciences did government and taste begin to improve. Thus, Dickinson argued, only
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the “mutual aid” of government and manners could lead to sustained progress.376 He
concluded that “the connection of civil government with manners and taste is the point,
on which the scale of national happiness turns. When this balance is destroyed, either by
the too bold strides of the one, or by the rapid progress or decline of the other,
convulsions ensue, and such convulsions as rend the political soul.”377 Turning to a
contemporary example of this phenomenon, Dickinson suggested that “an ally-nation,”
presumably Revolutionary France, may have “pushed its civil government one step
farther than its social state allows.”378 Dickinson thus identified a single principle that, he
argued, governed all human societies from ancient times to the present. This principle,
the mutual dependency of government and manners, could then be applied to show the
wisdom of the framers in crafting a constitution that fit the habits and manners of the
American people and to explain the general prosperity of the country since the
Constitution’s passage.379
In a similar manner, Samuel W. Dana’s anonymously published Essay on
Political Society (1800) offered a defense of the American constitution based on a train of
reasoning from principles. This treatise represented a defense of Federalism in a state
where Jeffersonian Republicans were beginning to make gains against the strong
Federalist establishment.380 Dana began his essay by asking “the grand question, in the
republic of letters...How shall humanity be protected against despotism?”381 Happily,
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Americans, through their written constitution, had nearly achieved “the art of
permanently exerting the will of society over all the depositaries of power.”382 Dana
defended the Constitution by an appeal to social principles. Just as in the “natural world,”
in society there existed certain “forces” that needed to be balanced against each other so
as to “conduce to that order in the moral world which resembles the sublime and
beautiful in the natural.” This “reciprocity,” Dana explained, constituted the principle
which ought to govern political society.383 Dana then went on to define the forces that
were subject to this reciprocity. Echoing Locke’s call for grounding moral science in clear
and distinct ideas that could lead to mathematical certainty, Dana argued that man’s
universal “attachment to happiness” served as the “causal power” in human society akin
to the “motive force in physics.” This principle operated universally throughout societies
to effect various causes, and Dana contended that “if we could discuss ethical subjects
with the same freedom from prejudice as those which are physical, perhaps we might
eventually reason concerning moral quantities with the mathematical correctness which is
observable in natural philosophy.”384 Returning to his concept of reciprocity, Dana argued
that “justice” was achieved when “the persons interested” gave their “moral concurrence”
for some action. In this way, the human motive force of the attachment to happiness
received restraint from the law of reciprocity.385
After developing these ideas about forces and laws that operated in human
society, Dana applied this system to government. In society, Dana reasoned, the rule of
reciprocity took on two faces. First, one could demand something from another, such as
payment of a loan. Second, one could refuse the excessive demands of another, such as
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the refusal to pay to a lender more than that to which the parties originally agreed. The
operation of these two tendencies, he continued, led to the formation of two distinct
classes in society, those who “restrain and govern” and “those liable to such restraint and
government,” or, respectively, the aristocratic and democratic classes.386 Aristocrats and
democrats naturally formed two rival parties in order to protect their interests against the
other. Allow one party to triumph over the other, and either “oppressive exaction” by the
aristocrats or “fraud and licentiousness” on the part of the democrats would result. Thus,
the political system needed to set these two parties against each other, “it being certain,
that their reciprocal counter-action would restrain them mutually to the point of justice.”
The bicameral legislature adopted in the Constitution presented the solution; the Senate
would guard the rights of property, while the House of Representatives would guard the
rights of the people.387 In the same way, the various branches of government operated
reciprocally to protect their own prerogatives and, at the same time, protect the general
integrity of the political system.388 A written constitution, instituted by society itself,
could create this system, and thus, “the will of society may be permanently exerted over
all.”389
Dana supported the effectiveness of a bicameral legislature by contrasting it
favorably to the various legislative schemes adopted during the French Revolution. His
attack on this French mode of government employed a gendered analysis to reinforce his
argument. The instability of French governments, Dana argued, proved that the French
framers of the constitutional systems had failed to construct a constitution on a sound
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basis. This French experience compared particularly poorly to the success of the
American Constitution:
Whether the framers of the American constitution were
controlled by an [sic] happy necessity of political situation;
whether their profound acquaintance with the most correct
theories of government determined the frame of the system;
or whether a manly force of mind, combined with scientific
skill, aided by much personal experience, and influenced by
a respectful attention to preconceived opinions, led to a
system so original in its general structure, so intervolved in
its parts, so compacted by the association of the whole;
whether and how far any or all of these causes operated to
produce the American constitution, one thing is
certain........The citizens of the New World have abundant
cause to felicitate themselves on their political destiny. The
American nation has now a municipal legislature
constituted to “provide for the common defence and
general welfare.”390
In true empiricist fashion, Dana refused to say definitively which causes necessarily led
to the beneficial effect observed. But he suggested that the framers’ masculine reasoning
ability certainly could have contributed to the success of the American experiment.
Dana put forward a similar analysis in his discussion of the executive powers that
the president possessed under the Constitution. Rightly, he argued, the Constitution
enabled the president to conduct diplomacy with foreign nations; the president was
responsible for receiving foreign ambassadors and for appointing ambassadors to other
countries. The success of American diplomacy during the wars in Europe that followed
the French Revolution had demonstrated the correctness of the principles laid down in the
Constitution on this point. American diplomacy’s “general character” had consisted of
“temperate investigation; precision in the detail; comprehension and perspicacity in the
great; a lucid order, a manly sense, in the discussion of questions arising under the law of
390. Ibid., 102–3.
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nations as applicable within the circle of modern Europe.”391 Once again, Dana associated
clear and precise reasoning with masculinity.
The operation of the government instituted by the Constitution resembled the
grand principles of the universe uncovered by natural philosophy. Reciprocity operated
just as universally in the natural world as in the human world: “Is not this the law which
is observed in the action and reaction of all physical bodies, in all their varieties of
minuteness and grandeur?” Dana further asserted that America provided “experimental
demonstration” of the principles he had originally promulgated.392 The second part of his
essay therefore used the young republic as “an experimental commentary on principles”
which he had explicated in the first section.393 He concluded his essay with a restatement
of the principles that were confirmed by the experience of the American polity. Natural
philosophy, Dana wrote, had discovered that gravitation universally operated as an
attractive force throughout all of creation. In addition, natural philosophy had observed
the reciprocal “action and reaction of all physical bodies.” Likewise, Dana stated that his
essay had shown “that political philosophy admits to a like simplification and
universality: It recognizes one universal motive, THE ATTACHMENT TO HAPPINESS; and
one universal law, THE RULE OF RECIPROCITY.”394 Dana’s essay employed a deductive
method. Starting from two principles in human nature, he deduced the proper way for
societies to institute sound government. He then found experimental confirmation of his
ideas in the success of the young republic of the United States.
The writings of Christopher Manwaring, a Jeffersonian Republican from
Connecticut, present a contrast with the reasoning of Dana. The Federalist Dana, upon
391. Ibid., 148–50.
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reasoning from principles, had found that society naturally divided into two conflicting
classes, aristocrats and democrats. Manwaring based his arguments upon the assumption
that all men were created equal, and he thus rejected any political system that sought to
erect a division between the rulers and the ruled. He thus strongly opposed a property
requirement for the franchise.395 In his arguments, Manwaring employed a Common
Sense retort to counter Federalist salvos. In an essay on government, he first attacked the
idea that all societies contained a natural aristocracy that ought to rule over the rest of
society. “We scarce know which are most deserving of our pity, or abhorrence,”
Manwaring commented—the aristocrat who would claim the right to “sacrifice the rights
of others at the altar of his own aggrandizement,” or the man “who would meanly submit
to these aristocratical impositions.” Both of these persons, the “contemptible” man who
would voluntarily submit to this kind of “slavery” and the “inconceivably abhorant and
destestable” aristocrat who would claim power over other men, had a defect in their
mental faculties, Manwaring argued:
As the mind bowed down by slavery, loses in silence its
elastic powers—so, when it is buoyed up by folly it
becomes incapable of exerting them. Aristocrats do not
have just ideas of themselves or of others.—They
constantly look through a false medium. When they take a
view of themselves, to discover their own greatness, they
comparatively look through a convex glass, which makes
them appear near, and magnifies them to an enormous
size...But when they take a survey of those whom they call
THE PEOPLE—they shift the perspective, and look through a
concave glass, which diminishes the object.
In this passage, Manwaring drew from the discourse on Common Sense. He argued that
the aristocrats’ preconceived notion of their own superiority overwhelmed their Common
395. Christopher Manwaring, Republicanism & Aristocracy Contrasted: Or, the Steady Habits of
Connecticut, Inconsistent with and Opposed to the Principles of the American Revolution: Exhibited in
an Oration, Delivered at New-London, (Con.), July 4th, 1804, on the Celebration of American
Independence (Norwich, Conn.: Sterry & Porter, 1804), 13.
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Sense and resulted in a skewed perception of the common people. If only the aristocrats
would reflect on “the true state of their own minds,” they would find that “their minds
were as poor as Pharaoh’s lean kine.” And why did aristocrats engage in such flawed
reasoning? Manwaring argued that “It is impossible that the mind which is occupied with
titles, stars, garters and ribbons, should ever be great, the childishness of the objects
intirely destroys the man.” Remove these marks of distinction, Manwaring continued, and
they appeared “just about the size of common men.” As he concluded, “if they did not
exhibit such striking proof of their knavery and folly, we should be willing to allow them
common sense.”396 Manwaring thus symbolized the frivolity of would-be aristocrats by a
reference to pointless marks of distinction worn on a person’s dress. He explicitly stated
that concern with these superficial signs of superiority made someone less than a man, or,
in other words, emasculated them.
Manwaring reiterated these themes in an essay “On Mutual Dependance and
Independence.” He began by arguing “that neither birth, rank, equipage or wealth,
constitutes the man; but correct sentiments reduced to practice.”397 A few paragraphs
later, he declared that “reason is the distinguishing characteristick of man; and acting
agreeable to enlightened reason, is what constitutes him both great and good.”398
Manwaring went on to discuss the wants that man experienced throughout his life. Some
of these were “natural and absolutely necessary,” and others were “merely superfluous
and imaginary.” This observation led Manwaring to criticize the tendency that he
observed to devalue the contribution that farmers and manufacturers made to society. “By
what principle in philosophy or religion,” Manwaring wrote, “mankind judge that there is
396. Christopher Manwaring, Essays, Historical, Moral, Political and Agricultural (New-London, Conn.:
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more merit and attention attached to a ribbon, or piece of gauze, than to a hoe or gridiron, I am at a loss to determine. Or why there should be more honour or respect given to
the man who stands behind the counter and vends the articles, than the husbandman and
manufacturer, is equally unaccountable.” Manwaring thought he had an explanation for
this phenomenon in “the vanity of the human mind,” for when the mind “leaves real
substances, it pursues shadows; while on the flight, not unfrequently lights on equipage,
parade, and external show, and in its rage for gratification, how often is real utility
sacrificed to vanity and extravagance.”399 This analysis of honor and rank in human
society also drew from Common Sense philosophy. Reid had insisted that humans did not
perceive ideas but real, existent things outside the mind. When the mind removed its
attention from the objects of perception, it could pursue airy notions that had no relation
to the external world revealed by perception. Manwaring added to this analysis by once
again associating the mania for visible marks of distinction with the devaluation of the
professions that actually provided valuable things to society rather than merely moving
them around.
Nathaniel Chipman returned to the deduction of the operations of government
from principles in his Principles of Government (1833). A Vermont Federalist who had
served in the United States Senate, the Vermont Supreme Court, and the US District
Court for Vermont, Chipman wrote this treatise in the latter part of his life. He proceeded
to outline his views on government in a progressive historical manner. According to
Chipman, human beings possessed certain “principles” provided to them by nature that
induced them to form societies. These principles included man’s desire to associate with
other men and man’s capability of receiving impressions of the external world and of
399. Ibid., 104, 106–7.
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pleasure and pain.400 Chipman then provided a narrative of how these innate principles
led to the formation of ever more complex forms of law and government. As he argued,
“man, in an unimproved state,” had very little ability to explore the “operations of his
own mind, the extent of his powers and faculties and the result of their various
combinations.” Man could only accomplish the improvement of his mind and society
through experience, for “as in physics, no reliance can be had on reasonings a priori.”
The fleeting impressions experienced in the mind could only be investigated with
difficulty. Also, the powerful effect of “habit” on the human mind led to “bias” in sorting
through man’s experience. Thus, any improvement required a great deal of time, as the
history of the human race attested. In the beginning stages of society, for example, men’s
minds “are unable to connect private injuries with the public concerns of the nation or
tribe.” The only “practical checks” on such injuries were “hatred and revenge”; the hatred
of a man towards his assailant obliged him to take revenge on him or her. As society
progressed, however, “the multiplication of desires and objects of gratification” led to
more and more chances for men to injure one another. The old checks on injury, hatred
and revenge, could no longer serve, for the increase in men seeking to take revenge
would lead to a brutish and chaotic society. Fortunately, Chipman argued, “nature is
always equal to her occasions. Active enterprise and more extensive pursuits invigorate
and enlarge the powers of the mind, and render men equal to the task of a more extensive
legislation.” Government provided alternatives to individual acts of revenge in the form
of “reparation.”401 Thus, the human mind and society progressed together.
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This mutual progression promoted the rationalization of the polity by introducing
a measure of predictability to human relations. As Chipman explained, the individuals
who made up human societies had diverse backgrounds, interests, and predilections.
Unlike in the physical sciences, in which men could find out some of the “causes” and
“laws” of nature, human nature presented a much more complex picture. “To descend to
every situation, to every character, and thence to learn, fully, the particular influence of
motives, and the individual actions that will follow in each,” Chipman argued, “is far
beyond the reach of human sagacity.” In pursuing their various interests and passions,
men would clash with each other. “However innocent and right those interests and
pursuits may be, when considered separately,” Chipman wrote, “they will by frequent,
though unintentional, interferences and oppositions, form a scene too intricate for the
powers of the human mind to evolve.” Nature presented one solution to this exceedingly
complex problem, Chipman argued: “By the establishment of laws, which the individuals
of the community have become bound to observe, as the rules of their future conduct,
each is enabled to foresee, with a sufficient degree of certainty, the future interests and
pursuits of others.” Civil government, therefore, provided laws to regulate society
analogous to the natural laws that governed the physical world.402 Chipman’s argument
here thus paralleled Hume and Reid’s discussion of the constancy of nature. The two
philosophers attacked the problem from very different premises, but both found that
human understanding of the world and of humanity depended upon their natures
remaining constant, even if one could not definitely prove this proposition. In a similar
manner, Chipman held that law and government provided a constancy to human affairs
that society would otherwise lack. This predictability enabled humans to direct their
402. Ibid., 52–54.
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future conduct with relative confidence in their ability to tailor their means to particular
ends. In this way, Chipman also followed a similar method as Dana. Dana had found a
single motive and a single law that governed political society. Chipman did not reduce his
system to two short premises, but he did identify a number of principles inherent in
human nature that inexorably led to the rise of civil government.
Joseph Story and the Exceedingly Complex Science of Government
In 1834, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story delivered a lecture to the American
Institute of Instruction, a Boston-based organization formed to promote “the diffusion of
useful knowledge in regard to education.”403 Story’s address advocated the inclusion of
the science of government in educational curricula for young men and boys. His lecture
provided a brief outline of the nature of this science. As Story argued, the science of
government “is the most profound and exhausting of any, which can engage the human
mind.”404 This very complexity, he explained, recommended its presence in a young
man’s education. Story’s account of the science of government contrasted with the
deductive method of Dana, Chipman, and Dickinson. Indeed, Story argued for a science
of government that employed an inductive method and thus could lead only to
probabilities, not certainties. In this manner, Story drew more from the induction of
Hume and Reid instead of the deduction of Locke.
Story repeatedly emphasized the complex nature of the science of government. In
investigations into “the true ends of government, and the means, by which those ends can
be best achieved or promoted,” one needed to “reason from the imperfect experience of
the past for the boundless contingencies of the future.” Thus, one could only aim for
403. Richard B. Michael, “The American Institute of Instruction,” History of Education Journal 3, no. 1
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“nearer and nearer approximations to truth, without our ever being certain of having
arrived at it in a positive form.”405 The most respected ancient writers on government,
Aristotle and Cicero, confined themselves to the “suggestion of hints” rather than “the
formation of systems.” They refused to indulge in “the speculations of Plato,” who
discoursed only of his “own imaginary republic.” In the same way, the moderns found
little use for “the Utopia of Sir Thomas Moore, or the cold and impracticable reveries of
one of the most accomplished men of the last age, David Hume.”406 Here, Story likely
referred to Hume’s essay entitled “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” in which he laid
out a plan for the legislature, executive, and judiciary of an imaginary country.407 Such
speculations did not result in any progress, Story argued, because the science of
government “rarely admits of annunciations of universal application.” The diversity of
climates, customs, and institutions of societies across the globe prevented any
prescription for the one form of government that would satisfy every situation. Indeed,
government could be called “the science of adaptations—variable in its elements,
dependent upon circumstances, and incapable of a rigid mathematical demonstration.”408
This complexity, Story contended, gave the lie to the too common notions “that
government is a matter of great simplicity; that its principles are so clear, that they are
little liable to mistake; that the fabric can be erected by persons of ordinary skill.” In
particular, “a large survey of human experience” demonstrated that free governments
required complex structures that could provide checks and balances against the ambitions
of various parts of society, unlike tyrannical governments in which one man directed all
405. Ibid., 4.
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parts of the state.409 Story’s description of the exceedingly complex science of
government thus cast doubt upon any attempt to rationalize its study. Those who sought
to master this science could not learn a few simple principles and apply them to the
situation at hand. The science required deep and broad learning that drew lessons from
history to apply in the present.
Why would young men and boys benefit from learning the exceedingly complex
science of government? For the future statesmen of the republic, such studies were
indispensable. The science of government, with its consideration of the numerous factors
that exercised sway in political society, taught them to exercise caution and restraint in
discharging their duties under the Constitution and in making policy for a great nation
that contained a diversity of interests.410 But regular citizens without political aspirations
also required at least a basic understanding of this science. Learning about the complexity
of the science of government would lead them to consider carefully the programs
advanced by parties and ambitious politicians. Story sought reasoned and prudent change
rather than bold reforms. As he put it, “What is theoretically true, is often practically
false, or doubtful...what constitutes the true policy and security of free governments lies
not so unfrequently so distant from immediate observation and experience, that it is
rashly rejected, or coldly received.”411 The study of government would thus empower
ordinary citizens to resist the nefarious designs of demagogues who promised easy
solutions to supposed problems. Beyond these practical benefits for the health of the
republic, Story expounded on the intellectual fruits of the study of government. “There
are no studies,” Story explained, “better fitted to discipline the mind, or to accustom it to
409. Ibid., 8–9.
410. Ibid., 12–13.
411. Ibid., 16–17.

187

severe and close examination. They combine in a very high degree the speculations of
philosophy with the varied events of history, and increase the separate interest of each.”
Furthermore, the science of government taught young men to have a healthy skepticism
towards simplistic theories. “Nothing is so fascinating, and so delusive, as the simplicity
of theory, in the earlier stages of life,” Story asserted. “Nothing can have a more salutary
effect in repressing this undue pride and confidence than the study of the science of
government.” American youth would learn how useless “mere abstract speculations”
were in the practice of government; history testified to how often even the most learned
and skillful framers of governments had seen all their best laid plans fall into ruin when
confronted with political realities.412
O. A. Brownson and the Common Sense Retort
In the 1840s and 1850s, New England journalist Orestes Augustus Brownson
presented a Common Sense retort to what he saw as the rampant radicalism of the first
half of the nineteenth century. Brownson, once a member of the transcendentalist
movement in New England, converted to Catholicism in 1844 and proceeded to adopt a
highly conservative stance that denounced the radical religious and social movements
sweeping through much of the western world.
Brownson took particular issue with the Protestant emphasis on private judgment
over the authority of an established church. All of the errors of the nineteenth century, he
argued, flowed from this rejection of any authority outside of the individual. In an 1846
essay on Protestantism and transcendentalism, Brownson mounted a sustained attack on
Protestants’ rejection of the Catholic Church as a religious authority. Once Protestants
denied that the Church was a divinely established institution for promulgating the faith,
412. Ibid., 26–27.
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he explained, they had no basis for their religion outside of the private judgment of the
individual. Protestant claims for the authority of the Bible stood on no other grounds
besides that of private judgment, for the Protestant had “no external authority to decide
that the Bible is the word of God, and to declare its true sense.”413 This elevation of
private judgment “necessarily lays down the principle, that each and every man is in
himself the exact measure of truth and goodness,--the very fundamental proposition of
Transcendentalism.”414
Such faith in individual reasoning, according to Brownson, unfortunately made
men blind to the teachings of “common sense” and “experience.”415 In an 1846 essay,
Brownson lamented the rampant “speculation and experiment” in religion and politics.
The overriding attitude of the age, he observed, held that “we must borrow no light from
the past, adopt none of its maxims, and take no data from its experience.” In an apparent
attack on Locke and Hume’s theory of ideas, Brownson stated that the arrogant reformers
of the age declared that “it is not safe to affirm that black is black, for the word black
only names an idea which the past entertained, and most likely a false idea.”416 Here,
Brownson joined with the Common Sense philosophy of Reid, who argued that
properties like colors had an actual existence outside of human perception.
Brownson traced the regrettable triumph of reason over common sense and
experience to New England’s opposition to the War of 1812. Yankee ministers, he argued,
in expressing their opposition to the war, went entirely too far and declared that war was,
in principle, unlawful and immoral. This kind of abstract reasoning that ignored God’s
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sanctioning of war in the Bible and the whole history of the human race led to other
equally ridiculous radical ideas, such as antislavery. Some even took the “peace
principle” so far as to denounce George Washington as an “inhuman butcher.” Brownson
characterized the reformers’ attitude: “There was no true morality in the world before
these modern societies sprung from the womb of night, and we are required to look to a
few canting ministers, strolling spinsters, and beardless youths, as the sole authoritative
expounders of the precepts of the divine law.” Brownson further denounced these “selfconstituted guides” who attempted to instruct their fellows on “what it is safe to eat or to
drink” and “when to rise up or sit down,” as if such guidance was suddenly needed after
eons of humanity getting along well without them.417 For Brownson, it seemed like
reason had overstepped its bounds, with self-proclaimed experts submitting every idea,
not matter how commonsensical, to the test of their own reasoning.
This reliance on reason would inevitably lead to disruption and discord,
Brownson argued. In an 1848 essay, he attacked the “anarchy” that seemed to dominate
the times.418 With the rise of democratic sentiments in the early nineteenth century, it
seemed as if Americans recognized no authority as legitimate apart from public opinion.
Government, however, could not take its legitimacy from public opinion, for it often
changed with the slightest provocation, and the people often judged wrongly.419 But how
could one know that government had overstepped the bounds of sovereignty given to it
by God? Only through the determination of the Catholic Church could the citizens have a
firm authority for resisting the unjust actions of government. The countries who insisted
on the absolute separation of the Church from government necessarily descended into
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“anarchy” or devolved into “despotism,” for these countries denied the authority of God’s
established Church and raised the possibly unreliable private judgment of the people and
the rulers to the seat of authority.420 Both “reason and experience” proved that the final
court of appeal for determining the legitimacy of civil laws ought to be the Church.
Without the legitimate authority of the Church in pronouncing on the lawfulness of
governmental actions, revolutions would occur at the slightest provocation. As Brownson
argued, “if you will listen either to common sense or to the lessons of experience, you
will grant that revolutions tend only to throw men into barbarism and savagism.” No one,
he continued, could cite an instance in which the total destruction of a state’s (unwritten)
political constitution was followed by a better constitution. Brownson brought up the
American Revolution as a successful uprising that preserved rather than destroyed the
constitution of the thirteen colonies.421
Brownson made a particularly bold statement against the ascent of reason in an
1848 essay that attacked Fourierists and Associationists who were attempting to
reorganize society into a supposedly more rational form. According to Brownson, the
Associationists sought to enable each individual to follow his or her inclinations by
alleviating barriers to the free pursuit of one’s interests such as poverty. For
Associationists, man fulfilled his destiny when he fulfilled his natural desires, which
Brownson derided as “nothing but our old Epicurean philosophy, decked out in the latest
Parisian mode.”422 In order to accomplish these ends, the Associationists proposed to
organize people into “phalanxes” that would provide the necessary goods and services to
all of their members and thus allow each member to pursue freely their particular desires.
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Brownson pointed out various practical problems with the Associationists’ plan, but he
devoted particular attention to what he saw as the Associationists’ philosophical errors.
Most fundamentally, Brownson argued, the Associationists misidentified the destiny of
man. The Associationists often made analogies between humans and animals. The pig, for
example, naturally sought out food when it was hungry. Thus, according to the
Associationists, man ought to be free to fulfill his own natural desires. Brownson,
however, defended the Christian doctrine that one’s natural tendencies ought to be
controlled by reason. Furthermore, contrary to the views of the Associationists, man’s
destiny was not to obtain natural objects but to achieve salvation, a supernatural, not
natural, end. “Nature can guide us,” Brownson explained, “only on the assumption that
the end is natural,” which could not apply to man’s fate.423 Furthermore, “man is never
satisfied by the possession of the natural objects to which he is naturally drawn. All
experience proves it.”424 Satisfy every physical desire, Brownson argued, and man would
still want more. “There arise in him wants which are far too vast for nature, which swell
out beyond the bounds of the universe, and cannot, and will not, be satisfied with
anything less than the infinite and eternal God.” All men knew this fact, “a fact deep
graven on all hearts that have experience.”425 Finally, Brownson objected to the
Associationists’ focus on advancing mankind via collective action. Only through the
reorganization of society into a more rational form, the Associationists argued, could man
achieve his destiny in the world. This idea that one could improve the race only through
collective effort startled Brownson. “The species has actual existence only in
individuals,” he argued. The Associationists talked only about advancing the human race,
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“an abstraction.” Such talk amounted to blasphemy, Brownson declared, for it supposed
that salvation was beyond the reach of the individual and required collective human
effort, a barrier that God would not in justice place in front of an individual.426 This final
objection offered by Brownson thus indicted the Associationists for creating an
abstraction—the human species—which did not actually exist in the world and then
fixing their attention on the improvement of that abstraction rather than the individual.
Instead of analyzing man as man, the Associationists operated on a creature created by
reason, without an actual existence in the real world.
In Browson’s critiques against the reform impulse of the nineteenth century, he
continually turned to common sense and experience to bolster his arguments. The
arguments for antislavery and Associationism, for example, relied far too much on
abstract reasoning that neglected the lessons of common sense and experience.
Brownson’s work, then, might be seen as a counter to the deductive reasoning that the
New England Federalists employed earlier in the nineteenth century. For Brownson, too
much reliance on individual reason led to a disturbing disregard for traditional sources of
authority, such as the Catholic Church. In addition, placing personal reason above other
sources of authority resulted in a presentist arrogance that derided the thoughts and
experiences of people in the past as worthless or dangerous. In this way, Brownson
lamented, modern thinkers failed to employ the experience and common sense of the
human race in both the past and the present in crafting their analysis of humanity’s
condition. Only disaster could result from this epistemological narrowness, he argued.
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Tocqueville and the Democratic Mind
Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic examination of nineteenth-century America,
Democracy in America, provided an analysis of the “philosophical method of the
Americans” that closely resembled Brownson’s critique.427 Tocqueville’s consideration of
the workings of the human mind in a state of social equality merit attention because the
Frenchman put forward an account of the sources of intellectual authority in American
society. He also observed that Americans tended to consider very specific and particular
ideas or very general and vague ideas, with little in between.
For Tocqueville, equality of condition constituted the most important feature of
American society. Americans recognized no ranks or titles of nobility, and all citizens
possessed equal rights and privileges within the American Republic. According to
Tocqueville, this equality gave rise to “a philosophical method common to the whole
people.” He summarized the features of this method thus: “To evade the bondage of
system and habit, of family-maxims, class-opinions, and, in some degree, of national
prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of information, and existing facts only as a
lesson to be used in doing otherwise and doing better; to seek the reason of things one’s
self, and in one’s self alone; to tend to results without being bound to means, and to aim
at the substance through the form.” Tocqueville argued that he could further contain all of
these elements under the single proposition that “each American appeals only to the
individual effort of his own understanding.” In this manner, the Americans had applied
the principles of Descartes without reading him. Because a rigid class system did not
exist in America, its citizens could not look up to a superior class for their ideas. Also, the
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constant scramble for wealth and distinction in American democracy shattered the link
between generations, and therefore individuals could not look to tradition as an authority.
Finally, because all Americans stood “on an equal footing,” the individual could not turn
to his fellows as a source of authority. “It is not only confidence in this or that man which
is destroyed,” Tocqueville explained, “but the disposition for trusting the authority of any
man whatsoever.” The individual, then, had no recourse except his or her own reason.
The Americans had ended up applying Descartes’s cogito ergo sum in their reasoning on
all sorts of topics. As Brownson had argued, private judgment had become the chief
source of authority.428
But Tocqueville pointed out that American society imposed certain limits on the
operation of private judgment. First, the strong Christian roots of Anglo-America meant
that private judgment usually did not extend to questioning the truth of Christianity.
Although Americans had founded numerous Christian sects, almost no one challenged
Christianity itself. Second, in contrast to France, America had never undergone a social
revolution that rapidly introduced equality of condition into society. The Americans
“arrived upon the soil they occupy in nearly the condition in which we see them at the
present day.” Thus, America had never experienced a social upheaval that, in France, had
shaken the very foundations of authority and belief. This lack of a cataclysmic event
constituted another reason why Americans confined the operation of private judgment
only to certain spheres, while in France private judgment exercised a much broader
influence.429
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Tocqueville argued, furthermore, that the essential equality of democratic society
provided another, more important check on the operations of private judgment. Because
men in democracies all had quite similar conditions, there existed no class that the
individual could look up to for his beliefs. In addition, the individual’s confidence in his
own ability to understand meant that he distrusted “supernatural” sources of authority, or
authorities “above humanity.” Tocqueville concluded, then, that Americans “commonly
seek for the sources of truth in themselves, or in those who are like themselves.” A
strange shift in the locus of authority took place: “At periods of equality, men have no
faith in one another, by reason of their common resemblance; but this very resemblance
gives them almost unbounded confidence in the judgment of the public; for it would not
seem probable, as they are all endowed with equal means of judging, but that the greater
truth should go with the greater number.” Public opinion, then, constituted the primary
intellectual authority in democratic societies. “In the United States,” Tocqueville
explained, “the majority undertakes to supply a multitude of ready-made opinions for the
use of individuals, who are thus relieved from the necessity of forming their own.” The
individual stood powerless against this tide of public opinion, for in comparison with the
rest of society, “he is instantly overwhelmed by the sense of his own insignificance and
weakness.” Thus, ironically, the authority vested in democratic public opinion had the
potential to enslave the mind completely. The sheer force of public opinion could banish
contrary opinions from discussion, continually circumscribing the bounds of thought and
enforcing a rigid conformity on all members of society.430
Tocqueville continued his discussion of the democratic mind with an analysis of
the taste for general ideas in democratic societies like America. Equality of condition and
430. Ibid., 2:10–13.
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the lack of separate classes induced men to seek general ideas that applied to the whole of
humanity. Democratic man “cannot turn his mind to any one portion of mankind, without
expanding and dilating his thought till it embrace [sic] the whole.” This tendency,
Tocqueville argued, explained why the Americans had a greater taste for general ideas
than their English ancestors. “The English have long been a very enlightened and a very
aristocratic nation,” Tocqueville asserted, “their enlightened condition urged them
constantly to generalize, and their aristocratic habits confined them to the particular.”
Because of their sudden democratic revolution, the French displayed even more of a taste
for general ideas than the Americans. In his native land, Tocqueville explained, “I am
informed every morning when I wake, that some general and eternal law has just been
discovered which I never heard mentioned before.” But another cause, one more
insidious, operated on the democratic mind to turn its attention to general ideas. The
constant scramble for wealth and distinction that characterized democratic societies gave
rise to men who “have a great deal of curiosity and little leisure.” Because most
democratic citizens had very little time to probe the intricacies of some subject, they
preferred to make hasty generalizations based upon a cursory examination. Furthermore,
the democratic desire for “easy success and present enjoyment” led men to engage in the
less demanding pursuit of general ideas rather than the painstaking research of
particulars.431
But Tocqueville immediately followed this observation of a democratic mania for
general ideas with a discussion of why Americans questioned and resisted general ideas
in certain pursuits. In many branches of knowledge, he explained, Americans’ lack of
leisure caused them to take only a superficial view of subjects and to adopt general
431. Ibid., 2:14–19.
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notions rather than contemplate particulars. This attitude only applied, however, to those
branches of knowledge that Americans did not practice regularly. For example,
“mercantile men will take up very eagerly, and without any close scrutiny, all the general
ideas on philosophy, politics, science, or the arts, which may be presented to them.” But
offer them general ideas related to commerce, and these merchants would hesitate to
adopt them. Their daily practice of commerce introduced them to too many intricacies
and details that a general theory could never completely capture. Tocqueville went on to
argue that because Americans had a long experience in participating in government at the
local, state, and national levels, Americans tended to question the legitimacy of general
ideas in politics.432 This analysis of how practice moderated the desire for general ideas in
politics suggested an interpretation of the Federalist political treatises earlier in the
century that sought to deduce the nature of government from a few general principles
inherent in society or human nature. The New England Federalists began from the
assumption of the inequality of mankind; although the laws should apply to all citizens
equally, a natural aristocracy would always exist to rule over the masses. The practice of
American politics over the course of the nineteenth century, however, would turn in a
democratic direction that would give ordinary citizens the opportunity to practice politics
on a daily basis. These Federalists, writing at the early stages of democratic politics in
America, demonstrated a greater appetite for general ideas than democrats with
experience in politics. In addition, Tocqueville’s argument about practice moderating the
desire for general notions suggested the reason why many Americans would distrust
general ideas in agriculture, an activity that a large portion of Americans practiced.

432. Ibid., 2:21.
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Returning to his analysis of the democratic desire for generalization, Tocqueville
identified particular intellectual pursuits in which Americans displayed this tendency
most vividly. Most importantly, Americans possessed very general and expansive ideas
about religion and its account of human nature. Tocqueville explained this phenomenon
by arguing that “fixed ideas about God and human nature are indispensable to the daily
practice of men’s lives; but the practice of their lives prevents them from acquiring such
ideas.” In response to these difficulties, the Americans wisely refused to exercise their
private judgment on questions of God and human nature and instead deferred to the
authority of religion. “The first object, and one of the principal advantages, of religion,”
Tocqueville argued, “is to furnish to each of these fundamental questions a solution
which is at once clear, precise, intelligible to the mass of mankind, and lasting.” A
religion that provided these goods to its followers “imposes a salutary restraint on the
intellect.” By providing a kind of epistemological grounding, religion prevented the rise
of debilitating doubts, which if left unsolved, could easily lead men to submit voluntarily
to tyranny. When men lacked such grounding, chaos reigned within the mind. “As
everything is at sea in the sphere of the mind,” Tocqueville explained, “they determine at
least that the mechanism of society shall be firm and fixed; and, as they cannot resume
their ancient belief, they assume a master.”433 Here, we can detect a somewhat Reidian
response from Tocqueville to Humean skepticism about finding any kind of truth.
Tocqueville posited that the precepts of religion could provide the same epistemological
grounding that Common Sense did for Reid. This account of the dangers of ungrounded
private judgment also reflected Brownson’s attack on the lack of authority that he
observed all around him. In another argument that Brownson would have wholeheartedly
433. Ibid., 2:23–24.
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endorsed, Tocqueville predicted that, despite the Protestant heritage of the majority in the
United States, more and more citizens would find themselves drawn towards
Catholicism. As he observed, “equality inclines men to wish to form their own opinions;
but, on the other hand, it imbues them with the taste and the idea of unity, simplicity, and
impartiality in the power which governs society.” Americans were skeptical towards
religious authority, “but if they consent to subject themselves to any authority of this
kind, they choose at least that it should be single and uniform.” Thus, the “great unity” of
the Catholic Church provided an attractive answer to those who desired to ground their
lives in the general ideas promulgated by religion.434
The writing of history also saw the citizens of democratic countries engage in
general theorizing. In aristocratic times, Tocqueville argued, historians dwelt on the
particular personalities and decisions of great men to explain the course of history. In
contrast, democratic historians lived in a society where each individual appeared rather
insignificant, but the masses appeared great and strong. Democracy thus induced
historians to explain all the events of the past as a result of huge, impersonal forces not
subject to the will of individuals. This method not only lined up well with democratic
sensibilities but also saved historians from the effort required to trace the innumerable
effects of specific events and individuals on the past. The democratic historian “prefers
talking about the characteristics of race, the physical conformation of the country, or the
genius of civilization.” Tocqueville admitted that this attempt to find general causes in
history served to explain the movements of society in a democratic age rather well, but he
also perceived dangers in this mode of reasoning. A blinkered focus on general causes
inherent in civilization, the environment, or certain races of people had the potential to
434. Ibid., 2:33–34.
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deny human beings free will. Democratic historians thus “deprive the people themselves
of the power of modifying their own condition, and they subject them either to an
inflexible Providence or to some blind necessity.” Historical literature such as this failed
to teach men “how to command”; it could only teach men “how to obey.”435 In this
analysis, Tocqueville echoed Brownson’s disgust at how some modern thinkers denied
the free will of the individual and made the salvation of the collective human race the
primary purpose of man’s earthly existence.
Perhaps reflecting the constant activity that he observed in his travels in America,
Tocqueville’s account of the democratic mind had Americans shifting the nature of their
ideas based on the particular subject at hand. As he argued in a discussion of the “inflated
style” that American writers and orators often used, it seemed as if Americans could find
no middle ground between an obsession over details and an embrace of vague
generalities:
In democratic communities, each citizen is habitually
engaged in the contemplation of a very puny object,
namely, himself. If he ever raises his looks higher, he
perceives only the immense form of society at large, or the
still more imposing aspect of mankind. His ideas are all
either extremely minute and clear, or extremely general and
vague: what lies between is a void. When he has been
drawn out of his own sphere, therefore, he always expects
that some amazing object will be offered to his attention;
and it is on these terms alone that he consents to tear
himself for a moment from the petty, complicated cares
which form the charm and excitement of his life.436
Similarly, in a discussion of oratory in Congress, Tocqueville remarked that the speeches
of representatives often vacillated between “great general truths” that touched on the
weightiest affairs of state and “petty minutiae” which concerned only the parochial
435. Ibid., 2:103–7.
436. Ibid., 2:94.
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interests of their constituents. Tocqueville explained this curious mixture by observing
that the representative depended entirely on the approval of his constituents to maintain
his office, and his constituents demanded that the representative simultaneously pursue
the general welfare of the country while attending to the particular concerns of the
district. To make matters worse, the individual representative often had only a few
opportunities to make a speech before Congress. Each time he spoke, then, he attempted
to fit everything of importance into a brief address “so as to furnish a sort of complete
and brilliant epitome off his constituents and himself. On these terms, they will vote for
him in the next election.”437
Combining these observations of writing and oratory with his discussion of how
practice moderated the taste for general ideas, Tocqueville’s account of the democratic
mind posited that Americans moved back and forth between two epistemologies. In
pursuits that Americans practiced a great deal, such as manufacturing and politics, they
engaged in the collection of particular facts and resisted the imposition of systems or
theories. On more esoteric or difficult subjects, such as religion, human nature, and
history, the natural democratic taste for general ideas took over, and Americans eagerly
embraced ready-made systems and theories that did not require a close analysis of
particulars. On raising their view to the prospect of the human race as a whole,
Americans conceived of mankind as a single, all-powerful force animated by common
passions and steered by God’s providence.438
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Conclusion
Tocqueville’s analysis of the democratic mind provides a useful framework to
review the practice of science in America, a country that came of age in the latter stages
of the Enlightenment. Although Tocqueville did not mention Reid by name, the
Frenchman echoed several of the themes of Common Sense philosophy. Reid had argued
that all human beings of sound mind possessed an inherent Common Sense that enabled
them to search out the truth. Tocqueville observed that democratic societies took this
principle even further and gave public opinion, the sum of the workings of all the minds
in society underpinned by a Common Sense, a supreme authority. The rise of Common
Sense in the libraries and colleges of the Early Republic might therefore reflect a rapport
between Reid’s epistemology and democratic sensibilities.
Tocqueville also sheds light on the attempt to found pattern farms in the Early
Republic. The promoters of these farms, who usually did not have much experience in
farming, tended to speak of generally applicable laws of agriculture that could be
deduced from experiments on pattern farms. Representatives of working farmers, in
contrast, threw doubt upon this search for generally valid ideas in agriculture and
preferred to focus on what experience had proved useful.
Similarly, proslavery theorists hesitated to make their stand on an analogy
between the slavery of ants and the slavery of humans. As Samuel A. Cartwright argued,
the specific empirical evidence that southerners had gained from years of observation of
the black population provided enough support on its own for the defense of slavery. A
general and vague appeal to analogy felt ineffective because direct experience had
induced southerners to avoid general ideas about slavery.
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George Blackburn certainly would concur with Tocqueville’s observation of the
natural desire for easy success in democratic societies. Very few of his students were
willing to make the necessary efforts to make progress in the mathematical sciences.
Even the South Carolina government wanted a quick and cheap state map rather than a
precisely accurate one.
Finally, Tocqueville’s analysis casts doubt on the traditional interpretation of
nineteenth-century Americans as unenlightened and unconcerned with ideas. The
Frenchman did remark that Americans cared little for formal philosophy and for the
disputes between the philosophical schools of Europe.439 But he nonetheless recognized
that American society gave rise to a people with a particular philosophical method that
ranged between the minute analysis of particulars and the sweeping consideration of
generalities. As such, the Americans combined the particularism of their English forbears
with the grand abstractions of the French. Tocqueville noted the weaknesses and pitfalls
of this method, but he never questioned America’s presence in the great arena of ideas
that we now call the Enlightenment.

439. Ibid., 2:1.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The practice of science in the Early Republic constituted one of the flash-points of
the late Enlightenment. Indeed, the discourse surrounding science might represent the
most important arena of ideas in the Enlightenment, for the questions raised about science
and knowledge in this period spoke directly to the fundamental issue of how human
beings could know and understand the world.
As the records of American libraries revealed, Americans engaged in this
conversation about the nature of knowledge on a foundation of English and Scottish
epistemology, with the continental optimism of Condorcet as a significant minority view.
The philosophers that appeared in American libraries presented varying accounts of how
human beings could know. Most of these philosophers, with the obvious exception of
Condorcet, expressed nagging doubts about the ability of the human mind to achieve
definite knowledge of the external world. Epistemology in the Enlightenment raised
difficult questions; philosophers provided few settled, final answers. When discussing the
nature of knowledge about the natural world, these philosophers generally agreed that
only an empirical and inductive method could lead to any kind of truth. This empiricist
account of knowledge contained inherent uncertainty. In the most dramatic example of
these doubts, David Hume observed that one could not prove that the sun will rise
tomorrow; faith in this occurrence only resulted from unchanging observations of the
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phenomenon. Thus, although empiricism provided the only means to achieve knowledge
of the natural world, this method could never result in the certainty of deductive
reasoning or mathematical proof. The method of deduction used relations of ideas to form
a chain of reasoning. Each step in this chain had a necessary connection with the previous
step, so as long as one agreed with the premises, the deductive method could yield
definite truths akin to the unquestionable propositions of geometry. John Locke suggested
that this deductive method could prove useful in uncovering truths in moral philosophy,
but not natural philosophy.
If empirical methods could never eliminate uncertainties, then the creditability of
investigators of nature mattered a great deal for the legitimacy of knowledge. Only
credible persons could be trusted to produce true, or at least faithful, reports of the natural
world. The American discussion about pattern farms revolved around this very question
of who had the authority to make sound knowledge of agriculture. As the gentlemen who
promoted pattern farms argued, ordinary farmers had neither the time, means, nor proper
education to produce useful knowledge about farming. The exchange of hints about
farming in the agricultural press offered no solution, because no one took the various
facts reported to the press and proceeded, by induction, to find universally applicable
laws of agriculture. Pattern farms run by qualified men of science would provide the
institutional space for an empirical science that would finally lead to improvement. The
promoters of pattern farms thus attempted to shift authority in agricultural knowledge
from a loose and scattered network of farmers to centralized agricultural research
institutions that could conduct experiments and derive general laws of agriculture from
these experiments.

206

Scientific investigations were not limited to empirical accounts of the natural
world. George Blackburn attempted, with many frustrations, to convince Americans of
the importance of mathematics for advancing science in the young nation. In his
advocacy of teaching and practicing mathematics, Blackburn represented the
epistemology of Condorcet, who emphasized the construction of scientific theories
susceptible to calculation. To his continual disappointment, Blackburn found that his
mastery of the mathematical sciences did not provide him with great authority amongst
Americans. The government of South Carolina, for example, agreed with Blackburn
about the need for a state map and enthusiastically hired him to complete the task. But
instead of allowing Blackburn to perform the work as he saw fit, the government
demanded that he record numerous details about the physical resources of the state.
While Blackburn emphasized the importance of exact calculations of latitudes and
longitudes within the state, the government desired a natural history of the state. In this
case, the government was more interested in an empirical description of the land’s
features than exact mathematical calculations. Blackburn’s mathematical mastery,
therefore, did not lead to Americans conferring great authority on him.
The discovery of slavery amongst the ants raised questions about the role of
analogies in the pursuit of knowledge. Drawing from the Enlightenment empiricists’
warnings about the fragility of arguments by analogy, the supporters of slavery regarded
ant slavery as just another fact that demonstrated the natural basis of the peculiar
institution. This episode presented another instance of the American adoption of an
empirical epistemology that advocated the use of inductive reasoning to pursue truth. The
proslavery theorists, for example, preferred to base their case on a long list of
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observations drawn from experience living among the black race rather than a speculative
argument by analogy. Authority in questions about slavery, the proslavery theorists
argued, should derive from knowledge of human nature (particularly the nature of blacks)
and human history rather than knowledge of the natural history of animals. The behavior
of animals had little to teach human beings about how they should conduct themselves,
for an analogy between the human mind and animal instinct could not hold.
The scientific work of Peter A. Browne demonstrated the practice of empirical
principles in the pursuit of natural historical knowledge. Throughout his writings,
Browne hesitated to develop theories without first gathering as many facts as possible.
Only after this collection of facts could he proceed to employ induction to suggest the
true origin of meteors, for example. He attempted to make sense of hair and wool by
developing a system of classification that required the careful measurement and
observation of a sample’s qualities. This taxonomic practice further underscored
Browne’s commitment to an empiricism that sought the exhaustive collection of facts
about the various kinds of hair and wool. Some advocates of agricultural improvement
saw Browne’s measurements of the wool of sheep as authoritative analyses that would
lead to progress in American sheep breeding. His precise measurements, the agricultural
improvers argued, provided a much more credible judgment of the wool’s quality than
common methods that relied on the look and feel of the wool.
The operations of reason in the political tracts of the Early Republic presented a
contrast to the mostly inductive method of investigating the natural world. Although
several authors, including Orestes Augustus Brownson and Christopher Manwaring,
turned to the lessons of history and Common Sense to understand politics and society, the
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New England Federalists, following in the footsteps of John Locke, adopted a deductive
method that proceeded from first principles to uncover the universal laws that governed
politics and society. The political reasoning of the Early Republic, then, revealed a clash
between inductive and deductive methods. Commentators such as Brownson and
Tocqueville discussed the diffuse and confused nature of authority in America. The
mostly free reign of private judgment in America gave rise to a society in which nothing
seemed settled, and the lack of a stable center of authority led to constant
experimentation in thinking about politics and society.
As revealed in the practice of both the natural and human sciences, Americans
found themselves in the thick of the transatlantic Enlightenment discussion about the
nature and limits of knowledge and authority. The English and Scottish empiricists had
recognized the inherent uncertainty of knowledge, especially knowledge gained through
sensory experience. Their investigations into knowledge had left many questions open
even as they constructed frameworks to structure the human understanding. Scientific
practice in the Early Republic confronted these thorny questions, and Americans
attempted to sort through them. Americans engaged in a continual disputes over which
persons and methods had authority to produce sound knowledge about the world. In the
end, Americans’ struggles with these questions placed them squarely within the arena of
ideas that we now call the Enlightenment. Like many of the other participants in the
Enlightenment, Americans produced very few settled answers to these questions.
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